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INTRODUCTION

The Tenth Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
grants to Congress the power "[tlo define and punish... Offenses
against the Law of Nations.. . ." Rarely cited by the Supreme

Court, relied upon in only a handful of cases, the Offenses Clause
has been the subject of minimal scholarly commentary, with no
analysis of its full significance. Yet the long-ignored Clause lies at
the heart of the dispute over federalism and foreign affairs and is
central to a hotly debated constitutional issue: the federal
government's authority, pursuant to the foreign affairs power, to
regulate areas traditionally governed by the states.
Properly understood, the Offenses Clause grants Congress
exceptional powers to incorporate international law into federal
law, even when such norms infringe upon areas otherwise regulated
by the states. The failure to understand the broad authority
contained in the Offenses Clause, and its role in the battle over
federalism and foreign affairs, has hampered full understanding of
the federal government's foreign affairs powers. The Offenses
Clause provides heretofore unrecognized support for a broad
interpretation of that power, support rooted not in the structural
implications of the Constitution, but in a specific, enumerated
constitutional power.
Although federal dominance over foreign affairs has long been an
accepted pillar of our constitutional structure, tensions about the
source and extent of that power have been ever present. These
disputes have a new significance today, when the nature of
international relations has changed dramatically. Contacts among
nations are no longer dominated by trade, diplomacy, and war, and
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 [hereinafter Offenses Clause]. The full text of Clause 10
grants Congress the power "[to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations."
I have modernized the spelling of "offence" to "offense" throughout. I also use the modern

term"international law" as a synonym for the"law ofnations." Known as the "law of nations"
in the eighteenth century, "[niowadays, the terms the law of nations and internationallaw
are used interchangeably." MARK W. JANS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(1988); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES pt. I, ch. 2, introductory note at 41 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]

(discussing the "the law of nations, later referred to as international law").
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are no longer conducted by governments and merchants along welldefined paths. Individuals, local governments, and nations now
communicate directly and almost instantaneously across international borders. Increased interactions have led to increased
interdependence, and to the recognition that the internal policies of
one nation impact directly on its immediate neighbors, its region,
and even the world. In a striking response to the international
concern about domestic actions, the world communityhas developed
detailed norms prohibiting international human rights violations
committed by government officials within their own national
borders and against their own citizens. Over the past decade,
violations of such rights have led to international criminal
prosecutions, 2 as well as to wars such as the recent military action
in Kosovo.3
This expansion of the terrain governed by international law and
of the range of players participating directly in foreign relations
poses a challenge to our interpretation of the foreign affairs power.
Several scholars have argued in recent articles that federal
authority to implement international law obligations is subject to
limits imposed by federalism, and that the federal government
should not maintain exclusive constitutional power over the
implementation of international law, given the evolution of that law
to regulate formerly domestic matters. Peter Spiro and Curtis
Bradley, for example, both stress the fading distinction between
domestic and foreign affairs. Spiro argues that the doctrine of
2. In the first criminal prosecutions for international crimes since World War II,
international tribunals were established by the U.N. Security Council to prosecute war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. See
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprintedin
33 I.L.M. 1598 (establishing a tribunal for Rwanda); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217 mtg., Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 1203 (establishing a tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia). A treaty establishing a permanent International Criminal Court is now
open for signature and ratification, to take effect when ratified by 60 nations. See Rome

Statute ofthe International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, art. 126, 37 I.L.M. 999.
3. See Joint Statement on Kosovo, 35 WEEKLY CoMp. PRES. DoC. 711 (Apr. 23, 1999)

(describing the military action against the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia as aimed at ending
ethnic cleansing and other violence and protecting "universal human rights and freedoms"
in Kosovo); Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 516, 516-17
(Mar. 24, 1999) (describing air strikes as a "moral imperative," aimed, in part, to halt Serb

attacks "on a largely defenseless people").
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exclusive federal control over foreign affairs "was once appropriate,
even imperative, but is fast becoming obsolete" in the face of
increasing state and local government activities in the international
arena. 4 Bradley criticizes what he calls "foreign affairs exceptionalism," and urges the application of "the usual constitutional
restraints" to federal foreign affairs decisions. 5 He concludes that
federal foreign affairs powers should be subject to the limitations
imposed by the states' primary responsibility for domestic
where domestic actions implicate foreign policy
affairs-even
6
.
concerns
Questions about the viability of an exclusively federal foreign
affairs powers are heightened by the Supreme Court's revived
emphasis on states' rights. In a rapid series of cases over the past
several years, the Court has limited Congress's power to legislate
pursuant to both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment,7 and has redefined structural limits on the federal
power to impose mandates on the state governments. 8 These
4. Peter J. Spiro, ForeignRelations Federalism,70 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1223, 1225 (1999).
He insists that state and local governments are capable ofinteracting directly with foreign
nations and of playing an important role on the international stage. See id.
5. Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 539 n.51, 555-56 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, Breard]
(decrying"foreign affairs exceptionalism," defined as "the view that the usual constitutional
restraints on the federal government's exercise of power do not apply in the area of foreign
affairs"). Bradley argues that separate standards for review of domestic and foreign affairs
are unfounded because the sharp distinction between them that existed in prior centuries
has now faded. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty PowerandAmericanFederalism,97 MICH.
L. REV. 390,461 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley, The TreatyPower];see alsoJack L. Goldsmith,
FederalCourts,ForeignAffairs,and Federalism,83 VA. L. REV. 1617,1622-23 (1997) (noting
that "the category of foreign relations" now includes "matters traditionally regulated by
states in which the states have a genuine interest"); G. Edward White, Observationson the
Turning of ForeignAffairs Jurisprudence,70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1114-16, 1123 (1999)
(predicting that the sharp separation between domestic and foreign affairs will fade, given
that foreign affairs are no longer limited to the "international geopolitical relations of the
United States").
6. See Bradley, The Treaty Power,supra note 5, at 460-61.
7. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1754, 1758-59 (2000) (Commerce
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-29 (1997)
(Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (Commerce
Clause).
8. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that the federal government
cannot, under Article I, abrogate states"immunity from suits in their own courts); College
Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,672-75 (1999)
(limiting federal authority, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to abrogate states' immunity
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federalism decisions have the potential to alter the definition of
state sovereignty within the federalist paradigm. This shift in the
constitutional landscape has given rise to additional doubts about
the future of the federal foreign affairs power, where federal efforts
to enforce international obligations intrude into areas otherwise left
to state control. 9
The Offenses Clause, the only reference to international law in
the Constitution, sheds important light on the scope of the foreign
affairs powers of Congress and of the federal government in
general. An analysis of the Clause supports the conclusion that the
framers delegated extraordinary foreign affairs powers to Congress,
far broader than those granted on the domestic front. In this sense,
the framers understood foreign affairs to be different from other
issues facing the nation, justifying exceptional federal powers in
order to centralize and regularize our interactions with the rest of
the world. In addition, the Offenses Clause provides strong
constitutional support for a wide range of congressional actions
heretofore based on less specific constitutional powers. Finally, an
understanding of the context in which the Clause was adopted and
the concerns that it addressed undercuts claims that international
law, or even foreign affairs, should be limited to the kinds of
international problems confronting the framers in the eighteenth
century. To the contrary, the framers understood that the law of
nations would evolve in ways that they could not control or predict;
to read limits into the federal government's ability to respond to
evolving notions of international law would frustrate the purpose
of the foreign affairs power in general, as well as the Offenses
Clause itself.
To consider an example to which I will return later in this
Article, much of the international community considers the
execution of defendants who committed their crimes as juveniles to
in federal court); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627,634-39 (1999) (same); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (prohibiting
federal government from commandeering states to administer federal programs).
9. Bradley argues that the Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding unconstitutional
interference with states' rights "at least raise the question of whether similar restrictions
might apply in the area of foreign affairs." Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign
Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1100 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, New Foreign
Affairs Law]; see Bradley, The Treaty Power,supra note 5, at 399-40.
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violate international law."° The United States has declined to join
the near consensus on this issue, refusing to be bound by the
customary international law prohibition of capital punishment of
juveniles, or to ratify a provision in an international treaty that
incorporates this norm. If the President and Congress changed their
view as to this rule, indicating that they accepted the customary
norm, the international community would view the prohibition as
binding upon the United States. Could Congress then enact
legislation prohibiting state executions of convicted killers who
committed their crimes as juveniles, or would such a statute
intrtide upon state powers in violation of the Constitution?
Congress's constitutional power to act on this issue could be
based on the implied incorporation of international law into federal
common law, or on powers implied from the very structure of our
government: the federal government controls our relations with
foreign States," including the implementation of international law
within this country. The Offenses Clause, however, offers a far
more direct constitutional source for congressional authority to
implement an international law obligation. By its terms, the Clause
authorizes Congress to define violations of international law and
impose sanctions for those violations. In barring the juvenile death
penalty, Congress would be defining capital punishment under such
conditions as a violation of international law, and declaring it a
federal offense to act in conflict with the international norm.
The dearth of interest in the Offenses Clause, and the failure to
recognize its relevance to the federalism and foreign affairs debate
or to the particular question posed here, is largely a result of the
unexamined assumption that the Clause is limited to the power to
define crimes and to impose criminal sanctions. The few
commentators to analyze the Clause in depth have assumed,
without discussion, that it is limited to penal sanctions. 2 The
10. See infranotes417-26 and accompanyingtext(discussingthejuvenile deathpenalty).
11. I capitalize "State" throughout to refer to a sovereign nation, while "state" refers to
one of the U.S. states.
12. See Charles D. Siegal, Deference and Its Dangers: Congress' Power to 'Define...
Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 866-67 (1988)
(describing the Clause as "permitting Congress to define violations of customary
international law as domestic crimes") (emphasis added); Howard S. Fredman, Comment,
The Offenses Clause:Congress' InternationalPenalPower, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279
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Supreme Court has never addressed this question, and the handful
of cases in which the Court has relied on the Offenses Clause all
concern criminal statutes such as laws penalizing piracy or war
crimes."3 Congress itself, however, has twice cited the Offenses
Clause in support of the much broader power to regulate civil
liability in cases touching upon international law: Congressional
reports cite the Clause as support for the authority to determine
when foreign sovereigns can be sued in U.S. courts, 14 and for the
power to create civil liability for certain international human rights
15
violations.
A close examination of the text of the Offenses Clause, the
historical context in which it was drafted, and the constitutional
structure of which it is a key part, demonstrates that the Clause
was not-and should not be-limited to criminal prosecutions. As
used in the Offenses Clause, "offenses" encompasses all violations
of international law, regardless of whether criminal or civil
sanctions apply, and the power to "define and punish" includes the
power to impose civil or criminal regulations and sanctions.
Moreover, the constitutional language is not limited to the
particular international law norms existing at the time the
Constitution was ratified, or to any categories indicated by the
types of violations recognized in the eighteenth century, but rather
evolves over time as international law continues to develop.
Properly understood, the Clause authorizes broad congressional
regulation of all activities governed by modern international law.
The decision to grant Congress this power to address both criminal
and civil violations of that law, as it evolved, reflected a strong
commitment to the enforcement of international law and a firm
(1969) (reflecting this assumption in the title); Zephyr Rain Teachout, Note, Defining and
PunishingAbroad:ConstitutionalLimits on the Extraterritori
alReachoftheOffenses Clause,
48 DUKE L.J. 1305, 1310-14, 1316, 1320, 1324, 1326, 1331 (1999) (limiting discussion to
international jurisdictional rules applicable to crimes); see also infra notes 22-45 and
accompanying text (examining the dispute over the breadth of the Offenses Clause).
13. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
14. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,6610-11

(listing the Offenses Clause as one basis of congressional constitutional authority to enact
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 12 (1976) (same).
15. See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5-6 (1991) (listing Offenses Clause as one basis of
Congress's power to enact the Torture Victim Protection Act).
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decision to place control over its implementation in the hands of the
federal government.
Recognition that the Offenses Clause authorizes civil as well as
criminal liabilities also sheds new light on the debate about the
constitutional foundation of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),' 6 a
statute that has been applied to authorize civil litigation for human
rights violations. 7 The language of the ATCA reflects the concerns
underlying the Offenses Clause, suggesting both that the Clause
was seen by the founding generation as applying to civil litigation
and that it provided constitutional authorization for the statute.
This strong foundation puts to rest questions about the
constitutionality of the statute.

As an initial effort to understand the import of a long-ignored
constitutional provision," much of this Article focuses on the likely
significance of the Clause to the generation who drafted, ratified,
and struggled to implement the Constitution-a group of actors to
whom I refer collectively as the "framers."' I consciously define my
efforts as a search for the significance of the Offenses Clause to
encompass several distinct objectives: the "meaning" of the
language at the time it was drafted; the "intent" of those who chose
those particular words at the Constitutional Convention; and the
"understanding" of the Clause by "the Constitution's original
readers'-the "citizens, polemicists, and state convention delegates"
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
17. See infra notes 301-20 and accompanying text.
18. With lawyers-as-historians under scathing attack, I emphasize that this is primarily
a work of legal scholarship, reviewing a large body of legal material and more limited
historical sources, in order to reach thoroughly modem legal conclusions as to the powers
afforded to Congress by the Offenses Clause. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History 'Lite" in
Modern American Constitutionalism,95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 525 (1995) ("[Clonstitutional
discourse is replete with historical assertions that are at best deeply problematic and at
worst, howlers."); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse offHistoy in the War PowersDebate,
70 U. CoLO.L. REv. 1169, 1169-70 (1999) (summarizing criticism of the methodology of "law
office history" and "the use of history in foreign affairs scholarship).
19. Notto be confused with"the Framers," the smaller group ofmen who actually drafted
the Constitution, although they, of course, were key players in my broader group of
"framers."
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who participated in the ratification process.20 None of these can be
isolated and defined with precision in any constitutional study; less
so here, where the historical record contains only a few scattered
references to the actual language of the Clause. On the bright side,
however, the record is replete with comments about the broader
topics to which the Clause refers: the relationship of international
legal standards to domestic law, and the blurred line between civil
and criminal offenses and the sanctions appropriate for each. Of
course, the participants at the Constitutional Convention and state
ratifying conventions, as well as their contemporaries, held a
"bewildering array" of views about the document they drafted and
eventually adopted. 2 ' The available history can, at best, identify a
range of views, rather than firm definitions.
My focus on the framers does not imply that I view their
intentions as definitive, but rather that the likely original
understandings of the Clause, to the extent that we can uncover
them, serve as a point of departure for a project aimed at
understanding its modern-day import. I undertake two interrelated
enterprises in this Article, asking first what the framers might have
understood and intended, and then exploring what that signifies for
us today. My goals are to articulate a coherent interpretation of the
Offenses Clause, and to examine the issue of federalism and the
foreign affairs power in light of this new understanding of the
Clause.
With these goals and caveats in mind, I begin in Part I with an
overview of the modern dispute about the breadth of the Offenses
Clause, as reflected in the sparse case law, commentary, and
congressional references to the long-overlooked constitutional
provision. To understand the likely significance of the Clause to the
framers, Part II starts with a review of the commitments to
international law and international obligations that played a key
role in the decision to redraft the terms of the Confederation and to
design a government capable of enforcing the law of nations. The
record of the drafting and ratification debates reflects the
20. Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (OrTo It), 65 FORDHAmL. REv. 1587,159495 (1997).
21. See JACKN.RAKOVE, ORIGINALMANINGS:POLITICSANDIDEASINTHEMAEINGOFTHE

CONSTrUTION 6 (1996).
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widespread understanding that the best means to achieve that goal
was to vest control over foreign affairs in the federal government.
I then examine the adoption of the Offenses Clause, the only
constitutional provision to actually mention the law of nations. The
scant information available about the Clause indicates that it
represented one means of implementing the framers' oftenexpressed commitment to federal enforcement of international law.
Part III analyzes the minimal case law applying the Offenses
Clause in the ensuing two centuries. Although brief, the record
nevertheless indicates that the Clause is capable of a broad
application-one that supports the special role of foreign affairs
within our constitutional structure.
In Part IV, I address the fundamental dispute about whether the
Clause authorizes civil responses to violations of international law,
or is limited to criminal penalties. I frame the question by exploring
the meaning of "offenses against the law of nations" in the late
eighteenth century, demonstrating that such offenses encompassed
a broad range of infractions calling for an equally broad range of
civil and criminal remedies. I then analyze the language of the
Clause, refuting the unsupported assumption that the use of the
terms "offenses" and "punish" limit the Clause to criminal
prosecutions. Next, I analyze the broad powers granted to Congress
under an accurate understanding of the Offenses Clause. Applying
this interpretation to a historical constitutional puzzle, the origins
of the ATCA, I show that the framers themselves understood the
full implications of the Offenses Clause.
Finally, I examine the Offenses Clause in its constitutional
context in Part V. The Clause has fallen into relative neglect
because Congress has legislated on international law issues through
several other powers, and because of the mistaken view that the
Clause is limited to criminal offenses. An understanding of the
breadth of the Offenses Clause, however, provides a more accurate
view of the foreign affairs powers of Congress, and of the federal
government overall. Moreover, linking Congress's control over
international law to a specific constitutional provision responds to
federalism concerns raised in recent articles. Applying the
reinvigorated Offenses Clause to modern constitutional debate, I
conclude that the Constitution, through the Offenses Clause,
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authorizes Congress to implement this country's international law

obligations, even when such obligations require regulation of areas
otherwise delegated to the control of the states.
Challenges to the scope of the foreign affairs powers come during
an unprecedented explosion of international interaction and
interdependence. Ironically, a narrow view of the foreign affairs
power, based on a misguided application of federalism principles,
threatens to pull the United States away from universal application
of international law norms at the same time that economic,
political, and social concerns increase the need for uniform
enforcement of those norms in our interactions with individuals,
corporations, and governments around the world. Fortunately, our
Constitution anticipated the likelihood of dramatic changes in the
scope of international law and granted our federal government the
powers necessary to lead the nation into the interconnected world
we inhabit today.
I. THE MODERN DISPUTE OVER THE MEANING OF THE OFFENSES
CLAUSE

The sparse academic commentary on the Offenses Clause
generally has assumed without discussion that the provision
applies only to impose criminal penalties. The only two articles
devoted entirely to the Clause, both student comments, assume that
it is limited to penal powers." A third article, with a substantial
section detailing the history of the Clause, states the crimes-only
assumption in its first paragraph, describing the Clause as
"permitting Congress to define violations ofcustomary international
law as domestic crimes."23 Prior to 1993, I have uncovered only one
reference to the question of whether the Clause is limited to
criminal sanctions: one sentence of a 1944 law review article in
22. One, a 1969 student comment, reflects the assumption in its title, "The Offenses
Clause: Congress' International Penal Power." Fredman, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
The second limits its analysis throughout to international criminal law. See Teachout, supra
note 12.
23. Siegal, supra note 12, at 867 (emphasis added). Quincy Wright discussed the broad
meaning of "offenses against the law of nations" in a 1945 article concluding that the
Offenses Clause provides constitutional authorization for U.S. trials of war criminals. See
Quincy Wright, War Criminals,39 AM. J. INTL L. 257, 261, 279-82 (1945).
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which the author concludes emphatically, but with virtually no

discussion, that the Clause "relates wholly to acts of a criminal
nature."' One 1993 article does argue that the Clause authorizes
noncriminal regulation, with a brief discussion focused on the use
of the word "define" in the Clause.2 5 In addition, a handful of law
review articles have noted the issue in passing, but have not
attempted to analyze the issue in context, or to review the history
of the Clause, its likely meaning at the time of the framing of the
Constitution, or Supreme Court cases applying the Clause.26

24. Charles Pergler, ConstitutionalRecognitionoflnternationalLaw,
30 VA.L.REv. 318,
325 (1944). Pergler gave two reasons for his conclusion. First, he pointed to the placement
ofthe Offenses Clause in the same provision as the power to define piracy and felonies on the
high seas. See id. For a discussion of this argument, see infra notes 292-96 and accompanying
text. Second, he relied on the use of the word 'offense" to refer to a felony or misdemeanor
in an obscure Kentucky statute. Offense was indeed frequently used to refer to crimes, but
was also often used in a much broader sense; the fact that "offense" is limited to "crime" in
one particular state statute is irrelevant to the understandingofthe constitutional language.
See infra notes 194-227 and accompanying text.
25. As stated by Posner and Spiro, the Offenses Clause includes the power to define civil
offenses and to prohibit certain conduct:
The Framers... viewed Congress's authority to "define" and "punish"offenses
against the law of nations as separate powers. Congress could define offenses
without necessarily proscribing criminal penalties for them. This power to
declare "civil" offenses or simply prohibit conduct violating international law
provides Congress with the flexibility to deal with various types of offenses
against international law. Vhile such acts as piracy and hijacking are natural
candidates for criminal sanctions, violations of international law by state
governments require more sensitive treatment. In this context, simple
prohibitions are more appropriate than criminal penalties butno less consistent
with the Offenses Clause authority.
Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States Ratification of the
Covenanton Civil and PoliticalRights: The InternationalHuman Rights ConformityAct of
1993, 42 DEPAULL. REv. 1209, 1224-25 (1993).
26. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, BringingInternationalLaw Home, 35 Hous. L. REv.
623, 665-66 & n.211 (1998) (stating without discussion that the Offenses Clause provides
support for the Torture Victim Protection Act); Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw
Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1831 n.40, 1843-44 n.105 (1998) [hereinafter
Koh, Is InternationalLaw State Law?] (concluding without discussion that several civil and
criminal statutes rest upon the Offenses Clause); Donald J. Kochan, Note, Constitutional
Structureas a Limitationon the Scope ofthe 'Law ofNations" in the Alien Tort ClaimsAct,
31 CoRNELLINT'L L.J. 153, 180 n.161 (1998) (stating in a footnote that he takes no position
on the question of whether the Offenses Clause is limited to defining criminal offenses); see
also Yoav Gery, Note, The Torture Victim ProtectionAct: RaisingIssues of Legitimacy, 26
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 597, 597-98 (1993) (quoting concerns about the civil
application of the Offenses Clause raised in Senate hearings and by dissenting Senators).
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The basic criminal power deriving from the Clause is undisputed.
The Supreme Court has relied on the Offenses Clause in a handful
of cases, upholding congressional power to criminalize counterfeiting of foreign securities, 27 war crimes,2" and conduct threatening
foreign diplomats in the United States.29 In addition, the Supreme
Court has several times described the Offenses Clause as one of the
few explicit penal powers granted to Congress, making the point
that the inclusion of explicit penal powers did not negate the
existence of analogous implicitpowers. ° In the first such reference,
Chief Justice Marshall wove a discussion of the Offenses Clause
into his famous explication of the broad reach of the "necessary and
proper" clause in McCulloch v. Maryland.1 The Constitution,
Marshall noted, expressly authorized Congress to punish
counterfeiting, piracy, felonies on the high seas, and offenses
against the law of nations. 2 However, "[a]ll admit" that the United
States has the power to punish any violation of its laws through the
penal code. 3 The existence of the express grant of authority did not
negate the existence of the broader, implicit right to enforce the law
through the imposition of penal sanctions, even though such a
power was, strictly speaking, not "necessary" to the exercise of the
related constitutional powers. 34
Although the Court has not relied on the penal power granted by
the Offenses Clause, Congress has cited the Clause in support of its
authority to define civil claims. In enacting the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA),35 Congress relied on several Article I
powers, including the power to define offenses against the law of
27. See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 483-87 (1887).
28. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 355 n.22 (1952); Hirota v. MacArthur,
338 U.S. 197,199-215 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946);
Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
29. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316, 323 (1988).
30. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 169 (1927); Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263, 283 (1892); United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 345-46 (1878); Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457,535-36 (1870); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,233
(1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416-17 (1819).
31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 416-17.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 416.
34. See id. at 417-18.
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1994).
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nations. 6 The FSIA provides for federal court jurisdiction over all
claims against sovereign States, details the procedures applying to
such cases, and lists the circumstances in which the States'
sovereign immunity is waived. In upholding the constitutionality of
the FSIA, the Supreme Court has twice noted, without comment,
congressional reliance on the Offenses Clause as a constitutional
basis for this civil statute.
The Offenses Clause has also been cited by Congress as authority
for the enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)."8
The TVPA creates a federal civil cause of action for damages for
torture and extrajudicial execution.3 9 The Senate report accompanying the statute relied on two sources for its constitutional
power to enact the statute. The report first cited Congress's power
to confer jurisdiction on U.S. courts to recognize claims arising
under international law,4 ° noting in a footnote that cases under the
TVPA "raise legal issues-such as interpretations of international
law-that are matters of Federal common law and within the
particular expertise of Federal courts."4 '
Second, the report stated: "Congress' ability to enact this
legislation also drives from article I, section 8 of the Constitution,
which authorizes Congress 'to define and punish . . . Offenses
against the Laws of Nations."'4 In Senate testimony, however,
representatives of the Bush administration challenged this
interpretation of the Offenses Clause:
The reference in the constitutional text to "punish[ing] Piracies
and Felonies ... and Offenses" suggests that the Founders
36. See H.R. REP.No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 6604,6610-11
(listing the Offenses Clause as one basis of congressional constitutional authority to enact
the FSIA); S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 12 (1976) (same).
37. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,436 (1989);
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 n.19 (1983).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994); see S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5-6 (1991) (listing the
Offenses Clause as one basis of constitutional authority for enactment of TVPA). The TVPA,
enacted in 1991 as a note to the ATCA, creates causes of action for official torture and
extrajudicial execution.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note at § 2(a).
40. See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5-6.
41. Id. at 6 n.6.
42. Id. at 5-6 (alteration in original).
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intended that Congress use this power to define crimes. It is a
difficult and unresolved question, therefore, whether that power
extends to creating a civil cause of action in this country for
disputes that have no factual nexus with the United States or
its citizens.4"
The administration's argument was quoted by two Senators in a
minority report suggesting that the legislation "possibly exceeds
Congress' constitutional authority."" The Senators continued, "In
short, we simply do not agree with the contention in the majority
views that Congress 'clearly has authority to create a private right
of action for torture and extrajudicial killings committed
abroad.' . . . We must concur with the Department of Justice's
reservations about the constitutionality of this statute."45
The question of the scope of the Offenses Clause, therefore, was
posed at the time of the passage of the TVPA in 1992. It is
undisputed that the Offenses Clause authorizes Congress to enact
criminal statutes penalizing conduct that violates the law of
nations. The broader meaning of the Clause, however, becomes
clear from an analysis of its place within the constitutional
structure and the meaning of its language at the time of the
framing.
II. AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The dearth of attention given to the Offenses Clause over the
past 200 years contrasts sharply with the weight given to the issues
it addresses by the framers. Although the Clause triggered little
recorded debate or discussion at the Constitutional Convention or
at the ratification assemblies, this relative silence reflected general
unanimity about the importance of the powers conferred on the
national government, rather than disinterest. To the contrary, the
need for a central government capable of holding accountable those
responsible for violations of international law was a main impetus
43. Torture Victim ProtectionAct of 1989:Hearingson S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before the
Subcomm. on ImmigrationandRefugeeAffairs ofthe SenateJudiciaryComm., 101st Cong.,
13-14 (1990) (prepared statement of John 0. McGinnis, Department of Justice) (alteration

in original).
44. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 13 (Minority Views of Messrs. Simpson and Grassley).
45. Id. at 14.
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to the framing of the Constitution. The Offenses Clause assigned
exactly that power to the federal government. The Clause cannot be
understood without reviewing the assumptions about international
law, federalism, and foreign affairs of those who adopted it. As has
been well documented, the framers consistently expressed a strong
commitment to a federal government that would regulate domestic
enforcement of international law norms. Given the paucity of
language in the Constitution expressing this commitment, it is
likely that the Offenses Clause was intended to play a major role in
enabling the federal government to enforce compliance with the
nation's international law obligations.
A. The Binding Importanceof the Law of Nations
The Constitution was written by a prepositivist generation who
believed that unwritten laws were binding on nations and
individuals alike. They viewed these fundamental, binding rules-as
founded upon "maxims and customs ... of higher antiquity than
memory or history can reach."46 As sources for these rules, the
framers and their peers looked to both reason and morality, finding
no inherent conflict between the two.' Basic notions of the rights
and obligations of governments and individuals were understood to
be "distilled from reason and justice through the social and
governmental compacts."48
The law of nations was one component of this common law,
binding upon nations and their citizens, and regulating virtually all
interactions between the governments and citizens of different
States. As defined by Blackstone,
The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural
reason, and established by universal consent among the
civilized inhabitants ofthe world; in order to decide all disputes,
to regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and to insure the
observance ofjustice and good faith, in that intercourse which
46. 1 WILIAm BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARiES *67.

47. See Jules Lobel, The Limits ofConstitutionalPower:ConflictsBetweenForeignPolicy
and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071,1078-83 (1985) (describing the framers' reliance
on both natural law, founded in morality, and common law, based in reason).
48. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 77
(1992).
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must frequently occur between two or more independent states,
and the individuals belonging to each.49
Such intercourse included "mercantile questions, such as bills of
exchange and the like," "all marine causes, relating to freight,
average, demurrage, insurances, bottomry, and others of a similar
nature," the "law-merchant" and "disputes relating to prizes, to
shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills," along with safeconducts, passports, the rights of ambassadors and their employees,
and piracy.5 ° The law of nations thus governed commerce as well as
diplomacy, business as well as war.
In the absence of treaties or other agreements, this enormous
area of international interaction was to be governed by the
unwritten law, equally available to and equally binding upon all
nations of the world.51 Moreover, as the law of all nations, no one
State could tamper with or amend its content. "Whence, as this law
is immutable, and the obligations that arise from it necessary and
indispensable, nations can neither make any changes in it by their
conventions, dispense with it in their own conduct, nor reciprocally
release each other from the observance of it."5 2 By obtaining its
independence, the United States became bound by this existing
body of laws. "The law of nations, although not specially adopted by
the constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the
law of the land. Its obligation commences and runs with the
existence of a nation .... "53
49. 4 BLACKSTONE, supranote 46, at *66.

50. Id. at *67-73.
51. See E. DEVATTEL, THE LAWOFNATIONS vii (Joseph Chitty ed., new ed., Philadelphia,

T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1876) (1758).
52. Id. at Iviii.
53. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (Edmund Randolph). In the words of the first Chief

Justice John Jay, echoing those of Attorney General Randolph, "[Tihe UnitedStates had, by
taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations."

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
The framers repeatedly stated that the law of nations was part of the law of the United
States. See Stewart Jay, The Statusof the Law ofNations in EarlyAmerican Law, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 819, 825-28 (1989) (quoting Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Charles Lee,
among others). Leaders at the time of independence "believed that the attainment of

independence obligated the United States to receive and to follow the law of nations [and]
viewed adherence to international law as a concomitant to sovereignty." Lobel, supra note
47, at 1084; see Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789:A
Badge ofHonor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461,484 (1989). Chief Justice Marshall concurred, stating.
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B. Crafting a Government Capable of Enforcing the Law of
Nations
During the difficult years between the Declaration of
Independence and the ratification of the Constitution, the leaders
of the struggling Confederation were deeply concerned about
ensuring enforcement of international law obligations.' These
concerns reflected, in part, the deep-seated belief that international
law, or the law of nations, was a key component of the common law,
binding on all nations.55 Enforcement of international law norms
was, after all, a moral obligation.5" A less altruistic motivation also
spurred the framers' interest in obeying the mandates of
international law: violations of the laws of nations gave cause for
war-a danger very much on the minds of the framers as they
drafted the Constitution in the military shadow of the more
powerful nations of Europe. The new nation was struggling mightily
to protect itself in a world in which warfare was a chief means of
resolving disputes.5 " To avoid giving offense through violations of
"[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land." The
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815). For a detailed analysis of late-eighteenthcentury views of the law of nations, see Jay, supra, at 821-28.
54. See Lobel, supra note 47, at 1084.
55. See Jay, supra note 53, at 825-28.
56. James Wilson emphasized the religious underpinnings ofthe law ofnations: "The law
of nations, as well as the law of nature, is ofobligation indispensable: the law of nations, as
well as the law of nature, is of origin divine .... Universal, indispensable, and unchangeable
is the obligation of both." James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, Lectures on Law (1790-91),
in 1 THEWORKS OFJAMES WILSON 130,133 (James DeWittAndrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan
and Co. 1896). "[nfree states, the law of nations is the law of the people; I mean that, as the
law ofnature, in other words, as the will ofnature's God, it is indispensably binding upon the
people, in whom the sovereign power resides .... " Id. at 136.
Given the moral underpinnings of common law precepts, obedience to their mandates
constituted a moral duty. "The Framers sought to uphold the law of nations as a moral
imperative-a matter of national honor." Burley, supra note 53, at 482; see also id. at 475
(stating that the framers understood the United States to have a "duty to propagate and
enforce" international law).
57. See Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Foundingof the Constitution,
82 Ai. J. INT'L L. 62, 64 (1988) (noting that, in the eighteenth century, the "plight of
individual citizens in foreign countries, and not territorial ambitions, was the major excuse
for war); Jay, supra note 53, at 821, 839-40 (stating that "America was, after all, a weak
power with an unproven government, operating in a world in which warfare was a common
form of dispute resolution and aprincipal element ofthe international aspirations motivating
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commonly accepted, norms of international behavior constituted a
prudent course of behavior. In addition, given that the law of
nations provided the rules governing international commerce,
adherence to its norms promoted the economic growth of the new
58
nation.
Unfortunately, however , the weak national government had little
ability to prevent or redress such offenses by the states, given its
limited powers. A series of crises triggered by the states' refusal to
enforce international law lent urgency to the search for a means to
enforce the law of nations. Both the French and Dutch governments
threatened reprisals after states refused to prosecute individuals
who had attacked their diplomats, in violation of the customary
norms that protected emissaries representing their nations abroad.
In one such incident, a French diplomat, Mr. Marbois, was
assaulted by a fellow Frenchman, an attack that sent shock waves
through the fledgling government and triggered an international
uproar.5 9 Key figures in the national government discussed the case
at length,60 but the federal government had no authority to institute
a criminal proceeding itself, or to force the state to do so. The
Continental Congress could do no more than explain to Marbois
that, given the "nature of a federal union," the federal government
had no power to act on his behalf.6 1 Several years later, a similar
international scandal erupted when local New York police entered
the home of the Dutch ambassador in an attempt to arrest an
employee.6 2
Perhaps even more problematic, the states refused to enforce
treaties between the federal government and foreign States. The
many nations").
58. See Douglas J. Sylvester, InternationalLaw as Sword or Shield? Early American
ForeignPolicy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL 1 (1999) (arguing that
economic concerns, not military security, spurred adherence to international law during the
late eighteenth century).

59, See William R. Caste, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts
Committed in Violation ofthe Law ofNations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467,491-94 (1986); William
S. Dodge, The Historical Originsof the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists,"

19 HASTINGS INVL & COMP. L. REv.221, 229-30 (1996).
60. See Casto, supranote 59, at 492-93 n.143 (counting dozens of references to Marbois

in the private correspondence of U.S. public figures).
61. 28 JOURNALS OFTHE CONTINENTALCONGRESS 1774-1789, at 314 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., U.S. Govt. Printing Office 1933), quoted in Dodge, supra note 59, at 229-30.
62. See Caste, supra note 59, at 494; Dodge, supra note 59, at 230.
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treaty ending the war with Great Britain pledged that debts to
British creditors would be paid.6 3 In practice, however, the state
courts repeatedly blocked efforts to collect such debts, and Great
Britain repeatedly threatened to take reprisals, endangering the
security of the new nation.'
Responsibility for these international violations and the
repercussions they provoked fell upon the national government,
despite its structural inability to enforce either treaties or the
unwritten law of nations. This problem was much-discussed by the
framers, and several expressed their frustration and concern about
the failure to assign the national government the power necessary
to meet its international law obligations. As Edmund Randolph
stated in 1787, "the law of nations is unprovided with sanctions in
many cases, which deeply affect public dignity and public justice."6 5
Randolph complained that the Confederation might be "doomed to
be plunged into war, from its wretched impotency to check offenses
against this law."6 6 John Jay also complained that the federal
government had no jurisdiction over cases implicating international
law obligations."
Concerns about implementing international law were indeed
uppermost on the minds of the framers when they gathered in
Philadelphia. Addressing an early session of the Constitutional
Convention, Edmund Randolph pointed to the central government's
inability to sanction violations of treaties and the law of nations as
one of the chief failings of the Confederation.6" Randolph argued
63. Article 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United

States stated that "Creditors on either Side shall meet with no lawful Impediment to the
Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts heretofore contracted."
Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 80, reprintedin 2 TREATIES
AND OTHERINTERNATIONALACTSOFTHEUN1EDSTATESOFAMERICA 151,154 (Hunter Miller
ed., 1931).
64. See Dunlop v. Ball, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 180,184 (1804) (reversing circuit court decision
blocking payment of a debt owed to a British citizen and stating that prior to 1793, "it was
the general understanding of the inhabitants [of Virginia] that British debts could not be
recovered"; Dodge, supra note 59, at 236, 254.
65. A Letter of His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esquire, on the Federal Constitution

(Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 86, 88 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
66. Id.
67. See 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 111 (Roscoe R. Hill

ed., U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1937), quoted in Dodge, supra note 59, at 230.
68. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) [hereinafter Farrand] (Madison's Notes, May 29, 1787). Rakove has emphasized the
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that the Confederation failed to provide security against foreign
wars, because Congress "could not cause infractions of treaties or
of the law of nations, to be punished," as a result of which, the
states "might by their conduct provoke war without controul [sic].69
Recognizing the need to guarantee the federal government power
to enforce international law, the framers sought a structure that
would assign the central government control over foreign affairs. As
Madison commented later: "The federal Constitution forms a happy
combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being
referred to the national, the local and particular to the State
legislatures."" The Constitution implemented this allocation of
powers both through positive grants of authority to the national
government, and by barring the states from participating in
particular foreign affairs issues.71

centrality of this concern:
[B]efore 1787 it was the inability of the existing Continental Congress to frame
and implement adequate foreign policies that evoked the most telling criticisms
of the "imbecility" of the Articles of Confederation. Well into 1786 most efforts
to amend the Articles were designed primarily to enable Congress to act
effectively in the one area-the realm of foreign relations-where its
responsibility was presumably least subject to question.
Jack N. Rakove, Making ForeignPolicy-The View from 1787, in FOREIGN POLICYAND THE
CONSTITuTION 1, 2 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990).
69. Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law ofNations as Partof the NationalLaw of the United
States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 36 (1952) (quoting 1 Farrand, supranote 68, at 19).
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (Prometheus Books 2000); see David
P. Currie, The Constitutionin Congress:The Third Congress, 1793-1795,63 U. CHi. L. REv.
1, 9-10 (1996) (noting the "widespread conviction that foreign relations was meant to be
essentially a federal matter").
71. The Constitution grants Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations," "establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization," "define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations," "declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water," and "repel Invasions," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, while the President is to serve as
"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," id. art. II, § 2, appoint
ambassadors subject to Senate approval, see id., and "receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers," id. § 3.
The states, however, are prohibited from entering into "any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation," granting "Letters of Marque and Reprisal," or, without the consent of
Congress, "lay[ing] any Duty of Tonnage, keep[ing] Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or
engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit
of delay." Id. art. I, § 10.
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The Supreme Court has read these enumerated grants and
prohibitions as reflective of a broader scheme intended to vest
foreign affairs power exclusively in the federal government. As the
Court stated in 1840: "Every part of [the Constitution] shows that
our whole foreign intercourse was intended to be committed to the
hands of the general government.... It was one of the main objects
of the Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign
relations, one people, and one nation." 2 Over 100 years later, the
Court again referred to the overall scheme of the Constitution as
reflective of federal foreign affairs supremacy, pointing to the
"M[various constitutional and statutory provisions... reflecting a
concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign
nations and indicating a desire to give matters of international
significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions."" One of the
provisions cited by the Court was the Offenses Clause.
C. Adoption of the Offenses Clause
Two resolutions of the Continental Congress presaged the
wording of the Offenses Clause. In 1781, Congress appointed a
committee "to prepare a recommendation to the states to enact laws
for punishing infractions of the laws of nations."74 The committee
report began by reciting the scope of the problem, listing several
complaints. First, the state criminal justice systems did not address
"offenses against the law of nations. 7 5 Second, a foreign government might hold the United States responsible for a violation of the
law of nations committed by a U.S. citizen, if the transgressor had
not been subjected to "regular and adequate punishment."76 And
finally, where individuals had been harmed by a violation of the law
of nations, "the author of those injuries should compensate the
damage out of his private fortune. 77
72. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575 (1840).
73. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,427 n.25 (1964).
74. Edmund Randolph et al., Report to Congress (1781), reprintedin 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 66 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Edmund Randolph, James

Duane and John Witherspoon submitted the committee report. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.

77. Id.
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With these problems as a backdrop, the congressional resolution
listed several recommendations to the state legislatures. First, the
states were asked to "provide expeditious, exemplary and adequate
punishment" for a list of the "most obvious" international law
violations, including violations of safe conducts or passports; "acts
of hostility" against those "in amity, league or truce with the United
States"; infractions of diplomatic immunities; and infractions of
treaties and conventions.78 Next, the states were urged to establish
a tribunal to "decide on offenses against the law of nations, not
contained in the foregoing enumeration . . . ."7 Finally, the
resolution recommended that the states "authorise suits to be
instituted for damages by the party injured, and for compensation
to the United States for damage sustained by them from an injury
done to a foreign power by a citizen." 0 Noteworthy in this
resolution is its mix of remedies: criminal sanctions for violations
of international law, as well as lawsuits for damages to the party
injured and to the U.S. government. Moreover, the resolution
incorporated an open-ended list of offenses against the law of
nations. States were urged to punish all violations of the law of
nations-not only the list of the "most obvious," but any and all
other such violations as well.
Only one state response has been reported: a 1782 Connecticut
law that both criminalized offenses against the law of nations and
afforded a civil tort remedy for injuries to foreign states or their
citizens.8 " Criminal penalties were imposed for a list of specific
violations-much as in the congressional resolution-as well as for
"any other Infractions or Violations of or Offenses against the

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 66-67.
81. See 4 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT FOR THE YEAR 1782, at
156-57 (1942) [hereinafter PUBLIC RECORDS]; William &. Casto, Correspondence,83 Ai. J.
IWLL. 901, 902-03 (1989) [hereinafter Casto, Correspondence].The Connecticut statutewas
drafted by Oliver Ellsworth who later, as a member of Congress, drafted the ATCA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1994), providing federal jurisdiction over torts"in violation ofthe law ofnations." See
Caste, supra, at 901-02; infra notes 303-20 and accompanying text (discussing the ATCA).
Ellsworth played a key role in the drafting of the Constitution and the First Judiciary Act,
and also served as the nation's Chief Justice from 1796-1800. See WIIAM R. CASTO, THE
SUPREME COURT IN'THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEFJUSTICESHIPSOFJOHNJAYAND OLIVER

ELiswORTH 27-53 (1995).
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known received and established Laws of Civilized Nations." 2 The
claim for damages, however, extended even further, providing a
remedy against:
any... Persons whatsoever [for] any Injury... to any foreign
Power or to the Subjects thereof, either in Their Persons or
Property, by means whereof any Damage shall or may any ways
arise happen or accrue either to any such foreign Power, to the
said United States, to this State or to any particular Person
83

Thus, Connecticut followed the lead of the Continental Congress in
linking criminal sanctions and civil tort remedies for violations of
international law.
In 1785, Congress again recommended that the states provide
penalties for violations of the law of nations. 4 The response
apparently continued to be less than overwhelming: Edmund
Randolph complained in 1787 that the failure to punish and deter
violations of the law of nations threatened to plunge the nation into
war.

85

As discussed above, this concern with preventing and punishing
violations of international law was one of the moving forces behind
the effort to reformulate the national government. Randolph listed
as one of the chief defects of the Confederation its inability to "cause
infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished." 6
Complaining that most of the states failed to punish violations of
international law, Randolph stated: "If the rights of an ambassador
be invaded by any citizen it is only in a few States that any laws
exist to punish the offender." 7 He -submitted to the Constitutional
Convention a proposal that included the legislative power "[tlo
provide tribunals and punishment for mere offenses against the law

82. 4 PuEBC RECORDS, supra note 81, at 157, quoted in Caste, Correspondence,supra
note 81, at 903.

83. 4 PUBLIC RECORDS, supranote 81, at 157.
84. See 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 654-55 (John C.

Fitzpatrick ed., U.S. GoVt Printing Office 1933), cited in Siegal, supra note 12, at 874.
85. See supra text accompanying note 68.
86. 1 Farrand, supra note 68, at 19 (Madison's notes, May 29, 1787).

87. 1 id. at 25 (McHenry's notes, May 29, 1787).
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of nations.""8 This language appeared in the Committee of Detail's
report in combination with provisions relating to piracy and
counterfeiting:
The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to...
declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and the punishment of
counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offenses
against the law of nations ..89
The initial debate on the Clause focused on the provisions relating
to piracy, felonies on the high seas, and counterfeiting, with no
mention of the Offenses Clause. The word "punishment" was
deleted, only to be replaced with "punish" after a debate in which
both Mason and Wilson noted that the provision would authorize
enactment of criminal or penal provisions regarding piracy and
felonies.90
The delegates proceeded to discuss the need to "define" felonies
committed at sea. 9 ' Ellsworth suggested slight modifications of the
Clause that brought it close to its final language, granting the
legislature the power
to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the
U. States, and offenses agst. the law of Nations.92
Farrand's records of this debate contain no mention of offenses
against the law of nations while these changes were being debated.
The Committee on Style originally included a virtually identical
version of the Clause, 3 but later pulled the provision on
88. 2 id. at 143 (Committee of Detail, Outline in Randolph's handwriting).
89. 2 id. at 181-82 (Madison's notes, Aug. 6, 1787).
90. See 2 id. at 315 (Madison's notes, Aug. 17, 1787). Two other delegates also raised
concerns about limiting the provision relating to counterfeiting to coins and to the currency
of the United States. See 2 id.
91. See 2 id. at 316.
92. 2 id.
93. The report of the Committee of Style and Arrangement granted the legislature the
power '[to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, to punish the
counterfeiting of the securities, and current coin of the United States, and offenses against
the law of nations." 2 id. at 570.
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counterfeiting into its own clause, leaving the Offenses Clause
much as it appears in the final draft of the Constitution:
The Congress... shall have power... To define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and punish
offenses against the law of nations."
This language, with the distinction between the power to "define
and punish" piracy and felonies on the high seas, but only "punish"
offenses against the law of nations, produced the only substantive
debate on the offenses section of the Clause. Morris moved to strike
the word "punish" before "offenses agst. the law of nations," so that
the laws would "be definable as well as punishable, by virtue of the
preceding member of the sentence."9 5 Wilson argued against the
change, stating: "To pretend to define the law of nations which
depended on the authority of all the Civilized Nations of the World,
96
would have a look of arrogance[] that would make us ridiculous."
Morris replied by suggesting that "define" was intended to suggest
the need to provide detail, not to create offenses where none had
previously existed: "The word define is proper when applied to
offenses in this case; the law of nations being often too vague and
deficient to be a rule."97 The change was accepted by a vote of six to
five, and the Clause adopted as it now stands, granting Congress
on
the power "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
98
nations."
of
law
the
against
offenses
and
Seas,
the high

94. 2 id. at 594-95 (Committee of Style and Arrangement). It is unclear from the
convention records how "punish" appeared in this draft of the Offenses Clause, distinguishing
the power to "punish" offenses against the law of nations from the power to "define and

punish" piracy and felonies at sea. Farrand's compilation indicates that"punish" was omitted
from the Committee on Style report but apparently inserted by Madison on his own copy of
the report; Farrand explains that the omission was the result of a typographical error. See
2 id. at 595. The confusion may have arisen after the language addressing counterfeitingwas
moved to a separate clause, perhaps leaving unclear which verbs were intended to remain.
However it made its appearance, "punish" does appear in the version of the Offenses Clause
debated by the delegates, who voted to remove it.
95. 2 id at 614 (Madison's notes, Sept. 14, 1787).
96. 2 id. at 615.
97. 2 id. Brackets indicate corrections or additions made by Madison to his own notes
when he reviewed the manuscript in later years. See Farrand's explanations of Madison's
edits, 1 id at xv-xix, and of Farrand's use of brackets to indicate those changes, 1 id. at xix.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; Farrand, supra note 68, at 615.
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There was little reported debate about the Offenses Clause
during the ratification process. Speaking to the Virginia
Convention, Madison offered the Clause as an example of the
difficulties of obtaining "precision" in the use of technical terms in
the Constitution.9 9 To avoid the need to rely on British laws,
Madison explained, the Constitution used the "technical term of the
law of nations... [so] that we should find ourselves authorized to
introduce it into the laws of the United States." 00 The comment
seems to indicate that without congressional action, the law of
nations, as part of the common law, would be binding on the United
States as it had been interpreted by the courts of Great Britain. The
Offenses Clause avoided that unpalatable approach by making clear
Congress's power to legislate directly on the topic.
The Anti-Federalist Cincinnatus worried that the Offenses
Clause would permit Congress to bar publications criticizing
treaties or other foreign affairs:
[Tihe proposed Congress are empowered-to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations-mark well, Sir, if you
please-to define and punish. Will you, will any one say, can
any one even think that does not comprehend a power to define
and declare all publications from the press against the conduct
of government, in making treaties, or in any other foreign
transactions, an offense against the law of nations?10 '
Presumably, contemporaries would have responded to his complaint
by pointing to the limited meaning ofthe word "define": The debates
at the Constitutional Convention made clear that Congress would
have the power to punish only actual violations of the law of
nations, not to create new offenses. A more powerful response,
however, came shortly thereafter with the adoption
of the Bill of
10 2
Rights and, in particular, the First Amendment.
99. See 3 Farrand, supra note 68, at 331-32 (Madison's remarks in the Virginia
Convention, June 20, 1788).
100. 3 id. at 332.
101. Essays by Cincinnatus, Letter of Nov. 1,1787, in 6 THE COMPLETEANTI-FEDERALIST,

supranote 65, at 8.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 357-62 (discussing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312
(1988), and the impact of international law and the foreign affairs power on the First
Amendment).

20001

FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The only other recorded comments on the Clause praised it as an
example of the Constitution's assignment of issues relating to the
law of nations to federal control. Iredell, for example, emphasized
the propriety of placing authority over offenses against the law of
nations within the control of the national government:
[C]ertainly the cases enumerated wherein the Congress are
empowered either to define offenses, or prescribe punishments,
are such as are proper for the exercise of such authority in the
general Legislature of the Union. They only relate to
"counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United
States," to "piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and offenses against the law ofnations," andto"treason against
the United States." These are offenses immediately affecting
the security, the honor or the interest of the United States at
large, and of course must come within the sphere of the
Legislative authoritywhich is intrustedwith their protection.0 3
In The FederalistPapers,Madison similarly stressed the role of the
Clause in affording the national government authority over foreign
affairs. He placed the Clause in context as one of the "class of
powers" assigned to the federal government that "regulate the
intercourse with foreign nations."""' In particular, the Offenses
Clause would permit the federal authorities to prevent the states
from endangering the nation through violations of the law of
nations:
The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed
on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations,
belongs with equal propriety to the general government, and is
a still greater improvement on the articles of Confederation.
These articles contain no provision for the case of offenses
against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the
power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy
with foreign nations.'

103. Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, 1788, in 1 BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 452 (1971).
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 270 (James Madison) (Prometheus Books 2000).
105. Id. at 272.
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These comments echoed one of the concerns that led to the
momentous decision to draft the Constitution, the need to vest
control over both international law and foreign policy in the central
government. Referring to federal judicial jurisdiction over matters
relating to the law of nations, Hamilton reiterated the
plain proposition, that the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be
left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will undoubtedly be
answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.
And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be
accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.1
Madison as well noted "the advantage of

.

.

. immediate

responsibility to the nation107in all those for whose conduct the nation
itself is to be responsible."
As guidance for an understanding of the foreign affairs powers of
the federal government, the framers' comments are notably
consistent. Neither the individual states nor individual citizens
could be allowed to endanger the nation through unredressed
violations of international law. The concern with accountability
appeared repeatedly throughout these discussions: because the
federal government would be forced to take responsibility for
violations of the law of nations, the federal government must have
the power to prevent and punish such violations. The language of
the Constitution that most directly responds to this concern is that
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 516-17 (Alexander Hamilton) (Prometheus Books 2000).
Jay made the same point: "It is of high importance to the peace ofAmerica that she observe
the laws of nations towards all these [foreign] powers, and to me it appears evident that this
will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be
either bythirteen separate States or bythree or four distinct confederacies.THEFEDERALIST
No. 3, at 14 (John Jay) (Prometheus Books 2000). Jay emphasized that the national
government would have both the "power [and] inclination to prevent or punish" violations
of treaties and the law of nations. Id. at 15-16.
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 289 (James Madison) (Prometheus Books 2000). As
Justice Miller stated in the late nineteenth century, discussing a California statute
purporting to regulate immigration, "If[the United States] should get into a difficulty which
would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the
Union?" Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875). During the years leading up to the
Constitutional Convention, Thomas Jefferson wrote repeatedly of the need to unify control
of foreign affairs in the federal government. See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 14,46-48 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (1929); Dickinson, supra note 69, at
36 n.28.
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of the Offenses Clause, which empowers Congress to guarantee
enforcement of international law within the United States.
IL. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE OFFENSES CLAUSE: FEDERAL
POWER OVER THE EVOLVING LAW OF NATIONS
The Supreme Court has cited the Offenses Clause fewer than two
dozen times, and has relied upon it in only a handful of cases.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court references indicate that the
Clause reflects the framers' intent to vest foreign affairs powers in
the federal government. Morebver, these cases emphasize that the
Clause authorizes Congress to punish offenses against the law of
nations as that law develops over time, not as it existed at the time
it was drafted and ratified. Finally, the case law offers support for
a view of the Clause as encompassing civil responses to violations
of international law, as well as criminal.
The Court has several times referred to the Offenses Clause as
an example of the Constitution's intent to assign to the federal
government broad powers over foreign affairs."0 8 A pair of cases a
century apart tie the Clause not only to federal control over foreign
affairs, but more specifically to the need to ensure that the United
States complies with its international law obligations." 9 As the
Court said in the more recent of the two cases: "[Tihe United States
has a vital national interest in complying with international law.
The Constitution itself attempts to further this interest by
expressly authorizing Congress'[t] o define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law
of Nations."" Similarly, 100 years earlier, the Court noted that
108. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964) ("Various
constitutional.. provisions [includingthe Offenses Clause] reflect[] aconcernforuniformity
in this country's dealings with foreign nations and indicat[e] a desire to give matters of
international significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions."); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711-12 (1893) (listing Offenses Clause as one of many
constitutional provisions that make clear that the federal government possesses "the entire
control of international relations" and "all the powers ofgovernment necessary to maintain
that control and to make it effective"); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570 (1840)
(listing the Offenses Clause as one of several clauses that indicate that "[a]ll the powers
which relate to our foreign intercourse are confided to the general government").
109. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 323 (1988); United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479,
483 (1887).
110. Boos, 485 U.S. at 323.
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since the national government is "responsible to foreign nations for
all violations by the United States of their international obligations
...
Congress is expressly authorized 'to define and punish...
offenses against the law of nations.'"'
The evolving penal authority derived from the Offenses Clause is
apparent from an early case challenging the constitutionality of a
statute imposing criminal penalties for counterfeiting foreign
securities, United States v. Arjona."2 In Arjona, one of only a few
cases in which the Court has analyzed the reach of the Offenses
Clause, the Court applied an evolving notion of international law to
hold that Congress had the power to punish conduct that violated
then-existing requirements of the law of nations.1 13 Arona was
charged with violating a federal statute making it a crime to
counterfeit notes issued by foreign government-owned banks.1 4 He
pointed out that such foreign notes were unknown at the time the
Constitution was drafted, and argued that his crime could not
therefore have fallen within the framers' understanding of the
Offenses Clause. 15 The Court nevertheless found the statute to be
authorized, holding that "the law of nations" as used in the Clause
"extended to the protection of this more recent custom among
bankers of dealing in foreign securities." 1 6 The Court expressed no
hesitation in finding that the concept of the law of nations
incorporated into the Offenses Clause evolved over time, reflecting
new developments of international law.
The Supreme Court also relied on the Offenses Clause in a set of
cases arising out of World War II that upheld congressional power
to criminalize violations of the laws of war." 7 In Ex parte Quirin,
for example, the Court considered the constitutionality of a military
commission established to try two groups of German saboteurs
111. Arjona, 120 U.S. at 483 (second alteration in original).
112. 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
113. See id. at 483.
114. See id at 480-82. The constitutional provision empowering Congress to punish
counterfeiting did not apply, as it is limited to counterfeiting "the Securities and current Coin
of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
116. See Arjona, 120 U.S. at 485-86.
116. Id
117. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197,20715 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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captured after landing in New York and Florida intending to attack
war facilities in the United States.1 " Congress had provided for
such tribunals to try certain offenses against the laws of war, and
the Court found Congress's action within the reach of the Offenses
Clause:
Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may
constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have
jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war
in appropriate cases. Congress . . .has thus exercised its

authority to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the
jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses
which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations,
and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such
tribunals.'1 9
The Court thus upheld Congress's power to impose criminal
sanctions on actions in violation of the law of nations-here, that
branch of the law of nations governing the laws of war.
In these cases, the Court again looked at the content of
international law at the time the statute was'enacted, not at the
time of the framing of the Constitution, and applied an evolving
notion of the law of nations. In Quirin, for example, the specific
question before the Court was whether, under the laws of war,
enemy agents who entered the United States in disguise with the
intent to commit sabotage could be tried as war criminals." The
Court determined the content of the laws of war by looking at a
twentieth-century treaty, the Hague Convention,' 2 ' as well as
118. 317 U.S. at 21.
119. Id. at 28. In Madsen v. KInsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346-48 (1952), the Court applied the
same reasoning to uphold the constitutionality of the military trial of a civilian living in
occupied German territory.
120. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25, 31-33. Enemy soldiers in uniform would have been
treated as lawful belligerents and thus detained as prisoners of war rather than put on trial.
See id. at 35-36 n.12 ("[Tihe authorities are unanimous in stating that a soldier in uniform
who commits the acts mentioned would be entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war; it is the
absence of uniform that renders the offender liable to trial for violation of the laws ofwar.").
121. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,1907, annex,
§ 1, ch. 1, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, 289, cited in Quirin,317 U.S. at
30 n.7.
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modern rules governing warfare in other nations, 122 the opinions of
modern commentators,2' and the historical and modern practices
of the U.S. armed forces.' Based on its review of all of these
sources, the Court concluded that the laws of war incorporated into
the congressional enactment permitted trial of the defendants as
war criminals:
This precept ofthe law of war has been so recognized in practice
both here and abroad, and has so generally been accepted as
valid by authorities on international law that we think it must
be regarded as a rule or principle of the law of war recognized
by this Government by its enactment of the [applicable] Article
of War. 1 '

The rules followed by the United States at the time the
Constitution was adopted were relevant to show the development
of international law, but the Court's analysis did not begin and end
at that point in history; to the contrary, the Court looked at the law
as codified, applied and analyzed by modern sources.
Similarly, the Offenses Clause provided constitutional support for
a modern statute criminalizing conduct threatening to foreign
diplomats. In Boos v. Barry, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a statute limiting certain peaceful protests in
the vicinity of foreign embassies. 126 The Court recognized the
importance of protecting diplomats, citing the obligations imposed
by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,2 ' which "all
parties" accepted as stating "the current state of international
law." 8 Again, the Court looked at modern obligations toward

122. See Quirin,317 U.S. at 30-31 (highlighting similarities in the laws of war of several
countries).
123. See id. at 30-36, nn. 7, 8 & 12.
124. See id. at 31-36.
125. Id. at 35-36 (footnote omitted).

126. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
127. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr.
18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
128. Boos, 485 U.S. at 332. The Convention imposes "[the] special duty to take all
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and
to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity." Vienna
Convention, supra note 127, art. 22, § 2, 23 U.S.T. at 3237-38, 500 U.N.T.S. at 108.
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diplomats, not the international norms in effect at the time the
Constitution was drafted.
The significance of the evolving notion of international law
cannot be underestimated. International law is governed both by
treaties and by customary international law. The Constitution
assigns a special role to treaties, providing for their adoption by the
President "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate"129 and their
supremacy over state law, 13 and authorizing Congress to make
such laws as are "necessary and proper" to their implementation."13
But much international law develops through custom and
practice. 13 2 Where such customs are generally and consistently
followed "from a sense of legal obligation," they attain the status of
binding law in the international arena. 1 3 Today, as in the late
eighteenth century, customary international law governs issues
ranging from commercial practices to human rights norms to the
basic principles by which sovereign nations interact."M
129. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
130. See id. art. VI, cl. 2.
131. Id, art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
132. The RESTATEMENT(THIRD), supranote 1, § 102(1), lists three sources of international
law: customary law, international agreement, and general principles common to the major
legal systems.
133. "Customaryinternational law results from a general and consistent practice ofstates
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." Id. § 102(2); see also IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-11 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing sources of

international law); JANIS, supranote 1, at 35-46 (same).
134. Customary international law dominated internationalrelations until this century and
continues to occupy an important role to this day.
Until recently, international law was essentially customary law: agreements
made particular arrangements between particular parties, but were not
ordinarily used for general law-making for states. In our day, treaties have
become the principal vehicle for making law for the international system; more
and more ofestablished customary law is beingcodified by general agreements.
To this day, however, many rules about status, property, and international
delicts are still customary law, not yet codified.
RESTATFMENT (THIRD), supranote 1, pt. I, ch. 1, introductory note at 18. The basic rules that
bind nations to obey their international agreements are rooted in customary international
law, see id., as are, for example, key aspects of the law of the sea and the laws of war. See
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 232 (2d ed. 1996)
("Even now, in our third century under the Constitution and after a century of radical change
in the international legal system, most of the international rights and obligations of the
United States lie in unwritten, customary, international law."); Beth Stephens, The Law of
Our Land. Customary InternationalLaw as FederalLaw After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv.
393, 456-57 (1997).
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As the Supreme Court has recognized, customary international
law evolves over time, a result of the combined impact of the actions
of the nations of the world. 135 The United States plays an important

role in the development of international law, 13 6 and can arguably

"opt out" of developing rules, thereby blocking their application to
this country.1 37 The process is nevertheless a collective enterprise
which is to some extent out of the control of any one nation. Given
that treaties are otherwise covered by the Constitution, it is likely
that the Offenses Clause primarily addresses violations of
customary international law. The framers granted Congress the
power to define and punish offenses against an evolving law of

nations, a power that would by definition change over time. In
Arjona and the war crimes cases, the Supreme Court recognized
that the Offenses Clause incorporated
this evolving body of
38

customary international law.

135. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900) (applying newly developed
customary international norms). In a district court decision, Justice Story held that the slave
trade, once permitted by international law, was prohibited by newly evolved principles:
"It does not follow... that because a principle cannot be found settled by the consent or
practice of nations at one time, it is to be concluded, that at no subsequent period the
principle can be considered as incorporated into the public code of nations." United States
v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (D. Mass. 1822). His conclusion was overruled by
the Supreme Court on the basis that international law had not yet reached a consensus on
the illegality of the slave trade. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 101-02 (1825);
Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, FederalJurisdictionover InternationalHuman
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J.
53, 61 n.41 (1981).
136. As one of the two superpowers in the years before the breakup of the Soviet Union,
and now as the world's only superpower, the United States plays a unique role in the
development of international law. See Stephens, supra note 134, at 456-58. Moreover,
international custom often requires the consent ofthose nations most affected by a particular
rule; thus, the United States plays a pivotal role in the development of norma in those areas
ofmost importance to it, for example, the law of the sea, the law of outer space, and the law
governing the development and deployment ofnuclear weapons. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD),
supra note 1, § 102, cmts. b, i, reporters' note 2 (discussing the significance of consent of
those States most affected by an emerging rule).
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102, cmt. d ("[In principle a state that
indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of development is not
bound by that rule even after it matures."). Some commentators have disputed the
"persistent objector" rule, arguing that customary international law norms bind all States.
See, e.g., ANTHoNYD'AMATO, THE CONCEPrOF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONALLAW 190-96 (1971)
(asserting that states consent to international law as a whole system and may not opt out of
particular laws); Jonathan I. Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529,
538 (1993) (concluding that "the rule is open to serious doubt").
138. See supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Arjona decision indicates the Supreme Court's
recognition of the breadth of the Clause: "[If the thing made
punishable is one which the United States are required by their
international obligations to use due diligence to prevent, it is an
offense against the law of nations."13 9 Thus, offenses within the
meaning of the Clause encompass all acts which international law
requires the United States "to use due diligence to prevent."140
Certainly, a great many violations of international law under this
formulation would not constitute crimes-indeed, they might not
even constitute violations of the domestic laws of the United States.
The Offenses Clause, then, grants to Congress the power to
legislate over a broad and ever-changing set of issues, with the
scope governed not only by domestic decisions but by the combined
actions of the many nations of the world. 141 This interpretation of
the Clause meshes neatly with what we know of the framers'
understanding of the law of nations and the appropriate remedies
for violations of its,norms.
IV. THE UNSUBSTANTIATED CRIMINAL LAW RESTRICTION

As a grant to Congress of the authority to deter and penalize
violations of the evolving body of international law, the Offenses
Clause empowers Congress to enact a range of legislation
addressing foreign affairs. The Clause has been rarely cited, even
as an alternative constitutional basis for this broad foreign affairs
power, largely because it has been understood as limited to criminal
sanctions-an unfounded limitation, unsupported by the Clause's
history or the eighteenth-century significance of its terms.
Those who argue that the Offenses Clause empowers Congress to
impose criminal sanctions for violations of international law, but
not to create a civil cause of action for the same behavior, assume
139. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887).
140. In this regard, the Offenses Clause is similar to the treaty power, which extends the

federal government's powers to "all proper subjects of negotiation between our government
and the governments of other nations." Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890). See infra

notes 380-416 and accompanying text for additional discussion ofthe Treaty Clause and its
relationship to other constitutional provisions.
141. This is also exactly the result feared by those who raise alarms about broad views of
the foreign affairs powers ofthe federal government, misplaced fears that will be addressed
in Part V.
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that an offense against the law of nations refers only to a criminal
law violation, and that to punish such an offense means only to
impose criminal sanctions. In this part, I examine each of the
assumptions underlying this narrow construction of the Clause. I
first look at the meaning of the term "offenses against the law of
nations" at the time of the framing, a phrase that included a broad
range of violations which triggered an equally broad range of
sanctions. I then explore the eighteenth-century usage of "offense,"
concluding that the word contained considerable ambiguity, and
was capable of referring to all violations of legal norms. Similarly,
the concept of punishment, at the time of the framing as well as
today, encompasses far more than criminal sanctions. To the
contrary, punishment has long included a range of penalties
including monetary fines paid to private persons as well as the
government, and payment of compensatory and punitive damages.
Next, I look at the murky line distinguishing criminal and civil
actions. Although the Constitution provides special procedures for
criminal prosecutions, both in the original document and in the Bill
of Rights, late-eighteenth-century legislatures imposed civil and
criminal sanctions with apparent disregard for the distinctions.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has struggled for over two hundred
years-and continues to struggle today-to define the distinction,
in the face of a broad range of legal actions that defy categorization.
Having reviewed this history, I conclude that the language of the
Offenses Clause is sufficiently broad so as to empower Congress to
impose a range of criminal and civil sanctions. Finally, I apply this
new understanding of the Clause to help understand the
constitutional basis of a statute enacted by the First Congress,
creating civil remedies for violations of the law of nations.
A. The Eighteenth-CenturySignificance of Offenses Against the
Law of Nations
The eighteenth-century understanding of the law of nations and
of offenses in violation of that law, to the extent that we can discern
it, represents a broad approach both to the body of international
law and to the remedies available for infractions.
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1. Offenses Against the Law of Nations in Blackstone's
Commentaries
The phrase "offenses against the law of nations" appears in the
resolution ofthe Continental Congress bemoaning the states' failure
Its likely source is
to impose sanctions on such infractions.'
William Blackstone's famous four-volume treatise, Commentaries
on the Laws ofEngland,the book most often relied upon by jurists
of the framers' generation. 14 Blackstone devoted one chapter to
"offenses against the law of nations."'" Although this section is best
known today for its short list of three possible "crimes" in violation
of the law of nations, its analysis is in fact much broader, covering
142. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
143. As the Court stated in Schick v. United States:
[The Constitution] must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the
principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the

Constitution. Blackstone's Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory
exposition of the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the
Federal Constitution it had been published about twenty years, and it has been
said that more copies of the work had been sold in this country than in
England, so that undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were familiar
with it.
195 U.S. 65,69 (1904) (citations omitted); see AlbertW. Alschuler, RediscoueringBlackstone,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-19 (1996) (discussing the importance of Blackstone's Commentaries
in the early years of the nation). Professor Alschuler confirms that thousands of copies of the
Commentarieswere sold in the United States in the eighteenth century, purchased by many
of those involved in forging the new nation. See id. at 5-6, 15 n.87 (listing some of those who
were noted as subscribers to the initial American edition of the Commentaries,including
sixteen who later signed the Declaration of Independence). Many of the words used in the
Constitution were employed as defined by Blackstone: "Such words and phrases in the
Constitution as 'due process,' 'crimes and misdemeanors,' 'treason,' 'felonies,' 'ex post facto
laws,' 'criminal prosecutions,' Judicial power,'"legislative power,' 'legal rights and liabilities,'
'remedies,' 'levying war,' and many others were used in the sense in which Blackstone had
employed them." George W. Wickersham, Presentation of Blackstone Memorial (July 20,
1924), in 10 A.B.A. J. 571, 578 (1924).
Blackstone's importance continued throughout the first century of the nation. According
to one estimate, the Commentarieswere cited 10,000 times in reported U.S. cases between
1789 and 1915. See Alschuler, supra, at 7 n.29 (citing DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE 176 (1938)). As summarized by Professor Boorstin, "In the history of American
institutions, no other book-except the Bible-has played so great a role." DANIEL J.
BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW at iii (Peter Smith 1973) (1941). "In the
first century of American independence, the Commentarieswere not merely an approach to
the study of law; for most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law." Id. at 3.
144. Chapter 5 of the fourth volume ofthe Commentaries is entitled "OfOffenses Against
the Law of Nations." 4 BLACKSTONE, supranote 46, at *66-73.
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both civil and criminal responses to offenses against international
law.
Blackstone placed this discussion within a volume dealing with
"public wrongs." 4 5 As Blackstone explained,
Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species; private wrongs,
andpublicwrongs. The former are an infringement or privation
of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered
as individuals; and are thereupon frequently termed civil
injuries: the latter are a breach and violation of public rights
and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a
community; and are distinguished
bythe harsher appellation of
46
crimes and misdemeanors.

Despite the distinction between public and private wrongs, many
fell into both categories and triggered both public and private

remedies.' 47 For example, acts of violence directed against an
individual such as assault, mayhem, or false imprisonment,

constituted both private and public wrongs. Each was considered in
the Commen'tariesfirst as a private wrong "for which a satisfaction
or remedy is given to the party aggrieved."' 4 8 Each reappeared as a

public wrong: "[IT]aken in a public light, as a breach of the king's
peace, an affront to his government, and a damage done to his
subjects, they are also indictable and punishable with fines and
49

imprisonment; or with other ignominious corporal penalties... .1

145. Blackstone divided his legal universe into rights and wrongs, and further divided
wrongs into public and private wrongs. Thus, the four-volume Commentariescontained four
books: The Rights of Persons, the Rights of Things, Private Wrongs, and Public Wrongs. The
14 categories of public wrongs are treated in chapters 4 through 17 of volume 4 of the
Commentaries.See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46.
146. 3 id. at *2.
147. Like other of Blackstone's efforts to codify and organize his legal subjects, the
distinction between public and private wrongs proved difficult to maintain. See, e.g., 1
WILLIAM BLACKsTONE, COMMENTARIES 91-92 n.1 (George Sharswood ed., J.B. Lippincott Co.
1859) (stating Christian's criticism of Blackstone's division of "rights" into the rights of
persons and the rights of things as "resting upon a solecism). Christian, however, does not
judge Blackstone harshly, for he views the organizational task as fruitless: "[Als the order
of legal subjects is, in a great measure, arbitrary, and does not admit of that mathematical
arrangement where one proposition generates another, it perhaps would be difficult to
discover any method more satisfactory than that which the learned judge has pursued...
1 id.
148. 4 BLACKSTONE, supranote 46, at *216.
149. 4id.
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Further, Blackstone asserted that all crimes also have a private
aspect: "In all cases the crime includes an injury: every public
offense is also a private wrong, and somewhat more; it affects the
individual, and it likewise affects the community."1 5 °
For instance; in the case of battery, or beating another, the
aggressor may be indicted for this at the suit of the king, for
disturbing the public peace, and be punished criminally by fine
and imprisonment: and the party beaten may also have his
private remedy by action of trespass for the injury, which he in
particular sustains, and recover a civil satisfaction in damages.
So also, in case of a public nuisance, as digging a ditch across a
highway, this is punishable by indictment, as a common offense
to the whole kingdom and all his majesty's subjects; but if any
individual sustains any special damage thereby, as laming his
horse, breaking his carriage, or the like, the offender may be
compelled to make ample satisfaction, as well for the-private
injury, as for the public wrong.5 1
Blackstone generalized from these varied examples, concluding
that, "in taking cognizance of all wrongs, or unlawful acts, the law
has a double view," aiming both to provide redress to the injured
party, and to vindicate the public's need to prevent and punish
wrongs that threaten the public good.15 2 Battery, nuisance and
trespass were all "offenses" for which a private individual might
have a civil claim for damages, while the public prosecutor might
also prosecute for the harm to the community.5 3
Similarly, offenses against the law of nations included both
private and public wrongs. To begin, the law of nations itself
governed a wide range ofinternational commercial transactions and
diplomatic disputes between States, as well as acts by individuals
that infringed upon the rights of foreign States. As to private
commercial interactions, international law governed "in mercantile
150. 4/d. at *5.

151. 4 id. at *6-7.
152. 4 id. at *7.

153. See 4 id. at *6-7, *216; see also 3 id. at *220 (stating that although public nuisances
are generally public wrongs, as to which only the king can bring an action, nevertheless an
exception is made 'where a private person suffers some extraordinary damage, beyond the
rest of the king's subjects, by a public nuisance; in which case he shall have a private
satisfaction by action").
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questions, such as bills of exchange and the like; in all marine
causes, relating to freight, average, demurrage, insurances,
bottomry,... [and] in all disputes relating to prizes, to shipwrecks,
to hostages, and ransom-bills .... 1 5 4 In short, the law of nations
governed "civil transactions and questions of property between the
subjects of different states";15 5 offenses against these norms
constituted private wrongs, redressed through private ligitation.
"Public wrongs" in violation of the law of nations generally
involved disputes between States, and were resolved through
diplomacy or avenged through war.156 As explained in the
Commentaries:
[Olffenses against this law are principally incident to whole
states or nations: in which case recourse can only be had to war;
which is an appeal to the God of hosts, to punish such
infractions of public faith, as are committed by one independent
people against another: neither state having any superior
jurisdiction to resort to upon earth for justice.15
Where, however, an individual committed a public wrong, violating
a rule of the law of nations with public consequences, world peace
might be endangered, and "it is then the interest as well as duty of
the government, under which they live, to animadvert upon them
with a becoming severity, that the peace of the world may be
maintained."'58 In England, such "animadversion" involved criminal
154. 4 id. at *67.
155. 4 id.
156. See 4 id. at *68.
157. 4 id.

158. 4 id. What is the significance ofthe obscure verb, "animadvert"? Modem dictionaries
define the term as to "consider," "utter criticism," or "express censure or blame," and note a
now-archaic definition, to "take legal cognizance of," or 'to proceed by way of punishment."
1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 474 (2d ed. 1989). Blackstone's statement probably
encompassed a combination of censure, judicial cognizance, and punishment-a range of
remedies, including but not limited to criminal sanctions.
For contemporaneous eighteenth-century usage, consider the language of participants at
the Constitutional Convention, who used the term to refer to strong criticism, as in Madison's
statement, "I restrain myself from animadverting on the report, from the respect I bear to
the members of the committee. But I must confess I see nothing of concession in it," 1
Farrand, supranote 68, at 535 (Yates' Notes, July 5, 1787), or a description of Randolph as
"animadverting on the indefinite and dangerous power given by the Constitution to
Congress," 2 id. at 631 (Madison's Notes, Sept. 15, 1787). In an early case, a Pennsylvania
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sanctions for a handful of such offenses: violations of safe-conducts,
infringements of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.15 9 It also
included provision of a civil remedy to the injured party: several
contemporaneous statutes offered "restitution"and "amends" to the
victim of the violation. Thus, "notwithstanding the party be
convicted of treason, the injured stranger should have restitution
out of his effects
.... j6o Moreover, "if any of the king's subjects
attempt or offend, upon the sea," the justices "may cause full
restitution and amends to be made to the party injured." 6 '
Blackstone described the various criminal and civil remedies he
cited as "the principal cases, in which the statute law of England
interposes, to aid and enforce the law of nations, as part of the
common law; by inflicting an adequate punishment upon offenses
against that universal law, committed by private persons."6 2 Thus,
"punishment" of an "offense against the law of nations" committed
by a private individual included both criminal prosecution and
restitution or-compensation to the victim of the violation.
Blackstone thus provided the framers with a model of the law of
nations which protected a long list of private rights, as well as
public rights. Violations of private rights were properly redressed
through private civil litigation. Violations of public rights, rights
that implicated public interests and constituted public wrongs, were
subject to both criminal sanctions and to civil remedies for private
parties injured by the "offense."
court used animadvert to refer to criminal sanctions. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1

U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 117 (1784) (Ct. Oyer & Terminer Phila.) ("And it is now the interest as well
as duty of the government, to animadvert upon your conductwith abecomingseverity,-such
a severity as may tend to reform yourself, to deter others from the commission of the like

crime, preserve the honor of the State, and maintain peace with our great and good Ally, and
the whole world."). In alater prize case, however, counsel called for "animadversion" through

civil restitution. See The Fortuna, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 161, 164-165 (1817) ("The court can
only animadvert upon such misconduct by depriving the captors of their spoil....

).

159. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at *68. The list is not exhaustive: Blackstone
describes these as the "principaloffenses againstthe law ofnations, animadverted on as such
by the municipal laws of England. .. ." 4 i (emphasis added).

160. 4 id. at *69.
161. 4 id. at *69-70. See Judge Bork's discussion of this chapter of the Commentaries in
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: "[Alt least some offenses against the law of nations, such
as violations of safe-conducts, resulted not only in criminal punishment but in restitution for

the alien out of the offender's effects." 726 F.2d 774, 814 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supranote 46, at *69).
162. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at *73.
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2. The Framers'Views of Offenses Against the Law ofNations
The Continental Congress shared this view of the assorted means
of sanction and redress available to address violations of the law of
nations. As discussed earlier, resolutions passed in 1781 and 1785
called upon the states to enact legislation creating both criminal
sanctions for violations of the law of nations and also civil remedies
to compensate those injured by such violations.16 The very first
Congress followed through, sanctioning violations of the law of
nations by providing both criminal and civil remedies. The Crime
Bill of 1790 made it a federal crime to commit certain violations of
the diplomatic rights of ambassadors, consuls, and other foreign
representatives.164 The statute specifically incorporated "the law of
nations," making it a crime, for example, to "assault, strike, wound,
imprison, or in any other manner infract the law of nations, by
offering violence to the person of an ambassador or other public
minister.... 165 Further criminal law codification was unnecessary
in the early years of the federal government, since it was generally
assumed that the federal courts had the power to sanction common
law crimes-a power that was not definitively rejected by the
Supreme Court until 1816.166 Several cases record prosecutions
based on common law violations of the law of nations, without the
need for congressional action to define the offense or the proper
punishment.16
In its first session, as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the First
Congress also codified the civil side of the Offenses Clause,
authorizing federal court jurisdiction over claims by aliens for "a
tort only in violation of the law of nations." 6 ' Although no records
163. See supratext accompanying notes 74-80, 84-85.
164. See Crime Bill of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 25-28, 1 Stat. 112, 117-18.
165. Id. § 28; see also id. § 26 (stating that persons executing a "writ or process" on an
ambassador or other public minister"shall be deemed violaters [sic] of the laws of nations").
166. See United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415,416-17 (1816); United States
v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); see also Jay, supra note 53, at 825-26, 842-43
(explaining controversy over federal common law crimes).
167. See Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 (1795); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419, 474 (1793); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1108 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360);
see also Jay, supra note 53, at 825-26, 842-43 (listing additional cases).
168. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
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have been uncovered detailing the reasoning underlying the
provision, it seems clear that Congress was heeding in part the
resolutions of the Continental Congress, which had urged the states
in vain to provide criminal sanctions and civil remedies for
violations of the law of nations. 169 The Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA) was drafted by Oliver Ellsworth, principal author of the
resolutions passed just a few years earlier.'7 The common concerns
that run from those early resolutions through the drafting of the
Offenses Clause also underlie the ATCA. ensuring redress for aliens
harmed by violations of the law of nations.
The importance of civil remedies for offenses against the law of
nations was highlighted in an early reference to the ATCA, a 1795
opinion of Attorney General William Bradford.' Bradford was
asked by then-Secretary of State Edmund-Randolph to respond to
a complaint from the Sierra Leone Company alleging that U.S.
citizens had joined a French attack on the British colony,
"plundering or destroying the property of British subjects on that
coast." 72 Bradford responded that attacks against a country with
which the United States is at peace, if committed within the
territory or jurisdiction of the United States, would constitute "an
offense against this country," and would be "punishable by the laws
of this country."' 73 He found that criminal prosecution would not be
possible if the acts were committed within the territory of a foreign
country, and expressed some doubt about the statutory
authorization for such prosecutions if the events took place "on the
high seas."'7 4 Bradford concluded, however, that civil remedies for
the "offense" were both possible and perhaps preferable:
But there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who
have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a
civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being
expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues
for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of
(1994)). For a full discussion, see infra notes 303-20 and accompanying text.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80, 84-85.
170. See supra note 81.
171. See IOp. Atty. Gen. 57, 59 (1795).

172. Id. at 58.
173. Id.
174. I& at 58-59.
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the United States; and as such a suit may be maintained by
evidence taken at a distance, on a commission issued for that

purpose, the difficulty of obtaining redress would not be so great
as in a criminal prosecution, where viva voce testimony alone
can be received as legal proof.' 5
In a similar vein, Attorney General Randolph informed the
Secretary of State in 1792 that the unauthorized removal of slaves
from Martinique might constitute the "offense" of piracy, for which
the culprit could face either criminal trial or a civil case instituted
by the slave owners for restitution.'76 Thus, in the years shortly
after the ratification of the Constitution, these key figures in the
developing U.S. legal system viewed criminal prosecution and civil
actions for damages as two means by which offenses against the law
of nations could be sanctioned.
Early cases addressing violations of the law of nations also
recognized the importance of civil remedies for such offenses. One
of the few prize cases decided during the period predating
ratification of the Constitution for which a written record has
survived, The San Antonio, concerned the capture of a ship in the
mouth of the Mississippi River.177 The case provoked a diplomatic
uproar, with Spain insisting that the capture violated Spanish
sovereignty. The Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, a court
established by the Continental Congress to hear appeals from state
court decisions in prize cases,'7 8 found that the capture violated the

law of nations and ordered both payment of damages and
restitution of the seized vessel and cargo. 7 9
175. Id. at 59.
176. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 29, 29-30 (1792). Civil proceedings, Randolph noted, had the
distinct advantage of"imposing] the expense ofa suit upon the individuals interested, rather
than to assume any responsibility on the United States." Id. at 30.
177. See Henry J. Bourguignon, Incorporationofthe Law ofNationsDuringtheAmerican
Revolution-The Case ofthe SanAntonio, 71 AMJ. INT LL. 270 (1977). Bourguignon's article
reconstructs in detail the record and legal arguments of the case, as gleaned from notes and
scattered references.
178. See id. at 276 (explaining the history of this Court of Appeals); see also HENRY J.
BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT. THE FEDERAL APPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE

AMERICAN REvOLUTION 1775-1787 (1977) (same).
179. See Bourguignon, supranote 177, at 292. Bourguignon notes that the litigants relied
heavily on The Law ofNations, the well-known treatise by Emmerich de Vattel published in
1758 and available in an English translation published in 1759-60. See VATTEL, supranote
51; Bourguignon, supra note 177, 284 n.73. Vattel called for both punishment and
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In a series of admiralty cases in the 1790s, the courts again
recognized that a seizure of property at sea in violation of the law

of nations constituted an offense against the law of nations, and
that the victim could obtain compensation in a civil suit for
restitution, compensation, or other monetary reparations. In Talbot
v. Janson,for example, the Court held that the seizure of a ship by
U.S. citizen constituted "not merely an offense against the [United
States], but also against the law of nations."' Restitution was

proper, the Court concluded, whether or not the unlawful taking
constituted piracy within the meaning of the congressional

statute.'8 ' The following year, the Court found that a civil in rem
proceeding under admiralty jurisdiction was a proper remedy for
the "offense" of exporting arms to a nation with which the United
States was not at war." 2 When the French Ambassador to the

United States organized privateers to seize British ships, Hamilton
recognized that criminal penalties were possible, noting that under
the law ofnations, "[f] oreign recruitersare hangedimmediately, and

"satisfaction" for offenses against the law of nations:

Whoever offends the state, injures its rights, disturbs its tranquility, or does it
a prejudice in any manner whatsoever, declares himself its enemy, and exposes
himself to be justly punished for it. [The sovereign] should avenge his wrongs,
punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to make full reparation ....
VATrEL, supra note 51, at 161.
The Court of Appeals was not granted the authority to enforce its decisions, and the
Massachusetts courts adamantly refused to recognize the judgment, despite the explicit
request for enforcement from the Continental Congress. See Bourguignon, supra note 177,
at 292-94. As Bourguignon concludes, the case "glaringly exposed the inadequacy of this
appellate prize system established by the Continental Congress," and undoubtedly
contributed to the framers' resolve to create a federal court system with the power to enforce

its decrees. Id. at 295.
180. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 (1775).
181. See id.
182. See United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796). The Attorney General
argued that the case was criminal, given that the owner of the ship had violated a criminal
statute (as a criminal matter, the Circuit Court would not have had jurisdiction over the
appeal). See id at 298-99. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the action was a civil
claim for forfeiture of the ship, not a criminal prosecution of its owner: "[W1t is a civil cause:
It is a process in the nature of a libel in rem; and does not, in any degree, touch the person
of the offender." Id at 301; see also United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795)
(demanding compensation for a tortious act at sea, in violation of the law of nations).
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very justly." l"a In this case, however, he urged reliance 1on a civil

remedy, recommending restitution of the seized vessels.

8

In the controversial Henfield's Case, leading jurists among the
framers stressed the U.S. obligation to impose sanctions for offenses
against the law of nations, emphasizing both the duty to so act and
the range of responses open to the government. 5 The case played
a key role in the controversy over federal common law crimes,

triggering concerns that led to Supreme Court decisions finding
such criminal jurisdiction unconstitutional.'8 6 Despite the short life
of its holding as to common law crimes, the case illustrates the mix
of criminal and civil remedies available as sanctions for violations
of international law. As Wilson instructed the Grand Jury, "faults
or offenses" committed by individuals should not be automatically
imputed to their government, for "[iun every state, disorderly

citizens are unhappily to be found."'87 The consequences for the
nation may be mitigated if the individual is held accountable, both
through punishment and by requiring the culprit to "make
satisfaction" or offer reparation:
183. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (May 15, 1793), reprintedin
4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 408, 410 (H. Lodge ed., 1904).
184. See id. at 414-15; see also Stewart Jay, Origins ofFederal Common Law: PartOne,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1042-43 (1985) (discussing the incident in the context of the larger
"neutrality controversy").
185. 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
186. The background to the Henfield controversy is detailed in Jay, supra note 184, at
1042-53, as well as in several annotations to the reported record of the case. See Henfield's
Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1099 n.1, 1116, 1122-23 n.7. During the hostilities between Great Britain
and France, President Washington issued a controversial Proclamation of Neutrality. See id.
at 1102. Gideon Henfield joined the crew of a French privateer in various attacks on British
ships; at trial, he claimed ignorance of the law. See id. at 1110. Henfield's prosecution for a
common law violation of the neutrality act raised the ire of the vocal supporters of the
French battle against the former enemy of the new nation. See Jay, supranote 184, at 104252. Judges Wilson, Iredell, and Peters, as well as prosecutors Rawle and Randolph, all agreed
that the federal government had the power to impose criminal punishment for nonstatutory
violations of the law of nations, and so instructed the jury. See id. at 1050. Their position
horrified opponents of the growing federal powers, seemingly confirming fears that the
central government would become an instrument of unchecked repression. This combination
of hostility toward the common law indictment and sympathy for the French led to perhaps
the first recorded act of jury nullification in the young legal system: the jury acquitted
Henfield, despitejuryinstructions which clearly directed them to find him guilty, and he was
carried offto celebrate with his French allies. See id. at 1051. Unfortunately, his zeal led him
to enlist once more in the French cause, and he was soon taken prisoner by the British after
another attack on British shipping. See id. at 1051 n.240.
187. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1108.
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Let such be held responsible, when they can be rendered
amenable for the consequences of their crimes and disorders.
If the offended nation have the criminal in its power, it may
without difficulty punish him, and oblige him to make
satisfaction. When the offending citizen escapes into his own
country, his nation should oblige him to repair the damage, if
reparation can be made, or should punish him according to the
measure of his offense."c
Rawls, the district attorney, and Randolph, the Attorney General,
also argued that the United States had a series of options available
in response to violations of the law of nations. They stressed that
the violation of neutrality constituted "an offense against the law of
nations," and was therefore "punishable by indictment on
information as such."" 9 They noted that this option, however, was
concurrent with various other remedies, including trial of the
offenders as pirates by the injured nation, as well as both peaceful
and bellicose interactions between the governments implicated in
the offense: negotiation or war. 90 "We may negotiate as well on
national as on private concerns, but without prejudice to the
judicial remedy." 9 ' Judicial remedies included civil remedies as
well as criminal prosecutions: The prosecutors refer to two English
statutes cited by Blackstone,'92 one of which authorizes courts to
"cause full restitution and amends to be made to the party injured"
by an offense against the law of nations. 3
188. Id. at 1108 (Wilson, J.) (Charge to the Grand Jury) (citations omitted). Only "[ilfthe
nation refuse to do either" does "itrender[] itself in some measure an accomplice in the guilt,
and become[] responsible for the injury," responsibility thatwould most probably lead to war.

I&.
189. Id. at 1117 (Joint statement to Grand Jury).

190. See id.
191. Id.
[lit is the honour of free states that the judicial remedy is necessary ... [O]ur
courts should, with that impartial and unbiased dignity which characterizes
their judicial investigations of truth, apply the law of nations to men, of which
nations are composed, and substitute the scales ofjustice for the sword of war.

I&.
192. See id.
193. 4 BLACKSTONE, supranote 46, at *69-70.
[1lf any of the king's subjects attempt or offend, upon the sea, or in any port
within the king's obeysance, against any stranger in amity, league, or truce, or
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3. Eighteenth-Century Usage of "Offenses"
The Blackstonian concept of "offenses against the law of nations"
encompassed a broad range of infractions that triggered an equally
broad range of remedies, including civil claims for damages as well
as criminal sanctions. The Continental Congress in the years before
the drafting of the Constitution employed the same approach,
urging that such offenses be sanctioned by both criminal penalties
and civil remedies, and the courts and leading legal figures of the
1790s shared this approach.
In context, then, the constitutional phrase "offenses against the
law of nations" incorporates this flexible approach. A brief review
of the use of the term "offenses" in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries confirms that its significance was not
restricted to crimes, but rather varied depending on the context and
the modifiers attached to it. Although often used to refer to
violations of the public trust, usage was inconsistent: at times an
offense was synonymous with crimes, but it was also used as a
neutral term, taking meaning from its modifier, as in "political
offense" or "criminal offense." Overall, the term was broad enough
to carry a range of meanings, with the writer relying on context to
make clear which meaning was intended.
At the Constitutional Convention, the various notetakers
captured speakers using the term to refer to "offensive" actions that
provoked outrage;' 9 ' as a synonym for felonies and other crimes;' 9 5
under safe-conduct; and especially by attaching his person, or spoiling him or
robbing him of his goods; the lord chancellor with any of the justices of either
the king's-bench, or common pleas, may cause full restitution and amends to be
made to the party injured.
Id. Wilson as well recognized "'The general principle" of the law of nations that "prohibits
injury and commands the repar[a]tion of damage done." Wilson, supranote 56, at 138.
194. See, for example, Colonel Mason's reference to "offensive laws," 1 Farrand, supranote
68, at 102 (Madison's Notes, June 4, 1787), and to the danger of giving"offense" to the people
of certain states, 2 id. at 415 (Madison's Notes, Aug. 25, 1787).
195. Examples include a proposal to include a requirement that a citizen of one state
committing an "offense" in another state be subject to the same penalty as would apply to a
local citizen, see 1 id. at 243 (Madison's Notes, June 15, 1787), the discussion of the power
to pardon all "offenses" except treason, see 1 id. at 292 (Madison's Notes, June 18, 1787), and
a proposal requiring that a trial be held where the "offense" was committed, see 2 id. at 433
(Mason's Notes, Aug. 27, 1787).
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and as a general term indicating violations of legal duties,
frequently modified by "criminal."19 6 Several references used
offenses and variations thereof---offending," "offended," and
"offender"-to refer to violations of the law of nations. Thus,
Patterson's early constitutional proposal described as an offense a
violation of rules regulating foreign trade, rules that were governed
at the time by the law of nations. 9 7 Randolph used the concept to
describe violations committed by states, bodies that by definition
cannot commit crimes, as well as violations by individuals. In
explaining the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation at the
opening of the Convention, Randolph stated:
If a State acts against a foreign power contrary to the laws of
nations or violates a treaty, [the Confederation] cannot punish
that State, or compel its obedience to the treaty. It can only
leave the offending State to the operations of the offended
power. It therefore cannot prevent a war. If the rights of an
ambassador be invaded by any citizen it is only in a few States
that any laws exist to punish the offender."'s
Similarly, Madison complained that the Confederation had no
power "to compell [sic] an offending member of the Union" to obey
the law of nations. 9 In all of these passages, the speakers cited
"offenses" against the law of nations to refer to violations of

international norms, 20 0 not to criminal conduct.
196. This expression was used repeatedly in reference to what later became Article III,
Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury;, and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said
Crimes shall have been committed." As originally proposed, the Clause used "criminal
offenses" in place of "crimes." See 2 Farrand, supra note 68, at 144 (Randolph's Plan); 2 id.
at 173 (Wilson); 2 id. at 187 (Madison's Notes, Aug. 6, 1787); 2 id. at 433 (Mason's Notes,
Aug. 27, 1787); 2 U at 438 (Madison's Notes, Aug. 28, 1787). See infra text accompanying
notes 218-21 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis of the significance of this
change.
197. See 1 id. at 243 (Madison's Notes, June 15, 1787).
198. 1 i& at 24-25 (McHenry's Notes on Randolph's Speech, May 29, 1787).
199. 1 i& at 315 (Madison's Notes, June 19, 1787).
200. Wilson made even broader use of the term "offense" in a 1791 essay on the law of
nations, arguing that conduct of one nation in pursuit of "its own duties and rights" that is
"disagreeable or even inconvenient to another," should not be viewed as an injury that gives
"offense": "It at such conduct, offense is taken, it is the fault of [the offended nation,] not of
that nation, which occasions it." Wilson, supranote 56, at 147 (emphasis added).
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"Offense" was also frequently used at the time in the context of
impeachment, both at the federal and the state levels. The

president and other high office holders were to be impeached for
certain "offenses." "Offense" and "offender" in these references often
referred to violations of the public trust, political offenses that were

not necessarily criminal.2"' In the debates over ratification of the
federal Constitution, for example, Hamilton specified that
impeachment should reach political offenses:
The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed
from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the
abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature
which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately
to the society itself. °2
Story as well referred to impeachable offenses as "political offenses
: * , of so various and complex a character" as to be "utterly

incapable of being defined, or classified."2" 3 Wilson made clear in his
analysis of the Constitution that impeachable "offenses" were a
unique category, unlike other kinds of legal violations:
"Impeachments, and offenses and offenders impeachable, [do not]
come... within the sphere of ordinary jurisprudence. They are
founded on different principles; are governed by different maxims;
201. At the Constitutional Convention, for example, Wilson suggested that Congress be
permitted to expel members for an "offense," and included disorderly and indecent behavior
within the meaning of the term. See 2 Farrand, supra note 68, at 156. The 1776 Delaware
Constitution used "offense" to describe impeachable "misbehaviour" or "mal-administration,"
expressions that included broad categories of misconduct. DEL. CONST. of 1776, arts. 5, 23.
The 1776 Virginia Constitution used similar wording, permitting impeachment of the
Governor for "offending against the State, either by mal-administration, corruption, or other
means," and referring to such abuses as "crimes or offenses." VA. CONST. of 1776, arts. 16-17.
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 also used "offense" to describe the "misconduct"
and "maladministration" for which a government official could be impeached. N.H. CONST.
of 1784, Part 2, Senate, Executive Power. The debate at the federal convention made clear
that "maladministration" was not limited to crimes. Madison argued successfully against
permitting impeachment for "maladministration," explaining that it was "[s]o vague a term"
that impeachment on that ground would "be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the
Senate." 2 Farrand, supra note 68, at 550.
202. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 423-24 (Alexander Hamilton) (Prometheus Books 2000).
203. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 287

(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
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and are directed to different objects ... .."2 Debates continue to
this day about whether "impeachable offenses" were limited to
"indictable offenses,"2 0 5 but just posing the issue makes clear that
"offenses" can include noncriminal (nonindictable) violations.0 5
"Political offenses" were a unique category to the framers and their
contemporaries-just as "offenses against the law of nations" were

unique within their legal world.
In early Supreme Court opinions as well, "offenses" was at times
used to refer to crimes, 0 7 but also reflected a broader sense of

public wrongs. Several cases used "offense" to describe violations of

international norms, often in prize cases.20 8 Seizures of vessels
violating U.S. laws were considered in rem civil cases seeking

remedies for the "offense" through confiscation of the "offending"
property. "The thing is here primarily considered as the offender,
or rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing.... .2 o9 The
Court distinguished between criminal prosecutions of an individual
which might include forfeiture of property as part of the criminal
204. James Wilson, Comparison ofthe Constitution ofthe United States with that of Great
Britain, Lectures in Law (1790-91), in 1 WLSON, supranote 56, at 382, 408.
205. See Jason J. Vicente, Impeachment:A ConstitutionalPrimer,3 TE)L REV. L. & POL.
117, 145-47 (1998). Compare Frank Thompson, Jr. & Daniel H. Pollitt, Impeachment of
FederalJudges:An HistoricalOverview, 49 N.C. L. REV. 87, 107-08, 117-18 (1970) (arguing
that the only impeachable offenses are indictable offenses), with Michael J. Gerhardt, The
ConstitutionalLimits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TE L. REV. 1, 82-89 (1989)
(stating that a wide range of nonindictable offenses fall within the umbrella of"impeachable
offenses").
206. "Highcrimes and misdemeanors" denotes"certain serious crimes akin to treason and
bribery (high crimes'), as well as certain serious political offenses that were not necessarily
indictable as crimes ('high misdemeanors'). The Framers thus viewed impeachable acts as
'great offenses. ' Ken Gormley, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel:A Dysfunctional
Union, 51 STAN. L. REV. 309, 329 (1999) (citing RAouL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE
CONSTrTUTIONAL PROBLEMS 91 (1973)) (additional citations omitted).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 DalL) 17,18 (1795) (referring to treason
and other crimes as offenses); Georgiav. Braislford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402,403 (1792) (referring
to treason and other crimes triggering confiscation of the defendant's property as offenses).
208. See, e.g., Darby v. The Brig Erstern, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 34, 36 (Fed. Ct. App. 1782)
(stating that a flagrant violation of international rules governing neutrality constitutes an
offense); Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 n.a (Ct. C.P. Phila. County 1781) (describing
attorney's argument that attachment of goods belonging to the Commonwealth of Virginia
in violation ofthe law ofnations would constitute an offense).
209. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827); see also United States v. 1960 Bags
of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814) (upholding forfeiture of coffee from innocent
purchasers, because the forfeiture occurred at the time the "offense" was committed, and
remained with the property as it changed hands).
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sanction, and civil in rem proceedings directed against the offending
property itself.21 °
The term "offenses" was also broad enough to refer generally to
violations of legal obligations. Thus torts, particularly egregious
torts calling for punitive damages, were often described as offenses.

In an oft-quoted holding, for example, the Court stated:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in
actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury
may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive
damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his
offense rather
than the measure of compensation to the
211

plaintiff.

The Court proceeded to discuss this "offense" in language that

indicates the overlap between criminal and civil proceedings: "By
the common as well as by statute law, men are often punished for
aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of a civil action,
and the damages, inflicted by way of penalty or punishment, given
to the party injured."212 As these varied examples illustrate, the
term "offenses" was used to refer to a wide range of violations or
transgressions of various rules of law-regulatory rules and moral
precepts as well as civil and criminal statutes-for which the
appropriate sanctions varied just as widely.2 1
210. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14. Given that this action is directed against the
property, not its owner, seizure is justified regardless of whether the property owner was
aware of the offense committed by the property: "[This] is a proceeding against the vessel,
for an offense committed by the vessel, which is not less an offense, and does not the less
subject her to forfeiture, because it was committed without the authority, and against the
will of the owner." United States v. The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979,982 (C.C.D. V. 1818)
(No. 15,612). These holdings as to the civil nature of actions seizing property that has
committed an "offense," even when the offense concerned a violation of a criminal statute,
provide the foundation for modern analysis of the nature of civil forfeiture statutes. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1998) (quoting The Palmyrain discussion
of civil forfeitures). In Bajakajian,Justice Thomas noted that the "'guilty property' theory
behind in rem forfeiture can be traced to the Bible, which describes property being sacrificed
to God as a means of atoning for an offense." Id. at 330 n.5.
211. Dayv. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363,371 (1851); see alsoVasse v. Smith, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 226, 231 (1810) ("The conversion is still in its nature a tort... and is within that
class of offenses for which infancy cannot afford protection.").
212. Woodworth, 54 U.S. at 371.
213. Contemporary usage of the word "offense" displayed a similar inconsistency, with
usage ranging from broad misbehavior to criminal misconduct, as well as usage as a neutral

20001

FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

501

4. "Offenses" in the Constitution

The word "offense" is used three times in the Constitution: in the
Offenses Clause;214 in defining the President's pardon power;21 and
in the Fifth Amendment.21 As we shall see, the Supreme Court has
consistently found "offenses" to be a broader category than "crimes."
The most salient characteristic of the Court's "offenses"
jurisprudence, however, has been its clause-specific approach. As
the Court said in relation to the prohibition on bills of attainder:
"[The proper scope of [this] Clause, and its relevance to
contemporary problems, must ultimately be sought by attempting
to discern the reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution, and the
evils it was designed to eliminate."217 Similarly, the constitutional
meaning of "offenses" has varied according to the purpose of the
clause in which it is used.
The Supreme Court's first discussion of the meaning of "offenses"
actually arose not from its use in the Constitution, but rather from
its deletion. The Constitution provides that "[t]he Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury."218 As
presented to the Constitutional Convention, the clause provided
that "the trial of all criminal offenses ... shall be by jury"; "all
criminal offenses" was replaced by "all crimes" in a unanimous
term, gaining meaning through the adjective attached to it, as in "criminal offense." For
example, early Pennsylvania decisions often used "offense" to refer to crime, but usage also
reflected abroader meaning. Compare, e.g., Ingles v. Bringhurst, 1U.S. (1 Dall.) 341,345 (Ct.
C.P. Phila. 1788) (defining failure to pay share of cost of "party wall" as an offense),
Respublica v. Teischer, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 335, 337-38 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1788) (debating whether the
"offense" of killing a horse is "indictable" or whether plaintiff"is left to his civil remedy"), and
Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 114 (Ct. Oyer & Terminer Phila. 1784)
(stating that violation of the law of nations is an offense), with Respublica v. Mulatto Bob,
4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 145, 146 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1795) (murder), The Commonwealth v. Dillon, 4 U.S.
(4 Dall.) 116,117 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1792) (arson), Jones v. Ross, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 143, 143-44 (Sup.
Ct. Pa. 1792) (crimes), and Johnson v. Hocker, 1 U.S. (1 Dali.) 406, 408 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1789)
(forgery).
214. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 10.
215. See id. art. 11, § 2, c.1 (granting the President the "Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment").
216. See id. amend. V ("[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb ....
").
217. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,442 (1965).
218. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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vote. 21 9 To interpret the reach of the right to a jury trial, the
Supreme Court first turned to Blackstone for an analysis of the
meaning of the word "crime":
A crime, or misdemeanor, is an act committed, or omitted, in
violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it.
This general definition comprehends both crimes and
misdemeanors; which, properly speaking, are mere synonymous
terms; though in common usage the word "crimes" is made to
denote such offenses as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye;
while smaller faults and omissions of less consequence are
comprised under the gentler name of "mi[sidemeanors" only."20
Given this definition of "crimes" as "offenses ...

of a deeper and

more atrocious dye," the Court read the replacement of "criminal
offenses" with "crimes" as narrowing the reach of the constitutional
protection:
The significance of this change cannot be misunderstood. If the
language had remained "criminal offenses," it might have been
contended that it meant all offenses of a criminal nature, petty
as well as serious, but when the change was made from
"criminal offenses" to "crimes," and made in the light of the
popular understanding of the meaning of the word "crimes," as
stated by Blackstone, it is obvious that the intent was to
exclude from the constitutional requirement of a jury the trial
of petty criminal offenses."'
To the framers, the Court concluded, "criminal offenses"
encompassed all "offenses of a criminal nature," including petty
crimes as well as felonies and others of a "more atrocious dye,"
while the term "crimes" was limited to more serious violations. As
a result, the Court held that the constitutional right to a jury trial
does not apply to petty criminal offenses, those that are excluded
from the category of "crimes." The analysis confirms that "offense"
by itself is an ambiguous word, taking its meaning from the context
and modifiers attached to it. The expressions "criminal offenses"
219. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70 (1904).
220. Id. at 69-70 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supranote 46, at *5).
221. Id, at 70.
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and "offenses of a criminal nature," after all, would be redundant
unless the term "offenses" by itself is broader than criminal
violations.
In an analysis of the President's power to pardon. "Offenses
against the United States,"222 the Court again concluded that
"offenses" is a broader term than "crimes": "[Tihe term 'offenses' is
used in the Constitution in a more comprehensive sense than are
the terms 'crimes' and 'criminal prosecutions. "2 2' In Ex parte
Grossman, "offense" was read to include criminal contempts. The
Court explained at some length that contempt proceedings are "sui
generisand not criminal prosecutions" within the protections of the
Sixth Amendment or other provisions of the Bill of Rights.224 Thus,
once again the Court found that the term "offense" in the
Constitution is not a synonym for "crime"; for the purposes of the
Pardons Clause, "offense" includes certain contempt adjudications.
The Supreme Court has also recognized the breadth of the term
"offense" in analyzing the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The Clause states: "[Nior shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."225 As
discussed at greater length in the next section, the Court has
struggled to respond to the recognition that civil penalties can be
imposed as punishment for an offense, but only criminal
punishment by the same sovereign triggers the Double Jeopardy
Clause.226 In an early case involving the Double Jeopardy Clause,
the Court drew an analogy to the common (and constitutional)
imposition of both civil and criminal sanctions on an offender: "A
man may be compelled to make reparation in damages to the
injured party, and be liable also to punishment for a breach of the
public peace, in consequence of the same act; and may be said, in
common parlance, to be twice punished for the same offense."227 For
the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, therefore, an "offense"
222. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President ...shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.").
223. Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 117 (1925).

224. Id.
225. U.S. CONST.amend. V.
226. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); infra text accompanying notes 237-

44.
227. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13,19-20 (1852); see United States ex rel. Marcus

v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1942).
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can trigger both civil and criminal punishment, but only the threat
of double criminalpunishment is barred by the Clause. To arrive at
an understanding of the significance of this constitutional
protection, the Court has had to look beyond the ambiguous terms
"offense" and "punishment" to give effect to the intent underlying
this particular Clause.
As these constitutional usages indicate, "offenses" is a broader
term than "crimes," with a range of possible meanings; its
significance can be determined only by looking at the use of the
word in context. As we have seen, the context of the Offenses
Clause points to a broad authorization to regulate, sanction, and
deter violations of international law.
B. To Punish
Just as the term "offense" encompasses civil as well as criminal
wrongs, the term "punish" includes civil as well as criminal
consequences. As with the analysis of "offenses" in general, and of
"offenses against the law of nations" in particular, an
understanding of this term turns on an understanding of the
purpose of the particular constitutional clause in which it is used;
nothing in the word "punish" itself limits Congress to criminal
sanctions.22
A few years before the drafting of the Constitution, the
Continental Congress had appointed a committee "to prepare a
recommendation to the states to enact laws for punishing
infractions of the laws of nations."2 2 9 This committee reported three
antecedent problems: the failure of state criminal justice systems
to "sufficiently comprehend offenses against the law of nations"; the
danger that the United States might be held responsible by a
foreign nation for its failure to punish transgressions; and the
importance of requiring the offender to compensate those injured by

228. See Wayne A. Logan, The ExPostFactoClauseand the JurisprudenceofPunishment,
35 AM. CRIm. L. Rav. 1261, 1280-81 (1998) (analyzing recent Supreme Court decisions as
concluding that "the answer to whether a particular sanction is 'punishment,' at bottom,
should be driven by the identity of the particular constitutional challenge before the Court").
229. Randolph et al., supranote 74, at 66 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying
notes 74-80.
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a violation of the law of nations "out of his private fortune."230 The
recommendation reflected each of these points, including the tort
aspect, and recommended that the states "authorise suits to be
instituted for damages by the party injured." 1
The concept of civil damages as a form of punishment would not
have been foreign to the framers. They, no less than ourselves,
understood that an award of civil penalties might amount to
punishment, as stated in an oft-cited 1763 decision: "Damages are
designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but
likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such
proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the
jury to the action itself."2 " This realization carries through to recent
cases noting that "even remedial sanctions carry the sting of
punishment."' 3 The overlap between the assorted goals of various
civil and criminal sanctions is unsurprising, for "sanctions
frequently serve more than one purpose,"234 and those purposes are
not rigidly divided between the civil and criminal realms. 5
The mode by which the "penalty" is imposed-by civil or criminal
actions-is irrelevant to its character as a form of punishment for
the underlying "offense":
Admitting that the penalty may be recovered in a civil action,
as well as by a criminal prosecution, it is still as a punishment
for the infraction of the law. The term "penalty" involves the
idea of punishment, and its character is not changed by the
mode in which it is inflicted, whether by a civil action or a
criminal prosecution.... He has been punished in the amount

230. Randolph et al., supra note 74, at 66.
231. Id. at 66-67.
232. Wilkes v. Wood, 1 Lofft. 1, 18-19, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (K.B. 1763) (emphasis
added), quotedin Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,274 n.20
(1989).
233. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 (1989).
234. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993).
235. As the Court noted in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965), "[ilt would
be archaic to limit the definition of'punishment' to retribution.' Punishment serves several
purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive." Justice Frankfurter noted
some years earlier, "[plunitive ends maybe pursued in civil proceedings, and, conversely, the
criminal process is frequently employed to attain remedial rather than punitive ends."
United States ex reL. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,554 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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paid upon the [civil] settlement for the offense with which he
was charged .... 2 6

The divide between the civil and the criminal is of great
importance, however, to the determination of the applicability of
several constitutional provisions. In its long and tortured efforts to
distinguish between civil and criminal proceedings, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the fact that a defendant is punished is
not determinative; civil actions often result in sanctions that
constitute punishment. "By the common as well as by statute law,
men are often punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts,
by means of a civil action, and the damages, inflicted
by way of
"2 7
penalty or punishment, given to the party injured. 3
The Court rejected an early challenge to a state criminal
conviction on the grounds that it punished for the same offense as
a federal statute, noting that offenders can be punished through
imposition of both civil and criminal "punishment." The Double
Jeopardy Clause is not implicated where both civil damages and
criminal sanctions are imposed "in consequence of the same act,"
even though the defendant "may be said, in common parlance, to be
twice punished for the same offense." 28 Compensatory damages to
the civil plaintiff can constitute "punishment"-but for the purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the mere fact that a particular
sanction imposes "punishment" is not sufficient to trigger the
various constitutional protections afforded in criminal proceedings.
The Court has struggled with this problem in the past decade. In
United States v. Halper, the Court held that the fact that a civil
remedy constituted punishment might trigger the concerns of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, noting that "[the notion of punishment,
as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the
civil and the criminal law."2 9 The double jeopardy aspect of this
holding was overruled in Hudson v. United States, which revived
the longstanding constitutional recognition that, while both civil
and criminal proceedings may serve to "punish," only criminal
proceedings trigger the special protections of the Double Jeopardy
236. United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611 (1880).
237. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
238. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852); see Hess, 317 U.S. at 549.50.
239. 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989).
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Clause.' Thus, the first step in the constitutional analysis is to
determine "[wihether a particular punishment is criminal or civil,"
a matter of statutory construction relying on the intent of the
legislature.24 '
That civil remedies can constitute "punishment" is even more
clear when considering punitive damages. As the Supreme Court
noted in a recent case, civil damage awards in excess of the amount
necessary to redress the injured plaintiff were an established
practice in the eighteenth century:
[Tihe practice of awarding damages far in excess of actual
compensation for quantifiable injuries was well recognized at
the time the Framers produced the EighthAmendment. Awards
of double or treble damages authorized by statute date back to
the 13th century, and the doctrine was expressly recognized in
cases as early as 1763.'
The modern Supreme Court has also made it clear that "punitive
damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence,
which are also among the interests advanced by the criminal
law."' Indeed, as Justice O'Connor noted in dissent in BrowningFerris:"The Court's cases abound with the recognition of the penal
nature of punitive damages." 2'

240. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
241. Id. at 99.
242. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 274 (1989) (citing
Wilkes v. Wood, 1 Lofib. 1, 18-19, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (K.B. 1763)) (additional citations
omitted).
243. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 275.
244. Id. at 297 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As the Court noted in Beckwith v. Bean: "The
principle ofpermitting damages, in certain cases, to go beyond naked compensation, is for
example, and the punishment of the guilty party for the wicked, corrupt, and malignant
motive and design which prompted him to the wrongful act." 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 266,277 (1878).
See also Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, stating that in civil cases, exemplary
damages are imposed where there is
evidence ofsuch wilfulness, recklessness or wickedness, on the part of the party
at fault, as amounted to criminality, which for the good of society and warning
to the individual ought to be punished.... [I]n such cases, or in any case of a
civil nature, it is the policy of the law to visit upon the offender such exemplary
damages as will operate as punishment and teach the lesson of caution to
prevent a repetition of criminality....
147 U.S. 101, 115-16 (1893).
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Use of the term "punish" in the Offenses Clause, therefore, does
not limit its reach to criminal sanctions. To the contrary, civil
awards of compensatory and punitive damages have long been
recognized as a form of "punishment" of the defendant. Congress's
authority to "punish" violations of the law of nations includes the
power to impose civil liabilities for such violations.
C. The Civil/ CriminalLine
The historical context and the language of the Offenses Clause
indicate that the framers sought to grant Congress a flexible range
of options to respond to violations of international law, imposing
whatever sanctions best served to punish the perpetrators, deter
future violations, and make whole both the victims and the U.S.
government. This conclusion is buttressed as well by an
understanding of the blurred distinction between the criminal and
the civil at the time that the Constitution was framed. Indeed, a
sharp constitutional line limiting Congress to criminal sanctions
rather than civil remedies would have been an anomaly in the late
eighteenth century, for the practice at the time was to employ an
overlapping mix of civil and criminal penalties. 45 The distinction
between the criminal and the civil was both more malleable than it
is today, and less clearly pegged to modern notions of public versus
private prosecution, or imprisonment and fines versus compensation. Reading our own notions of these distinctions into the
Constitution would impose categories that were of limited
significance at the time the document was drafted.
The framers, it is true, understood the importance of preventing
governmental abuse of the criminal process, and amended the
Constitution accordingly soon after ratification. The Constitution,
and particularly the Bill of Rights, carefully delineate the special
procedures applicable to criminal prosecutions, but not to civil
litigation.2 Despite this careful distinction, however, the early
245. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
246. Article I1, Section 2, Clause 3 states: "Trial of all Crimes ...shall be by Jury... in
the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed. ."
Similarly, the Fifth
Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... nor shall any person
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legislators frequently switched from civil sanctions to criminal
penalties with apparent disregard for the fact that the defendant
would thereby gain or lose the greater protections offered by the Bill
of Rights. 7 This is not to say that the framers did not recognize the
distinction, but rather that they viewed both categories of judicial
action as appropriate means to penalize legal transgressions, and
often applied them interchangeably. A constitutional limitation to
criminal sanctions would have been an oddity in the legal
environment of the time.
To put a brief historical context behind this observation, civil and
criminal proceedings share tangled roots. The early English legal
system did not distinguish between crimes and torts. Instead,
violations of legal obligations were punished by monetary fines
payable to the Crown or by imprisonment, without distinction
between private and public wrongs or distinctive legal proceedings.
"Most offenses were punished by amercements or fines which were
exacted in lieu of imprisonment. Every tort, indeed, every civil
action, was a punishable offense."24 8 The distinction between civil
and criminal proceedings developed slowly over the centuries, with
civil proceedings continuing to reflect their mixed heritage as a
means of both punishing the offender and compensating the

be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
Finally, the Sixth Amendment ensures that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed. ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
The framers clearly thought that they knew a criminal prosecution when they saw one-as
one commentator has phrased it: "The Framers, for all their prescience, did not anticipate
post-modernism. They apparently thought they knew what the 'criminal' process was."
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection:Comments on the Ciuil.Criminal
Distinction, with ParticularReference to Sexually Violent PredatorLaws, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 69, 78-79 (1996). In practice, however, jurists of the time had a great deal of
difficulty in determining what proceedings triggered the constitutional protections, a problem
that continues to plague the Supreme Court, as discussed supra text accompanying notes
237-44.
247. See supranotes 232-36 and accompanying text.
248. Gerald W. Boston, PunitiveDamagesand the EighthAmendment:Application of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 5 COOLEY L. REv. 667, 720 (1988).
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victim. 9 The monetary payments that had been paid to the king as
punishment for an offense developed into compensatory and
punitive damages paid to the injured party through private tort
litigation.
[T]he English courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
have simply transplanted the reparative and punitive functions
from medieval times to the modern practice of private torts. The
only difference between amercements in King John's time and
modern civil actions is that payment goes to the plaintiff, not
the crown.'
On the other hand, criminal prosecutions maintained attributes
that we associate with private civil proceedings. Although
nominally in the name of the king, they were often litigated by
private parties, usually the victim, but sometimes a stranger.251 The
private party filed the charges, paid all expenses and presented
evidence. 5 Although a fine collected in such a lawsuit would be
paid to the king, private prosecutors could benefit from the
procedure by accepting a payment from the defendant in lieu of
prosecution-serving a function similar to a civil damage award. 3
Purely private prosecutions in the name of the victim were also
possible.' Furthermore, private informers or relators could litigate
249. See id. at 730-31 n.266.
250. Id. at 731; see also Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive
Damages:Some Lessons FromHistory, 40 VAND. L. REV.1233, 1267 (1987) ("[T]he function
of amercements, namely to sanction those guilty of offenses not criminal but worthy of
punishment, is clearly replicated in the awarding of punitive damages.").
251. See David D. Friedman, Making Sense ofEnglishLaw Enforcementin theEighteenth
Century, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 475,475-76 (1995).
252. See id.
253. "Compounding" a misdemeanorin this way was legal in eighteenth-century England,
and although compounding a felony was illegal, Friedman concludes that it was fairly
common. See i& at 486-87. Friedman argues that the system worked well to deter and
punish misconduct and compensate those injured:
The possibility ofcompounding provided anincentivetoprosecute-it converted
the system into something more like a civil system, where a victim sues in the
hope of collecting money damages. And while compounding might save the
criminal from the noose, he did not get off scot-free. He ended up paying, to the
prosecutor, what was in effect a fine.
Id. at 487.
254. Called an "appeal of felony," the procedure was rarely used in the late eighteenth
century. See i. at 476 n.ll (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at *312-16).
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claims for violations of statutory duties against both private

defendants and against government officials for violations of public
duties. Some statutes permitted the private litigator to keep part
of the fine imposed on the defendant. 25 Thus, in eighteenth-century
English civil and criminal actions, neither the sanctions imposed
nor the identity of the litigator conformed to modern notions of a
civil/criminal distinction.
Early U.S. law followed the English model, authorizing redress
for public offenses both through "pure" criminal proceedings,
initiated by a government prosecutor seeking imprisonment or fines
payable to the government, and through private litigation in which
a penalty or forfeiture for violation of a public duty could be
recovered by a private individual. "Statutes providing for actions by
a common informer... have been-in existence for hundreds of years
in England, and in this country ever since the foundation of our
Government."' The informer was a stranger to the underlying
action, litigating the claim for personal gain.2 57 In a society short of

public resources to prosecute criminal violations, private actions
played a key role in the enforcement of penal statutes, and many
such statutes authorized both options: "Almost every fine or
forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recovered by an action of
debt as well as by information."5 '
Civil and criminal proceedings were so intertwined at the time of
the drafting of the Constitution that distinguishing between them
255. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at *308.
256. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905), quoted in United States ex reL Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943); see also Evan Cainker, Comment, The Constitutionality
of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341-43 (1989) (discussing early history of qui tam

actions).
257. "The right to recover the penalty or forfeiture granted by statute is frequently given

to the first common informer who brings the action, although he has no interest in the
matter whatever except as such informer," Marvin, 199 U.S. at 225.

258. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805). Eleven statutes enacted by the
First Congress created qui tam actions, including several that "imposed penalties and/or
forfeitures for conduct injurious to the general public" and provided that the recovery be

"shared between the informer and the United States." Caminker, supranote 256, at 342 n.3.
Offenses included "marshals' misfeasance in census-taking,""harboringrunaway mariners,"
"unlicensed Indian trade," "unlawful trades or loans by Bank of United States subscribers,"
and"avoidance ofliquor import duties." Id Others "authorized informers bringingsuccessful
prosecutions to keep the entire recovery." Id. (citing statutes governing "import duty
collectors' failure to post accurate rates" and "failure to register vessels properly). An

additional qui tam statute allowed a suit for damages for copyright infringement. See id.
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2 59
in the historical record presents "[p] articularly thorny" problems.
"Colonial legislatures, like Parliament, made no sharp distinction
between different forms directed to the same end."2 60 Frankfurter
and Corcoran, in an exhaustive study of early criminal law
procedures in several of the colonies at the time of the Framing,
noted the difficulty of"observ[ing] the distinction between formally
different proceedings producing, as a matter of substance, the same
result."261 Listing hundreds of early statutes penalizing "petty
offenses," they pointed to "the wholly capricious way in which
infractions of the law were sometimes directed to be enforced by
formal criminal prosecutions, and sometimes by civil penalties."2 6 2
Moreover, nominally civil proceedings could lead to imprisonment
for failure to pay the fine imposed. 2" These early legal proceedings
did not distinguish between civil and criminal proceedings based on
either the identity of the litigator of the action (public official or
private citizen) or the form of the sanction (fine paid to the
government, fine paid to a private person, or imprisonment).
The First Congress recognized that violations of federal statutes
would be punished through both criminal and civil enforcement
procedures, providing federal court jurisdiction for both
proceedings. The Judiciary Act of 1789 asserted exclusive federal
jurisdiction both over "all crimes and offenses that shall be
cognizable under the authority of the United States... and of all
suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the
United States."26 4 The Crime Bill of 1790 specified that its statute
259. See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the

ConstitutionalGuaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 937 (1926).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 937 n,91.
262. Id. In one of many examples documented by Frankfurter and Corcoron, discharging

firearms in New York on New Year's Eve in 1771 subjected an offender to a fine of 20
shillings, enforced through a criminal prosecution. See id. at 946. In 1785, the fine was
doubled and enforcement shifted to civil qui tam suits, with half of the fine paid to the
informer, and half to the benefit of the poor. See id.
263.
From 1732 down to the Revolution there is abundant resort to qui tam
prosecutions for the enforcement of laws relating to fishing, hunting, Indians,
hawkers and peddlers, liquor, adulteration of food, with penalties as high as
fifty pounds and, in default of payment, imprisonment for six months at hard
labor.
264. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
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of limitations applied not just to prosecutions upon indictment or

information, but also to suits for "any fine or forfeiture under any
penal statute."265 In 1805, the Supreme Court ruled in Adams v.
Wood that this language applied to an action of debt, a private civil
action to recover money owed to the government, as well as to
criminal prosecutions.2 6 6
The confused interrelation between civil and criminal actions is
illustrated by the judiciary's struggle to classify these actions over

the ensuing decades. In Adams, Chief Justice Marshall noted that
"[ailmost every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be
recovered by an action of debt as well as by Jcriminal]
information."2 6 ' Shortly thereafter, Justice Thompson, sitting on a
circuit court in Stearns v. United States, confronted the question of
whether an action of debt seeking to recover a fine imposed by a
criminal statute was a criminal or civil action.26 8 The case offers a
striking example of the mix between what we would today view as
civil and criminal proceedings and sanctions. The litigation began

when William Cardell was sued in Vermont state court in a civil
action by a private party seeking a penalty for violations of a federal
criminal statute imposing duties on liquor retailors. Stearns posted
a bond to release Cardell from custody. When neither Cardell nor
Stearns paid the debt, Stearns was imprisoned "as bail" for
Cardell-imprisoned, that is, for failure to pay the civil debt owed

on Cardell's bond. 269 After Stearns was released early under a local
statute "relative to poor prisoners," an unknown private party

brought this action of debt in the name of the United States,
arguing that Stearns had escaped from prison and should be forced
to pay his debt.270 Under the applicable statute, half of the recovery
would have gone to, the private party---"the collector or
informer"-and half to the United States.271

265. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 32, 1 Stat. 112, 119.
266. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 340-42 (1805).
267. Id. at 341.
268. 22 F. Cas. 1188 (no date or district given) (No. 13,341). The issue was central to the
case because the court took as given that the state courts had no jurisdiction over federal
criminal prosecutions. See id. at 1189-90.

269. See id, at 1189.
270. Id271. Id. at 1192.
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Stearns argued that if the underlying action against Cardell were
criminal, the Vermont court would not have had jurisdiction.
Justice Thompson rejected this challenge, however, concluding that
the suit was civil, not criminal: "This was not a criminal
prosecution, but a civil action to recover a penalty for breach of a
statute.... To sustain this suit, is not administering the criminal
law of the United States. Actions for penalties are civil actions, both
in form and in substance .... 2 2 Thus, the court concluded, an
action by a private party to collect a fine imposed for a crime is a
civil action, depriving the distinction between the two of virtually
all normative and structural significance.
The Supreme Court has returned to this issue several times,
however, to determine what, if any, constitutional protection must
be afforded the defendant in these nominally civil proceedings. The
result has been to further muddy the line between civil and
criminal proceedings. In Lees v. UnitedStates, the Court once again
reaffirmed the civil nature of the action of debt:
[A] penalty may be recovered by indictment or information in a
criminal action, or by a civil action in the form of an action of
debt.... [Allthough the recovery of a penalty is a proceeding
criminal in its nature, yet in this class of cases it may be
enforced in a civil action, and in the same manner that debts
are recovered in the ordinary civil courts." 3
Nevertheless, the Court has applied the criminal law statute of
limitations to these civil actions,2 74 and refused to allow the
government's choice of civil rather than criminal remedies to limit
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination: "This, though
an action civil in form, is unquestionably criminal in its nature, and
in such a case a defendant cannot be compelled to be a witness
against himself."27 5 Efforts to draw constitutional lines around

272. Id. Although the circuit court upheld the validity of the underlying state court
judgment against Cardell, see id. at 1189-92, it reversed the federal district courts judgment
in the action against Stearns, holding that he had been validly released from prison under
the applicable state law and thus was not obligated to pay the fine. See id. at 1192.
273. 150 U.S. 476, 479 (1893).
274. See Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 340-42 (1805).
275. Lees, 150 U.S. at 480.
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these "quasi-criminal" proceedings continue to stymie courts and
commentators alike. 6
Traditional civil lawsuits also bore similarities to criminal
prosecutions. Imprisonment for debt was common in the late
eighteenth century, and debtors accounted for a substantial
proportion of the prison population well into the nineteenth
century.2 7 7 Recall that the unfortunate Joseph Stearns was
imprisoned because of the debt arising out of his failure to pay the
bond he posted on Cardell's behalf-that is, he was imprisoned for
failure to pay a civil judgment.278 It was not until the midnineteenth century that states began to eliminate imprisonment for
failure to satisfy civil monetary judgements, a reform drive that
was not substantially
successful until the beginning of the
279
twentieth century.
Several statutory schemes in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century reflected the common practice of combining
remedies that we would today classify as civil or criminal. The most
notorious early example, the Fugitive Slaves Act of 1793,'o arose
out of the southern states' push to implement their constitutionally
protected right to reclaim slaves who escaped to other states.2 8 ' The
criminal statute imposed sanctions on those who interfered with a
slave owner's efforts to recapture a slave. The penalties included a
276. See Gregory Y. Porter, Note, Uncivil Punishment: The Supreme Court's Ongoing
Struggle with ConstitutionalLimits on Punitive Civil Sanctions, 70 S. CAI. L. REv. 517
(1997).

277. See Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor-And a Modest
Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L REv. 809, 812-14 (1983);

Richard Ford, Imprisonmentfor Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 29 (1926). One member of the
Constitutional Convention, Robert Morris, was incarcerated nearly three years for debt, and
was released in 1801 only after Congress enacted a new bankruptcy law. See CHARLES
WARREN, BANKRUPrCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 13, 20 (William S. Hein & Co. 1994)
(1935). Another, Supreme Court Justice James Wilson, was forced to flee Pennsylvania in

1798 to avoid imprisonment for debt. See id. at 13.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 268-72.
279. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTOmS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY,
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at 249-68 (1974).
280. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 302.

281.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereo;
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence ofany Law or Regulation therein,
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim
of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
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fine payable to the slave owner or the owner's agent in an action of
debt; the owner was given a private right of action to file a civil suit
to collect the fine.2" 2 In addition, the statute granted the slaveowner
the right to sue in tort for damages.28 Thus, to secure the
constitutionally protected "property" right in slaves, Congress
offered a range of civil and criminal remedies to those whose rights
were violated.
The Court upheld similar crossover statutory schemes in other
areas, recognizing Congress's power to impose a mix of sanctions for
violations of statutory rights. For example, in UnitedStates v. Hall,
the Court considered a broad statute regulating the distribution of
federal pensions.28 4 The Court found that Congress's power to
establish the pension system implied the power to impose a wide
range of sanctions-both public and private, criminal and civil-to
protect that system.2 8 5 In an analogous setting, addressing a statute
imposing civil penalties for violations of regulations governing
railroads, the Court held that Congress has the power to create
remedies enforced by either the government or a private party:
The power of the State to impose fines and penalties for a
violation of its statutory requirements is coeval with
government; and the mode in which they shall be enforced,
whether at the suit of a private party, or at the suit of the
public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts
collected, are merely matters of legislative discretion. 8
These holdings indicate that, given the power to require compliance
with a given set of norms, Congress has the complementary power
to choose the method by which such compliance shall be enforced.
That enforcement can include, at the discretion of Congress,
penalties enforceable through civil suits or through criminal
prosecutions.

282. See Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. VII, § 4, 1 Stat. 302, 305; Robert J. Kaczorowsld, The
Tragic Irony of American Federalism:National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in

Slavery and in Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015, 1025-27 (1997).
283. See ch. VII, § 4, 1 Stat. at 305.

284. 98 U.S. 343 (1878).
285. See id. at 357-58.
286. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885).
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Similarly, given a constitutional power to sanction violations of
the law of nations, Congress is free to employ a range of different
means to enforce compliance with those norms. Such flexibility is
inevitable given the fluidity of the line between civil and criminal
proceedings at the time the Constitution was drafted.
D. Civil Regulation as an Adjunct to the Power to Criminalize
The Offenses Clause incorporates an evolving notion of
international law, as that law develops over time.28 Combined with
the broad powers conveyed by the Necessary and Proper Clause, the
Offenses Clause authorizes Congress to take all steps designed to
implement international law. As the Court noted in Arjona:
A right secured by the law of nations to a nation, or its people,
is one the United States as the representatives of this nation
are bound to protect. Consequently, a law which is necessary
and proper to afford this protection is one that Congress may
enact, because it is one that is needed to carry into execution a
power conferred by the Constitution on the Government of the
United States exclusively.'
Thus, even if the Clause were specifically directed to penal
sanctions, imposition of civil sanctions would be authorized as an
outgrowth of that criminal power by the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Under the Court's broad reading of that power, if Congress
deems the creation of a civil cause of action necessary to implement
the Offenses Clause, it can constitutionally do so; civil sanctions are
an included adjunct of a criminal power.
The Constitution grants Congress explicitly penal powers in three
8 9 piracy, and offenses on the high
other areas: counterfeiting,"
290
seas. As to all three, Congress clearly has a broad authority to
regulate as well as to impose criminal penalties. It is difficult to
trace the source of this authority, however, because the civil
287. See supra notes 10841 and accompanying text.

288. United States v. Aijona, 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887).
289. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (granting Congress the power "[t]o provide for the
Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States").
290. See icd art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power "[t]o define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas").
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regulatory power in each of these areas has an additional basis. As
to counterfeiting, the expansion of the Commerce Clause and other
constitutional powers long ago rendered the Counterfeiting Clause
irrelevant;29 ' there has been no need for the courts to determine the
full reach of the Clause.
The Offenses Clause is part of the broader provision that grants
Congress the power "[tlo define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas."292 Although both "piracies" and
"felonies" refer to crimes,29 the specific criminal language does not
indicate that they authorize only criminal sanctions. Both
commentators and courts have long recognized congressional power
to provide civil remedies for both piracy and offenses at sea. For
example, in 1795, Attorney General William Bradford discussed the
possible legal consequences for U.S. citizens who, in violation of the
U.S. neutrality in the war between Great Britain and France,joined
a French fleet attacking the British colony in Sierra Leone.294 As
"crimes committed on the high seas are within the jurisdiction" of
the U.S. courts, the Attorney General stated, the "offense" could be
prosecuted in those courts. 95 In addition, a civil suit by either the
corporation or individuals injured in the attack could be brought
under what is now known as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),

291. See Nathan K Cummings, The CounterfeitBuckStops Here:NationalSecurityIssues
in the Redesign of U.S. Currency, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 539, 539 (1999) (stating that
despite specific language of the Counterfeiting Clause, "the Supreme Court has surprisingly
construed other constitutional provisions to be the main bases of Congress' power to combat
counterfeiting, thus rendering the Counterfeiting Clause largely superfluous").
292. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. The full text of Clause 10 grants Congress the power
"[to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses
against the Law of Nations."
293. As noted earlier, the only reference I have uncovered prior to the 1990s that
addresses the issue of whether the Offenses Clause applies to civil as well as criminal claims,
a paragraph in a 1944 law review article, dismisses in a sentence the possibility on the basis
of the placement of "offenses against the law of nations" in this Clause alongside piracy and
felonies. See Pergler, supranote 24, at 325. This superficial conclusion ignores the fact that
civil sanctions may be imposed for criminal behavior.
294. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795).
295. Id. at 58. Bradford noted some doubt aboutwhether such prosecutions could actually
be undertaken, because of confusion about the terms of the authorizing legislation. He did
not question, however, the federal government's power to provide for such prosecutions. See
id. at 58-59.
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which provides federal jurisdiction for torts in violation of the law

of nations."'
That same year, a federal district court sustained jurisdiction
over a civil claim for restitution of "property" seized as sea, finding
jurisdiction under both admiralty and the ATCA.29 7 The ATCA soon
lost significance as a basis for jurisdiction over such actions, as the
Supreme Court confirmed admiralty jurisdiction over civil claims
arising at sea. 9 8 In a case implicating the Piracy Clause, the Court
decided in 1825 that admiralty jurisdiction permits civil suits for
damages against a tortfeasor even in cases where the harm was
caused through criminal acts such as piracy. 9 9 With federal,
jurisdiction over such civil litigation firmly based in admiralty law,

the courts had no need to consider the civil implications of the
powers granted to Congress by the Piracy Clause" or° the provision
governing "Felonies committed on the high Seas. 'G
296. See id. at 59. The ATCA is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), and is discussed
infranotes 303-20 and accompanying text. Attorney General Bradford noted the advantages
of a civil proceeding: Since "such a suit may be maintained by evidence taken at a distance,
on a commission issued for that purpose, the difficulty of obtaining redress would not be so
great as in a criminal prosecution, where viva voce testimony alone can be received as legal
proof." 1Op. Att'y Gen. at 59.
297. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607). I put "property" in
quotation marks because the dispute concerned "property" rights to three human beings,
slaves who were aboard a Spanish ship when it was captured as prize. See id. at 810.
298. There has been some dispute about whether the civil power was originally intended
to derive from admiralty jurisdiction. Compare William . Casto, The Origins of Federal
Admiralty Jurisdictionin an Age of Privateers,Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL
HiSm. 117 (1993) (arguing that the founders viewed admiralty jurisdiction as addressing
public litigation, not private civil litigation), with Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original
Understandingsand the PrivateLaw Originsofthe FederalAdmiraltyJurisdiction:A Reply
to ProfessorCasto, 30 J. MAP L. & COm. 361 (1999) (refuting Casto's public law paradigm).
299. The Court held in Manro v. Almeida that a civil claim for damages did not "merge"
with the crime of piracy and could be litigated under admiralty jurisdiction:
f
Upon the whole, we are of opinion, that for a maritime trespass, even though
it savours of piracy, the person injured may have his action in personam, and
compel appearance by the process ofattachment on the goods of the trespasser,
according to the forms of the civil law, as ingrafted upon the admiralty practice.
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 496 (1825); see alsoEx parteMcNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236, 242
(1871) ("Courts ofadmiralty have undoubted jurisdiction ofall marine contracts and torts.");
Solon D. Wilson, Offences on the High Seas, 18 CRIM. L. MAG. & REP. 651, 659 (1896) ("The
admiralty possesses unquestioned jurisdiction of suits for the redress of private injuries to
the rights of personal security and personal liberty committed on the high seas."). Wilsons
article considers both the criminal law and civil consequences arising out of "offenses"
committed at sea.
300. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8,cl. 10. These intertwinedconstitutionalprovisions, authorizing
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E. The Civil Power in Action: Remedies for Human Rights
Violations
Properly understood, the Offenses Clause authorizes
congressional regulation of any topic governed by the law of nations.
In particular, Congress has the power to "punish" an international
law violation by creating a federal cause of action for damages
against the perpetrator. Indeed, Congress has done exactly that in

two statutes enacted 200 years apart, the Alien Tort Claims Act" 1
and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 0 2 each of which
demonstrates congressional implementation of the powers granted
by the Offenses Clause.
Congress enacted the ATCA just two years after the ratification
o the
of the Constitution. As part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 30
ATCA provides federal court jurisdiction over a claim for damages
"by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of

nations."0 4 The ATCA was virtually ignored until the 1980 decision

in Fildrtigav. Pefia-Irala,when the Second Circuit applied the
statute to sustain jurisdiction over a claim against a Paraguayan
police official for the torture and death of a young man in
Paraguay.30 5 The Fildrtiga court recognized that the statute
a range ofresponses to violations of legal norms, further indicate the difficulty ofattempting
to sharply divide the civil and criminal realms.
301. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
302. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994).
303. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 63, 77. The original language stated that
the district courts "have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the
circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
304. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
305. 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); see also BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 8 (1996) (describing the preFildrtigahistory of the ATCA).
Although some commentators have argued that the ATCA is purely jurisdictional,
eighteenth-century references to the statute rely on its intent to grant a right to sue for
international law violations, as well as to shift jurisdiction from the state to the federal
courts. See, for example, Attorney General Bradford's discussion of the statute as granting
a right to sue for a violation of international law rules governing neutrality, supra text
accompanying notes 171-75. Every court that has reached the issue has concluded that the
ATCA provides a cause of action as well as federal court jurisdiction over such claims. See
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996)
(interpreting the statute "as providing both a private cause of action and a federal forum
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incorporates an evolving notion of international law, holding that
"it is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of
the world today." 0 6 Courts over the past twenty years have applied

the ATCA to a growing list of human rights abuses, including some
that violate recently developed international norms."0 7 Cases have
also expanded the range of defendants who can be held accountable

under the ATCA to commanders as well as the actual torturer,308
and to private actors, including corporations."0 9 Moreover, although
where aliens may seek redress for violations of international law"); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (upholding ATCA claims for
genocide, war crimes, and official torture); In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467,1474-75 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995) (rejecting argument that the ATCA is merely
jurisdictional). Moreover, in enacting the TVPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994), a modern
Congress indicated its agreement with this line of cases and their interpretation of the
ATCA. See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 1 (1992), reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84; see also
Abebe.Jira,72 F.3d at 848 (noting Congress's endorsement of the Fildrtigaline of cases). For
a full discussion of the various theories regarding the ATCA as a cause of action, see Harold
Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through
TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 22 T
INT'L L.J. 169, 186 nn.61-62 (1987); Kenneth
C. Randall, FurtherInquiriesinto the Alien Tort Statute and aRecommendation, 18 N.Y.U.
J. INTLL. & PoL. 473,477-95 (1986); Ralph G. Steinhardt, FulfillingthePromiseof Fildrtiga:
LitigatingHuman Rights ClaimsAgainst the Estate ofFerdinandMarcos, 20 YALE J. INT'L
L. 65, 72-82 (1995).
306. Fildrtiga,630 F.2d at 881. All courts that have decided the issue have agreed that the
statute refers to current norms of international law, and Congress has indicated its
agreement as well. See, e.g.,Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848; H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1992)
(noting that the ATCA permits suits based on "norms that already exist or may ripen in the
future into rules of customary international law"). The only dissenting judicial voice
appeared in a concurring opinion by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, in
which he argued that the statute should be limited to crimes similar to those recognized as
violations of the law of nations by Blackstone, an argument that has not been adopted in any
of the subsequent cases. 726 F.2d 774, 813-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
307. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246 (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against hmanity);
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (slavery); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185-89 (D. Mass. 1995) (certain acts of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment); id.at 173-75 (gender violence such as rape as a form of torture); Forti
v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-42 (N.D. Cal. 1987), reconsidered,694 F. Supp.
707, 709-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (summary execution, prolonged arbitrary detention, and
disappearance).
308. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242 (holding de facto head of state responsible for abuses
committed by his military forces); In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1474-76 (holding exdictator of the Philippines responsible for abuses committed by his security forces).
309. See Kardic, 70 F.3d at 239-45 (applying statute to private actors); Jama v. United
States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 365-66 (D.N.J. 1998)
(corporate defendant); Doe I, 963 F. Supp. at 889-95 (corporate defendant).
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the ATCA has been used primarily as the basis for suits against
foreign officials and U.S.-based corporations for actions taken
abroad, recent cases have also challenged the actions of U.S. and
local government officials. 10
The ATCA has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate over
everything ranging from its philosophical underpinnings"1 to the
significance of the word "only" in its text.3" One key dispute for
purposes of this Article concerns the constitutional basis for the
provision. Courts and commentators have generally pointed to two
interrelated grounds, both deriving to some extent from the
framers' expressed intent to centralize foreign affairs powers in the
federal government. First, as discussed at greater length in the next
section, the broad federal authority over foreign relations supports
congressional power to regulate foreign affairs by affording those
harmed by violations of international law the right to seek damages
in federal court. 13 In the ATCA, the eighteenth-century Congress
delegated to the courts the task of defining the exact contours of
such claims."1 4 Such delegation was unexceptional to the framers,
who assumed that customary international law was a part of the

310. See Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1998); Jama, 22
F. Supp. 2d at 365-66.

311. See generally STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 305 (providing an overview of the
history of the statute and its judicial application, and debates about the statute's
significance); THEALIENTORT CLAIMS ACT: ANANALYTICALANTHOWDGY (Ralph G. Steinhardt
& Anthony D'Amato eds., 1999) (presenting a selection of articles on the ATCA with an
extensive bibliography).
On the philosophical underpinnings of the ATCA, compare D'Amato, supranote 57, at 6465, stressing a concern that mistreatment of aliens could lead to wars, endangering national
security,- and Casto, supra note 59, at 488-510, stressing the need to protect foreign
diplomats, with Burley, supra note 53, at 464-88, suggesting that the statute's primary
purpose was to satisfy a moral duty to comply with international law, and critiquing
alternative theories as to the original goal of statute.
312. Compare Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations,
18 HASTINGS INT'L &COMP. L. Rnv. 445 (1995) (arguingthat the use of "only" indicates intent
to limit statute to torts committed in course of captures at sea), with Dodge, supra note 59,
at 254-56 (concluding that "only" was intended to restrict statute to torts rather than
contract claims).
313. See infra notes 324-47 and accompanying text.
314. '[W]e conclude that the Alien Tort Claims Act establishes a federal forum where
courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations ofcustomary
international law." Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
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law of both the states and of the new federal governcommon
3 15
ment.

In our modern, post-Erieworld, this unwritten international law
is part of the federal common law, a source of both supreme federal
law binding on the states, and of federal court jurisdiction.3 16 A
second constitutional basis for the ATCA, relied on in part by the
Fildrtigacourt, rests upon the conclusion that since customary
international law is part of the federal common law, cases alleging
violations of such international norms "arise under" federal law for
the purposes of Article HI of the Constitution. 17
The Offenses Clause provides a third constitutional plank, one
that rests upon a specific, enumerated power. Under the Clause,
Congress has the power to "define and punish" violations of the law
of nations. It did so in the ATCA by creating a civil cause of action
for such violations, leaving the definition of the offenses to the
courts. A modern Congress followed suit when it enacted the TVPA,
which creates a federal cause of action for torture and extrajudicial
execution.318 Congress referred to the incorporation of international
315. See Stephens, supranote 134, at 408-13.

316. See id. at433-53. Debate over this issue continues. Commentators seem to agree that
customary international law was labelled as general common law prior to Erie,and thus part
of both federal and state common law, and that Erie put an end to the mixed general common
law. Instead, the crux of the dispute centers on whether, afterErie,the "federal" components
of the general common law, including customary international law, were adopted into the
newlyrecognized federal common law. Compare Koh, Is InternationalLaw StateLaw?, supra
note 26 (arguing that customary international law is a matter offederal law), and Stephens,
supranote 134 (same), with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, FederalCourts and the
Incorporationof InternationalLaw, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley &
Goldsmith, FederalCourts] (arguing that customary international law is not federal law).
317. See Fil&rtigav. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
318. Enacted in 1992, the TVPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994), provides a modern
counterpart to the ATCA. The TVPA authorizes a civil suit by any individual-citizen or
noncitizen-for extrajudicial execution and torture, when committed by "fain individual"
acting"under actual or apparent authority, or color oflaw, of any foreign nation." Id. § 2(a).
The TVPA's detailed definitions of the two torts reflect accepted international standards. See
id. §§ 3(a), 3(b). See also the comparison of TVPA definitions with international law norms
in STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 305, at 63-68. The legislative history of the TVPA
stresses that it is not intended to replace the ATCA, but rather to define two specific human
rights claims that trigger federal court jurisdiction, and to extend the cause of action to
citizens as well as aliens. As the House Report stated:
The TVPA would establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of
action that has been successfully maintained under an existing law, .. . the
Alien Tort Claims Act.... [The ATCA] has other important uses and should
not be replaced. There should also, however, be a clear and specific remedy, not
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law into federal common law as a source of its constitutional
power to enact the TVPA, 319 and also to the Offenses Clause.120 Once
established that the Clause authorizes imposition of civil remedies,
the TVPA and the ATCA fit neatly within its grant of congressional
powers.

A narrow, ahistorical reading of the Offenses Clause would define
an "offense" as a crime and "punish" as the imposition of sanctions
through criminal proceedings, and would combine them to interpret
the punishment of "Offenses against the Law of Nations" as limited
to criminal prosecutions for acts defined as crimes by Congress. We
have seen that these cramped definitions, however, are inconsistent
with the historical meaning of the words and the legal context in
which the Clause was drafted. "Offense" was often used to refer to
violations of legally protected rights, rights implicated by injuries
to the public trust as well as private harms. "Punish" has consistently included a variety of sanctions, including monetary payments
to private parties and to the government, whether intended as
compensation, deterrence, or retribution. Most importantly,
"Offenses against the Law of Nations" refers to a broad range of
limited to aliens, for torture and extrajudicial killing.
H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1992); see also S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4-5 (1992) (same).
319. The Senate Report states:
Congress clearly has authority to create a private right of action for torture and
extrajudicial killing committed abroad. Under article III ofthe Constitution, the
Federal judiciary has the power to adjudicate cases "arising under" the "law of
the United States." The Supreme Court has held that the law of the United
States includes international law. In VerlindenB.V. v. CentralBank ofNigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 481 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the "arising under"
clause allows Congress to conferjurisdiction on U.S. courts to recognize claims
brought by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign defendant.
S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
320. The Senate also stated: "Congress' ability to enact this legislation also drives from
article 1, section 8 of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress 'to define and punish...
Offenses against the Laws of Nations.' Id. at 5-6 (alteration in original).
The Fildrtigacourt noted the possibility that the Offenses Clause authorized Congress's
enactment of the ATCA, but declined to rest its decision on that basis.SeeFildrtiga,630 F.2d
at 887; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("[The
ATCA] presumably is based upon Congress' power under Article I, section 8 to 'define and
punish... Offenses against the Law of Nations.'") (alteration in original).
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violations of international norms, subject to an equally broad range
of sanctions. The Clause thus authorizes Congress to regulate
matters governed by international law, by prohibiting conduct that
andimposing both civil and criminal sanctions
violates those 3norms
21
for violations.
This flexible understanding of the Offense Clause reflects the
"the reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution, and the evils it
was designed to eliminate," as the Supreme Court has instructed.3 22
The framers repeatedly expressed concern about preventing, as well
as punishing, violations of international law. In the language
familiar to them at the time, the punishment of an offense against
the law of nations encompassed multiple means of redress.
This formulation of the powers granted to Congress by the
Offenses Clause leaves open two sets of questions. First, such a
broad ranging power could lead to conflicts with other
constitutional provisions, such as protections of individual rights,
or the division of powers among the separate branches of the federal
government. Further, although the Clause clearly incorporates an
evolving definition of the scope of international law, modern
international norms reach into areas previously governed by the
states, raising federalism concerns. The following sections analyze
the scope of the Offenses Clause in light of these potential
limitations.
V. THE OFFENSES CLAUSE IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The Offenses Clause, one of the short list of enumerated
congressional powers, is also one of several constitutional provisions
ensuring federal control over foreign affairs. The federal foreign
affairs power has long been viewed as distinct from the powers
exercised by the federal government in the domestic arena. Recent
321. As Professor Henkin has concluded, the Clause "authorize[s] Congress to enact into
U.S. law anyinternational rules designed to govern individual behavior." HENKIN, supra note
134, at 69; see Koh, Is InternationalLaw State Law?, supranote 26, at 1835 (describing the
Offenses Clause as granting power "to define and fashion federal rules with regard to the law
of nations"). Judge Bork has summarized the Clause as empowering Congress "to enforce
adherence to the standards ofthe law of nations." Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450,1458 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), affd inpart and rev'd in part by Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
322. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,442 (1965) (referring to the clause prohibiting
bills of attainder).
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scholarship, however, has challenged the federal primacy over
foreign affairs, criticizing the view that the federal government has
greater powers in foreign affairs than it has in the domestic sphere
as "foreign affairs exceptionalism. 323 A proper interpretation of the
long-ignored Offenses Clause adds weight to the conclusion that the
framers themselves were foreign affairs exceptionalists, crafting a
Constitution that affords Congress broad power to legislate on
otherwise domestic matters that implicate international law.
In this part, I examine the impact of the long-overlooked Offenses
Clause on the traditional analysis of the federal foreign affairs
power. I first consider the general contours of the foreign affairs
power, and then review several potential limitations: individual
rights, separation of powers, and, in particular, federalism.
Although the individual rights protected by the Constitution and its
division of powers among the branches of the federal government do
impact upon the foreign affairs power, federalism concerns are
largely irrelevant. Finally, to demonstrate one of the consequences
of an accurate understanding of the Offenses Clause, I apply this
new interpretation to the example posed at the outset of this
Article, concluding that Congress has the power to prohibit the
juvenile death penalty, should it find that such a prohibition is
necessary to implement international law.
A The ConstitutionalStructure of ForeignAffairs
Despite its potential breadth, the Offenses Clause is rarely cited,
in part because other constitutional provisions are interpreted as
authorizing wide-ranging congressional powers in the field of
foreign affairs. Congress's power over foreign commerce, immigration and naturalization, and the declaration and conduct of war,
along with the power to enact legislation to implement treaties, all
support actions touching international law." In addition, the broad
323. See, e.g., Bradley, Breard, supra note 5, at 539 n.51 (decrying "foreign affairs

exceptionalism," defined as "the view that the usual constitutional restraints on the federal
government's exercise of power do not apply in the area of foreign affairs").
324. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the authority to "regulate

Commerce with foreign Nations," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, "establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization," iU cl. 4, "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations," id. cl. 10, "declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," id. cl. 11,
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interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause endorsed by the
Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century made it less
necessary to rely on specific enumerated powers such as the
Offenses Clause. 25
The Supreme Court has also recognized a federal foreign affairs
power founded upon the basic structure of our government, in
which the federal government handles foreign affairs on behalf of
the entire nation. As stated in a case addressing federal authority
over immigration: "For local interests the several States of the
Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power." 26
The Court has frequently used similar principles to explain federal
supremacy over issues touching upon foreign affairs. In Hines v.
Davidowitz, for example, the Court held unconstitutional a state
statute requiring aliens to carry registration cards.

27

The Court

relied upon the supremacy of federal authority over "the general
field of foreign affairs," ofwhich immigration and related issues are
just one example, a supremacy to which the Court has "given
continuous recognition.3 28
The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective
interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and
exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign
and "repel Invasions," id- cl. 15, and "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States," including treaties, i&. cl. 18.
The Supreme Court has noted that these constitutional provisions, along with parallel
provisions granting the executive and judicial branch substantial foreign affairs powers,
"reflecti] a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations and
indicat[e] a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of federal
institutions." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)."
325. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. In Chief Justice Marshall's famous words: "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistwith
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
326. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); see also MacKenzie v. Hare,
239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) ("As a government, the United States is invested with all the
attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of
nationality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other
countries.").
327. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
328. Id. at 62.
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sovereignties.... Our system of government is such that the
interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the
interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires
that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left
entirely free from local interference. 29
This has been the consistent holding of the Supreme Court, stated
most strongly in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
where Justice Sutherland reasoned, "the powers of external
sovereignty [do] not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution," but rather are "vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality."3 ° The Constitution,
Sutherland concluded, was based upon the "irrefutable postulate
that though the states were several their people in respect of
foreign affairs were one.""3 1 Despite extensive criticism of CurtissWright's historical analysis, its holding as to federal supremacy
over foreign affairs reflects basic principles of federalism.3 2 As the
Supreme Court summarized the following year: "Governmental
power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested
exclusively in the national government."m Similar statements were
made in cases evaluating the effect on state property laws of federal
diplomatic agreements, 34 including Justice Sutherland's dismissive
comments about the states' role in foreign affairs in United States
v. Belmont: "In respect of all international negotiations and
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state

329. Id. at 63.
330. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).

331. Id. at 317.
332. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94-95 (1990) (detailing the "withering criticism" of

Curtiss-Wright's historical analysis); see also HENIN, supra note 134, at 19 (noting that
"challenging [Justice Sutherland's] history does not necessarily destroy his constitutional

doctrine"). Henkin notes that, despite its weaknesses, Curtiss-Wright"has been cited with
approval in later cases, and remains authoritative doctrine." HENIUN, supranote 134, at 20.

"Whatever the theory, then, there is virtually nothing related to foreign affairs that is beyond
the constitutional powers of the federal government." Id. at 21.
333. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).

334. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942). "We repeat that there are
limitations on the sovereignty of the States. No State can rewrite our foreign policy to
conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs is not shared by the States;
it is vested in the national government exclusively." Id
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As to such purposes the State of New York does not
lines disappear.
"3 5
exist. 3
The Supreme Court relied on this power more recently, upholding
the constitutionality of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).3 36 The FSIA defines the claims for which foreign sovereigns
shall be amenable to suit in U.S. courts, and grants the federal
courts jurisdiction over all such suitsA37 The Second Circuit had
found the statute unconstitutional as applied to 'suits by aliens
founded upon state law, such as contract disputes or tort actions.3 8
According to the appellate court, since such actions neither arise
under federal law nor trigger diversity jurisdiction, Congress had
no constitutional authority to grant the federal courts jurisdiction. 3 9
The Supreme Court disagreed, analyzing the FSIA as two
complementary parts, one that defined, as a matter of federal law,
the circumstances in which sovereign immunity was waived, and
4
the second asserting federal court jurisdiction over such claims.m
If the former was a valid exercise of congressional powers, then the
claims raised issues of federal law, and the jurisdictional grant was
constitutionally valid."' 1 The Court found the delineation of the

335. 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
Foreign affairs are national affairs. The United States is a single nation-state
and it is the United States (not the states of the Union, singly or together) that
has relations with other nations; and the United States Government (not the

governments of the states) conducts those relations and makes national foreign
policy.

HENKIN, supra note 134, at 13; see also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432, 436 (1968)
(declaring unconstitutional an Oregon statute that imposed conditions on a foreign heir's

ability to inherit, finding the statute to be "an intrusion by the State into the field offoreign
affairs," and declaring that "foreign affairs and international relations" are "matters which
the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government"). See generallySpiro, supranote
4, at 1228-41 (tracing the principle of exclusive federal foreign affairs powers from the
framing of the Constitution through the nineteenth century, and noting that the principle
applies both to enumerated constitutional powers and to powers implicit in the structure of
federal government).
336. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).

337. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1994).
338. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461
U.S. 480 (1983).

339. See id. at 324-30.
340. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486-97.
341. See id. at 497.
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scope of sovereign immunity to be a valid exercise of Congress's
foreign relations powers:
By reason of its authority over foreign commerce and foreign
relations, Congress has the undisputed power to decide, as a
matter of federal law, whether and under what circumstances
foreign nations should be amenable to suit in the United States.
Actions against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive
issues concerning the foreign relations ofthe United States, and
the primacy of federal concerns is evident. To promote these
federal interests, Congress exercised its Art. I powers by
enacting a statute comprehensively regulating the amenability
of foreign nations to suit in the United States.S
The Court relied on two distinct sources of congressional authority,
foreign commerce and foreign relations. Foreign commerce alone
would not have supported the holding, given that the FSIA
addresses all litigation involving foreign sovereigns, including torts
and other noncommercial suits.' Thus, congressional authority
over foreign relations is essential to the constitutionality of the
statute.
Many of the cases triggering discussions of the inherent foreign
affairs powers of the federal government, and, specifically, of
Congress, could have been decided under the Offenses Clause. Read
in tandem with the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Offenses
Clause authorizes virtually any legislation that specifies rules
governing interactions with foreign actors. For example, the
342. Id. at 493 (footnote and citations omitted). The Court explained that the application
of federal law thus triggered federal court jurisdiction:
The statute must be applied by the district courts in every action against a
foreign sovereign, since subject-matter jurisdiction in any such action depends
on the existence of one of the specified exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity. At the threshold of every action in a district court against a foreign
state, therefore, the court must satisfy itself that one of the exceptions
applies-and in doing so it must apply the detailed federal law standards set
forth in the Act. Accordingly, an action against a foreign sovereign arises under
federal law, for purposes of Art. III jurisdiction.
Id at 493-94 (footnote and citation omitted).
343. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) lists the claims forwhich a foreign sovereign
can be sued in federal court, including, inter alia, claims arising out of commercial activity,
see id. § 1605(a)(2), ownership of property, see id. § 1605(aX4), or for personal injury or death
cause by a "tortious act or omission," id. § 1605(a)(5).
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Offenses Clause, properly understood to authorize Congress toregulate all issues concerning international law, provides an
additional constitutional basis for the FSIA. Indeed, Congress relied
on the Offenses Clause, a fact noted but not discussed by the
Supreme Court. 3 " Of the specific constitutional provisions cited
by Congress, only the Offenses Clause supports congressional
regulation of noncommercial, domestic torts committed by foreign
sovereigns.
Even if the other enumerated powers, including the treaty power,
coupled with the structural foreign affairs power and the Necessary
and Proper Clause, are interpreted as granting the federal
government exclusive authority over foreign affairs, -an accurate
interpretation of the Offenses Clause is nevertheless important. 5
The Supreme Court has indicated, for the first time in decades, an
intent to construe congressional powers more narrowly, requiring
a demonstrable connection between the constitutional language
and the congressional action. 4 At the same time, commentators
continue to debate the validity of basing federal foreign affairs
powers on the structure of the constitutional system. 7 The
Offenses Clause provides direct authorization for congressional
foreign affairs enactments, with textual and historical support for
a broad reading of the scope of the power. Furthermore, a broad
understanding of Offenses Clause contributes to the ongoing
debates about the modern division of foreign affairs powers among

344. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493 n.19; H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted
in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610-11.
345. Professor Spiro challenges the modern justification for a dormant federal foreign
affairs power that bars the states from acting in the absence of a contrary federal action, but
nevertheless recognizes thatpositivefederal powers are still an important safeguard: "[We
should be more hesitant to scale down affirmative federal powers than dormant ones....
lOin would want to reserve a federal capacity to overcome subnational resistance where the
national interest continues to demand it." Spiro, supranote 4, at 1273.
346. Curtis Bradley argues that the Supreme Court's recent decisions restricting federal
powers as unconstitutional interference with states' rights "at least raise the question of
whether similar restrictions might apply in the area offoreign affairs." Bradley, New Foreign
Affairs Law, supranote 9, at 1100.
347. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in ForeignAffairs: The Original
75 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 341(1999) (challenging
UnderstandingofForeignPolicyFederalism,
the "conventional view" that structural design of the Constitution vested exclusive foreign
affairs powers in the federal government).
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the branches of the federal government and between the federal
government and the states, debates to which I turn next.
B. ConstitutionalLimits on the FederalForeignAffairs Powers
Recent scholarship has attacked the notion that the
constitutional regime governing foreign affairs is distinct from that
regulating domestic matters. In a flurry of articles, Professors Jack
Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley have challenged what they see as
unexamined assumptions about the role of the federal government
in implementing international law. 34 Two particular concerns
animate their work. First, they challenge the role of the federal
courts in applying international law as federal common law, in the
absence of instructions from the political branches. 49 This concern

is based largely on separation of powers, the complaint being that
when the courts apply the federal common law of foreign affairs,
they enter into a realm delegated to the legislature and the
executive. Second, Bradley argues that Congress's foreign affairs
power should be subject to the same constitutional limitations as its
348. See, e.g., Bradley, Breard,supra note 5; Bradley, New ForeignAffairs Law, supra

note 9; Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 5; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary InternationalLaw asFederalCommon Law: A Critiqueof the Modem Position,
110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International
Law]; Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supranote 316; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy];
Goldsmith, supra note 5; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
InternationalLaw, 66 U. CH. L.REV. 1113 (1999).
349. See Bradley & Goldsmith, CurrentIllegitimacy, supranote 348, at 319 (stating that
"courts should not apply CIL [Customary International Law] as federal law unless authorized
to do so by the federal political branches"); Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International
Law, supra note 348, at 817 (stating that "contrary to conventional wisdom, CIL should not
have the status of federal common law"); Bradley & Goldsmith, FederalCourts, supra note
316, at 2260 (stating that "our view is that CIL should not be a source oflaw for courts in the
United States unless the appropriate sovereign-the federal political branches or the
appropriate state entity-makes it so"); Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1640-41 (noting the
difficulties arising from the application of CIL as federal common law, stating that "if
customary international law is federal common law, it binds the states under the Supremacy
Clause," and consequently "a state law that is consistent with federal statutes and the
federal Constitution would nonetheless be invalid if inconsistent with customary
international law") (citations omitted); Goldsmith & Posner, supranote 348, at 1168 (noting
that "[i]t is often the case... that courts apply CIL without any guidance from the political
branches").
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domestic powers, including limits imposed by the states' traditional
authority over domestic matters. 5 ' This federalism concern, he
argues, has a new relevance, given the Supreme Court's renewed
attention to states' rights as a limit on federal powers. Bradley
summarizes his objections by decrying what he calls "foreign affairs
exceptionalism," defined as the view that the Constitution resolves
disputes as to the allocation of authority over foreign relations in a
manner distinct from that used to resolve such disputes on a
domestic level."5 '
These complaints conflate three separate constitutional concerns:
protections of individual rights; separation of powers; and
federalism's division of foreign affairs authority between the federal
and state governments. As to individual rights and separation of
powers, foreign affairs trigger no unusual constitutional scrutiny.
But on the key issue of federalism, a distinct distribution of
authority is built into the very structure of our government. Indeed,
constitutional text, structure, history, and precedent all indicate
that the framers themselves were "foreign affairs exceptionalists,"
and modern developments have only highlighted the wisdom of
their approach.
1. Individual Rights
In principle, the federal foreign affairs power is subject to the
same constitutional protections of individual rights as domestic
powers. "Nothing in the Constitution suggests that the rights of
individuals in respect of foreign affairs are different from what they
are in relation to other exercises of governmental power."352
Although the Supreme Court suggested inMissouriv. Hollandthat
the treaty power might be exempt from other constitutional
restraints, 3. this possibility was rejected in Reid v. Covert, in which
350. See, e.g., Bradley, Breard,supranote 5,at 539 n.51, 555-56 (decrying"foreign affairs
exceptionalism," defined as "the view that the usual constitutional restraints on the federal
government's exercise of power do not apply in the area of foreign affairs"); Bradley, The
Treaty Power, supra note 5, at 461 (arguing that "foreign affairs exceptionalism" is
unfounded because the sharp distinction between domestic and foreign affairs has faded).
351. See Bradley, Breard,supranote 5, at 539 n.51.
352. HENKIN, supranote 134, at 283.
353. 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only
when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made
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the court stated that"no agreement with a foreign nation can confer
power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."35 4 Treaties
and other international agreements cannot circumvent the
individual protections of the Constitution. Federal statutes, of
course, are enacted pursuant to the Constitution and free from any
unfounded doubt raised by Holland. Thus, statutes enacted
pursuant to the Offenses Clause, as well as treaties, are subject to
the limitations imposed by specific provisions of the Constitution.
In practice, however, application of constitutional protections to
federal actions touching upon foreign affairs has been limited by an
extreme degree of deference to governmental concerns. Most
protections require a balancing of competing interests or permit
restrictions where the government interest is compelling. Where the
government claims that national security interests underlie foreign
policy decisions, the courts regularly defer to the political branches
and limit individual rights. Examples of these limitations range
from the indefensible discrimination based on race and national
origin that led to the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War H,"' to more recent limitations on the right to travel
and to free speech. 5
In Boos v. Barry, the only Supreme Court case to consider the
interplay between the Offenses Clause and constitutional
protections, the Court considered and rejected a claim that a
content-based restriction on speech was justified because of a
under the authority of the United States.").
354. 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (four-justice plurality opinion). The plurality distinguished
Holland, noting that the migratory bird treaty at issue in that case did not violate any
specific provision in the Constitution, whereas the treaty challenged in Reid violated the
constitutional right to a jury trial in a criminal prosecution. See id. at 18-19.
Commentators in the period between the decisions in Holland and Reid had considered
the possibility that the Court might find the treaty power to be exempt from other
constitutional restrictions on the theory that the Constitution does not require that treaties
be made "pursuant to the Constitution." Reid rejected this construction of the constitutional
language. Statutes enacted under the authority of the Offenses Clause, of course, are clearly
subject to constitutional restraints.
355. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
356. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222,240-43 (1984) (upholding restrictions on travel
to Cuba); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306-10 (1981) (upholding decision to revoke passport
of U.S. citizen deemed a threat to national security); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
765-70 (1972) (upholding denials of visa to lecturer invited to speak in the United States).
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compelling international interest. 17 Boos addressed the constitutionality of a statute enacted by Congress to regulate political
protests in the vicinity of foreign embassies in the District of
Columbia.3 5 8 The Court struck down the statute as an invalid
interference with First Amendment-protected activity largely
because it was unnecessarily restrictive, as evidenced by the less
severe federal legislation in effect in the rest of the nation. 5 9 After
quoting Reid v. Covert for the proposition that agreements with
foreign nations are subject to the restraints of the Constitution, the
court proceeded to apply the First Amendment to the challenged
statute, concluding that "the fact that an interest is recognized in
interest
international law does not automatically render that
3 60
analysis."
Amendment
First
of
'compelling' for purposes
Nevertheless, while applying traditional, domestic constitutional
standards to an issue with significant foreign affairs implications,
the Court recognized the possibility that the balance might be
affected in a future case by the requirements of international law.
We need not decide today whether, or to what extent, the
dictates of international law could ever require that First
Amendment analysis be adjusted to accommodate the interests
of foreign officials. Even if we assume that international law
recognizes a dignity interest and that it should be considered
sufficiently "compelling" to support a content-based restriction
on speech, we conclude that [this statute] is not narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.3 81
Boos thus leaves open the possibility that constitutional protections
might in appropriate cases be outweighed by the needs of foreign
policy, as the Court has found in prior "national security" cases.
Boos thus confirms and applies the holding of Reid v. Covert,
finding that, in principle, constitutional protections for individual
rights limit federal powers in the area of foreign affairs just as they
do in the domestic sphere. International concerns do not
automatically provide the compelling interest necessary to override
357. 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988).
358.
359.
360.
361.

See id.at 324.
See id. at 326.
Id at 324.
Id.
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constitutional protections. WhereReid considered the treaty power,
Boos relied on the Offenses Clause, and held that congressional
enactments pursuant to that Clause are not automatically
overridden by the pressing concerns of international law. Boos
leaves open, however, the possibility that the historic deference to
national security -affairs might also extend to international law,

permitting "narrowly tailored" limitations on individual rights
where mandated by "compelling" international law interests. 6 2
2. Separationof Powers
The assignment of foreign affairs powers to the federal
government does not explain the division of such powers among the
three branches of that government. This issue has provoked heated
arguments since the first years of the new nation and continues
unabated today. While various foreign affairs powers are listed and

assigned in the Constitution, it contains no general explanation of
the intended distribution of the federal power that was such a
precipitous force in the drafting of the Constitution. 363 Although
there are strong indications that the framers intended Congress to
play a key role in formation of foreign policy, 3" disputes about the
roles of the executive and legislative branches broke out quickly
362. The Senate addressed a particular free speech concern when it gave its "advice and
consent" to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 19,1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171,6 I.L.M. 368. The ICCPR prohibits "propaganda for war" and "advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence." Id. art. 20. The Senate attached a reservation to the ICCPR ratification that states:
"Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that
would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws
of the United States." See 138 CONG. REC. 8070 (1992) (conditioning ratification on this
reservation).
363. Professor Henkin has noted that "where foreign relations are concerned the
Constitution seems a strange, laconic document" in which "many powers ofgovernment are
not mentioned." HENKIN, supra note 134, at 13-14. Professor Corwin recognized the
consequences ofthis structure, describing the Constitution as "an invitation to struggle for
the privilege of directing American foreign policy." EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENt.
OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 171 (1957).
364. See, e.g., Rakove, supranote 68, at 4-16 (concluding that framers intended to allocate
primary control over treatymaking to the Senate, with the President adding some measure
of control over that body). As to foreign affairs in general, Rakove concludes that the framers
"vest[ed] substantial authority over foreign relations in the legislature while providing the
president with a degree of independence that might, over time, evolve into a capacity for the
initiation and direction of foreign policy." Id. at 17.
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during the Washington presidency. Washington proclaimed
neutrality in a foreign war without the consent of Congress,
provoking the framers to express widely divergent views about the
foreign affairs powers of the two houses of Congress and the
executive branch 3 6 5-a debate that continues today. 66 Over the past
several decades, the dispute has focused on the distribution of war
powers between the executive and legislative branches, although
few deny the reality that the pendulum has swung sharply toward
the presidency.6 7
Scholars have long debated the constitutional standards by which
foreign affairs powers should be distributed among the three
branches. Those favoring domestic implementation of international
law have generally argued that the traditional checks and balances
among the three branches of government should apply without
exception to foreign affairs decisionmaking. Thus, they have urged
recognition and protection of Congress's role in declaring war and
other foreign policy decisions, and have encouraged federal courts
to play their accustomed role in evaluating foreign policy issues,
rather than mechanically deferring to the political branches. 8
365. See RAKOVE, supranote 21, at 355-65; ABRAHA D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGNAFFAIRS
AND CONSTITUTIONALPOWER: THE ORIGINS 85-93 (1976); Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary
Martyrdomof JonathanRobbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229, 258-66 (1990).
366. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTIONANDTHE CONDUCTOFAMERICANFOREIGNPOLICY(David
Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996); FOREIGN AFFAihs AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990).
367. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why the PresidentAlmost Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supranote
366, at 158.
368. This issue, as well as the relationship between individual rights andToreign affairs,
is distinct from the division of foreign affairs powers between the federal government and the
states. Thus, Professor Bradley errs in accusing advocates of domestic implementation of
international law of 'opportunistic" inconsistency when they call for the standard operation
of separation-of-powers principles to decide the division of responsibilities among the
branches ofthe federal government, but"special" rules in determining the division between
federal and state governments. See Bradley, Breard, supra note 5, at 555-56. One can
consistently argue that the division of foreign affairs powers among the three federal
branches should be same as for domestic issues, while arguing that the federal/state division
of foreign affairs powers operates differently than the division of domestic powers. Professor
Motomoru makes a similar distinction in analyzing"immigration exceptionalism," arguing
that one can consistently call for exclusive federal government authority over immigration
while opposing the view that the judiciary is barred from reviewing executive branch
decisions on immigration matters. See HiroshiMotomura,Federalism, InternationalHuman
Rights,and ImmigrationExceptionalism,70U. COLO.L. REV. 1361,1364-65,1392-94 (1999).
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The Offenses Clause makes clear the role of Congress in defining
international rights and duties and incorporating them into federal
law. It assigns Congress a key role in determining the content of the
nation's international obligations, but a role that coexists with the
constitutional prerogatives of the co-equal branches of the federal
government. The executive branch frequently states the official
position of the U.S. government as to which norms of customary
international law will be considered binding. As the law of the sea
evolved over the course of this century, for example, the President
and his representatives played an active role both in the
international discussions that led to the development of the
relevant rules and in deciding which rules would be accepted as
binding norms by the United States."6 9 In another field, the
executive branch has recognized that many provisions of the laws
of war are binding on the United States as customary international
law, even if the United States has not ratified the relevant
treaties.3 70 As illustrated by these examples, the executive branch
participates in the formation of customary norms, sifts through
369. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD), supranote 1, pt.V, introductorynote at3-8 (summarizing
U.S. recognition of customary law rules governing aspects of the law of the sea); Henry M.
Arruda, Comment, The Extension of the United States TerritorialSea: Reasons and Effects,
4 CONN. J. INTL L. 697 (1989) (detailing history of international and U.S. positions as to
sovereignty over coastal waters and control over undersea resources). The United States'
concept of coastal state economic rights over the continental sheltW announced in 1945, was
so quickly accepted as customary international law binding on all states that it has been
cited as an example of"instant customary law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 1, § 102
note 2.
370. For example, although the U.S. has not ratified Protocol Ito the Geneva Conventions,
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16
I.L.M. 1442 (1977), the government considers some of its provisions to be binding as
customary international law norms. See Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United
States Position on the Relation of Customary InternationalLaw to the 1977 Protocols
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419 (1987)
(discussing the Reagan administration's analysis of which of the multiple provisions of the
Protocols constitute norms of customary international law, binding on the United States).
The Reagan administration's approach to the Protocols is illustrative. Having decided not
to sign Protocol I because of disagreement as to certain key provisions, the executive branch
undertook a careful review of which of its provisions were nonetheless binding on this
country as customary international law. A Department of State attorney observed at the
time, "This question is not an academic one, but has considerable practical importance,"
because the United States would consider itself legally bound by those rules that reflected
customary international law. Id. at 419. Clarity as to which rules were binding was necessary
to guide U.S. military commanders, as well as U.S. allies.
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emerging
norms, and determines which norms reach binding
371
status.
Federal courts also play a role in the enforcement ofinternational
law within our federal system, although the contours of that role
have changed as the judiciary's approach to the common law has
evolved. At the time the Constitution was drafted, the framers
recognized the legal force of customary international law, and
expected both federal and state courts to interpret and apply its
unwritten international rules.7 2 As the Supreme Court has long
held, "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction,
as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination. 73 Prior to the Erie decision, before the
courts acknowledged a uniquely federal common law, federal court
decisions were labeled interpretations of the "general common law"
shared by both state and federal legal systems. 374 In practice,
however, during the decades leading up to the Erie decision, the
federal courts began to develop characteristically federal common
law principles to govern several uniquely federal questions,
including foreign relations. 375 After Erie, the Supreme Court quickly
began to regroup these areas under the newly recognized category
of federal common law. 6

371. T[Ilt is the executive branch, far more than the courts, that acts for the United States
to help legislate customary international law." Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in
the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1562 (1984).
372. See Stephens, supra note 134, at 400-03, 410.
373. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
374. See Stephens, supra note 134, at 418.
375. See id. at 413-33.
376. See id. at 433-47. The status ofcustomary international law within the federal legal
framework has provoked debate over the past few years. Compare Koh, Is InternationalLaw
State Law?, supra note 26 (arguing that customary international law is incorporated into
federal law), Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense about Customary InternationalLaw:
AResponse to ProfessorsBradley andGoldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997) (same), and
Stephens, supranote 134 (same), with Bradley& Goldsmith, Currentillegitimacy,supranote
348 (arguing that customary international law is not included in federal law), Bradley &
Goldsmith, CustomaryInternationalLaw, supranote 348 (same), and Bradley & Goldsmith,
FederalCourts, supranote 316 (same). In these articles, Bradley and Goldsmith reject the
conclusion that post-Erie cases have acknowledged the federal common law status of
customary international law.
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The Offenses Clause makes clear Congress's power to determine
the domestic significance of international law177 where it chooses to
do so, but that power does not negate the federal courts' power to
apply customary international law as federal law in the absence of
legislative or executive branch instructions to the contrary. As
stated in The Paquete Habana, "where there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations." 78 The
federal courts apply rules of international law "in the absence of
any treaty or other public act of their own government in relation
to the matter." 79 Thus, Congress's power to regulate the domestic
incorporation of international law does not conflict with the
traditional role of the judiciary in enforcing customary rules of
international law as part of the common law.
The Offenses Clause fits neatly within the constitutional division
of powers among the three branches of government, clarifying
Congress's role, but neither demanding nor requiring an
"exceptional" redistribution of the powers of the other two branches.
3. Federalismand ForeignAffairs
Federal control over foreign affairs is deeply embedded in the
structure of our government. As a general principle, issues affecting
our relations with other nations are entrusted to the federal
government and governed by federal law.8 ' The full extent of this
power is difficult to define, although we have seen one set of
limitations, at least in principle, in constitutional protections for
individual rights. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected
similar constraints arising out of the states' traditional authority
377. The international significance of an international rule of law may be beyond the
control of Congress or any branch of the federal government. Thus, if Congress declines to
obey an international law mandate, the legislative decision may have binding legal force
within the United States, but nevertheless leave the United States in violation of its
international law obligations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 116(1)(b) (stating

that the fact that the United States has blocked application of an international norm as U.S.
"domestic law does not relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the

consequences of a violation of that obligation").
378. 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added).
379. Id. at 708.
380. See supra notes 324-47 and accompanying text.
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over domestic matters. That is, federal responsibility for foreign
affairs authorizes the federal government to venture onto terrain
that would otherwise be left to state control. The Court has
recognized this foreign affairs authority as arising out of the
structural division of powers between the state and federal
governments, as well as the treaty power. Where the basis of
federal action is the Offenses Clause, one of Congress's enumerated
powers, congressional authority to regulate activities otherwise left
to state control should be equally apparent.
The Court recognized thebroad reach of the foreign affairs power
in Zschernig v. Miller, holding unconstitutional an Oregon probate
statute that imposed conditions on a foreign heir's ability to inherit,
rejecting the statute as "an intrusion by the State into the field of
foreign affairs."3"' Declaring that "foreign affairs and international
relations" are "matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the
Federal Government,"38 the Court held that the state's traditional
authority over probate matters "must give way if [state regulations]
impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy."8 3 The
extent of this dormant foreign affairs preemption, applicable in the
absence of federal government action, was not defined in the
opinion and has not been applied since.3" But questions about the
Zschernig precedent leave unshaken the narrower principle that
381. 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
382. Id. at 436.
383. Id. at 440. "[Ihe conduct of our foreign affairs is entrusted under the Constitution
to the National Government, not to the probate courts of the several States." Id. at 443
(Stewart, J., concurring).
384. See Koh, Is InternationalLaw State Law?, supranote 26, at 1847-48.
The question of a dormant foreign commerce power was at issue in BarclaysBank PLC v.
FranchiseTax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994), where the Court considered a challenge to a state
method of calculating taxes on foreign corporations that had prompted repeated complaints
from foreign governments. The bank argued that the state tax intruded into an area reserved
to the federal government, but the Court found congressional and executive acquiescence in
the state practice sufficient to negate the claim of a violation of federal control over foreign
commerce. See id.at 324-30. Prior decisions, the Court noted, held that explicit congressional
authorization was not necessary. "Congress may more passively indicate that certain state
practices do not 'impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.'"
Id. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
Moreover, the Solicitor General expressly called on the Court to stay out of the dispute,
declaring that the state action did not interfere with foreign policy. See id. at 330 n.32.
Note that there is no question that Congress could act to preempt state statutes such as
those at issue in both Zschernigand BarclaysBank-thequestion in both cases was whether
state legislation was preempted in the absence of affirmative congressional action.
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Congress has the authority to regulate matters otherwise left to the
states where the matters at issue implicate foreign affairs concerns.
This principle was reaffirmed in two recent Supreme Court
decisions, both finding state statutes affecting foreign commerce to
be preempted by federal provisions that governed the same activity.
In United States v. Locke, the Court held that federal laws regulating oil tankers preempted efforts by the State of Washington to
impose its own rules on tankers entering Puget Sound. 8 5 In Crosby
v. National Foreign Trade Council as well, the Supreme Court
found that a Massachusetts statute barring the state from purchasing goods from companies doing business in Burma was
preempted by a federal law addressing the same concerns.38
Where the treaty power is invoked, the Supreme Court has
squarely held that the federal government has the power to
regulate actions that would otherwise be subject to state control. In
Missouri v. Holland, the Court considered a constitutional challenge to a federal statute enacted pursuant to a treaty protecting
migratory birds.3 8 7 Two lower courts had found a similar statute,
enacted prior to the ratification of the treaty, to be an unconstitutional interference with the reserved powers of the states. 8 ' The
Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument "that what an act
of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers
reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do."38 9 To the contrary, the
Court held: "It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest
exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could

385. 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000). In Locke, the Court explained the dual test governing federal
preemption. In an area traditionally subject to state regulation, there is a presumption
against preemption that can be overcome by clear congressional intent. See id. at 1147. No
such presumption against preemption applies, however, "when the State regulates in an area
where there has been a history of significant federal presence," such as the regulation of
foreign shipping. Id. Locke addressed an area in which "Congress has legislated... from the
earliest days of the Republic," the area of "national and international maritime commerce."
Id. at 1148.
386. 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2301(2000). Having found a conflict with a congressional statute, the
Supreme Court declined to consider whether, in the absence of such preemption, the state
action would have been barred under Zschernig as an interference with the federal foreign
affairs power, see id. at 2294 n.8, an argument that had been accepted by the First Circuit.
See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999).
387. 252 U.S. 416, 430-31 (1920).
388. See id. at 432.
389. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
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not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could.... .""o
Finding that the migratory bird treaty did not "contravene any
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution,"39' the Court
rejected the claim that it was "forbidden by some invisible radiation
from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.... No doubt the
the control of the
great body of private relations usually fall within
392
State, but a treaty may override its power."
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court later rejected the
implication in Holland that treaties are completely free from
constitutional restraint.393 The decision in Reid, however, reaffirmed Holland's rejection of Tenth Amendment limitations on
the treaty power, noting that while a treaty could not circumvent
the specific provisions of the Constitution, the Tenth Amendments
reservation of powers to the states was simply inapplicable to the
treaty power: "To the extent that the United States can validly
make treaties, the people and the States have delegated their power
to the National
Government and the Tenth Amendment is no
39 '
barrier."
Scholars have recently debated the history of the exclusive
federal foreign affairs power. G. Edward White, for example, argues
that the modern view of federal preeminence was adopted only in
the twentieth century. 95 Spiro and Cleveland dispute White's
history, finding ample evidence that the federal courts rejected
virtually all state intrusions into foreign affairs throughout the
nineteenth century. 96 Nevertheless, the historical studies reflect
surprising agreement on crucial points. First, the Supreme Court
390. Id. at 433.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 434.
393. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1957); supranotes 353-54 and accompanying
text.
394. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18.
395. See G. Edward White, The Transformationof the ConstitutionalRegime of Foreign
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999) (argUing that the nineteenth-century view that federal
foreign affairs powers were limited by the reserved powers of the states was replaced only
in the early twentieth century with the now-dominant view that the federal governments
foreign affairs powers are subject to no federalism limitations).
396. See Sarah H. Cleveland, The PlenaryPower Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 1127, 1128-30 (1999); Spiro, supra note 4, at 1228-41. Spiro traces the
exclusivityprinciple" from the framing of the Constitution through the Cold War, evenwhile
arguing that it should now be rejected. See Spiro, supra note 4, at 1241-46, 1259-70.
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during this period never found a treaty or a statute implementing

a treaty to be an unconstitutional invasion of state powers. s7
Second, although the Court's opinions in the nineteenth century
recognized the theoretical possibility that state powers might limit
federal treaty powers, the limit referred to was a narrow one, one
that protected the very heart of the constitutional structure. For
example, in 1890, Justice Stephen Field explained:
[The treaty power is] unlimited except by those restraints which

are found in that instrument against the action of the
government or of its departments, and those arising from the
nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It
would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize

what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of
the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of
any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent.

But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any
limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any
matter which is398properly the subject of negotiation with a
foreign country.

Thus, although White stressed that the Court "regularly intimated"
that there might be limits imposed by the states' reserved powers,
he also acknowledged that those potential restrictions were
themselves limited to infringement on "state powers so essential to
the sovereignty of the states that the federal government could not
abrogate them."399 Even the nineteenth-century language relied
upon by White recognizes that the treaty power permits regulation

397. See Cleveland, supra note 396, at 1129 ("As White acknowledges, although the
Supreme Courthad addressed several cases involving conflicts between treatyprovisions and
existing state legislation during the nineteenth century, the Court had never invalidated a
treaty provision on the grounds that it conflicted with reserved state powers."). White
recognizes that "successive Supreme Court cases, extending over a lengthy period of time,
had regularly sustained the treaty power when the provisions of a specific treaty conflicted
with specific state laws." White, supranote 395, at 24 (citing Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258

(1890), Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879), Ware v. Hylton 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199
(1796)).
398. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (citations omitted).

399. White, supranote 395, at 24.
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of less "essential" domestic affairs that would otherwise be

entrusted to the states. 4°0
As an enumerated congressional power, the Offenses Clause is
subject to no greater restrictions. The Clause grants to Congress the
authority to legislate as to all matters encompassed by it or
"necessary and proper" to the implementation of its mandate. Such
actions are, of course, subject to the restrictions imposed by the
individual protections incorporated into the Constitution. But
Congress is constrained by the Tenth Amendment and the states'
reserved powers only if its actions go beyond the enumerated
authority of the Clause. Moreover, in deciding what falls within the
reach of the Clause, Congress's decisions are entitled to significant
deference from the judiciary.
In Boos v. Barry, the Court reviewed a statute that penalized
certain protests in the vicinity of diplomatic embassies.04 1 Although
the Court invalidated the statute for its unwarranted interference
with First Amendment-protected activity, the Court accepted
without pause Congress's authority to regulate activity that would
otherwise have been left to the control of the states, solely because
of its foreign affairs impact.0 2 Noting the historic roots of
400. A contrary claimwould clash with the reality that "treaties have dealt with domestic
matters for as long as the Republic has existed.' Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to be a Nation?
FederalPower vs. "States'Rights'in ForeignAffairs, 70 U. COLO.L. REV. 1277, 1306(1999).
401. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
402. The particular statute enacted by Contress and subsequently invalidated in Boos
governed the District of Columbia; Congress has exclusive legislative authority over the
capital district. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; Boos, 485 U.S. at 327. Congress also
enacted a less restrictive national statute-in effect everywhere except the District of
Columbia-addressing the same concerns, and penalizing "willful acts or attempts to
'intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass ... a foreign official.'" Boos, 485 U.S. at 325 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2)). The Court invalidated the statute largely because it found that
Congress itself no longer felt its more restrictive provisions were necessary: indeed, at the
time the case was decided, Congress had begun the process ofreplacing the D.C. statute with
the narrower legislation in effect in the rest of the country. See id. at 325-29. The Court
"rel[ied] on congressional judgment in this delicate area" to hold that the less restrictive
statute adequately complied with U.S. obligations under international law:
Thus, after a careful balancing of our country's international obligations with
our Constitution's protection of free expression, Congress has determined that
§ 112 adequately satisfies the Government's interest in protecting diplomatic
personnel outside the District of Columbia.... [Ihfever it did so, Congress no
longer considers this statute necessary to comply with our international
obligations. Relying on congressional judgment in this delicate area, we
conclude that the availability ofalternatives such as § 112 amply demonstrates

546

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:447

international efforts to protect diplomats, the Court stressed that

"[tihe need to protect diplomats is grounded in our Nation's
important interest in international relations.""' Indeed, the Court
stated that, if anything, the pressing national interest in diplomatic
protections is "even more true today given the global nature of the
economy and the extent to which actions in other parts of the world
affect our own national security."' Whereas Boos applied the
individual protections of the Constitution to limit Congress'ss
foreign affairs powers, federalism constraints were conspicuously
absent from the analysis. Moreover, the Court relied heavily on
"congressional judgment in this delicate area" involving U.S.
405
obligations under international law.
Statutes seeking to implement international obligations fall
neatly within the reach of the Offenses Clause, whether or not
congressional action on a particular issue would otherwise be
authorized. Boos itself points to the Offenses Clause as authority
for this congressional regulation of criminal activity directed at
diplomats-activity that would fall beyond the scope of
congressional control if not for its international implications.0 6
Indeed, this was clearly the intent of the framers; several of the
incidents that concerned them during the Confederation involved
state action (or inaction) as to violent crimes-a domestic matter
normally subject to state regulation.4 °7 The very first Crime Bill of
1790 imposed federal criminal penalties for certain violent attacks
on diplomats, violent crimes that would have been left to state
control if not for the fact that the victim was protected by
international law.408
that the display clause is not crafted with sufficient precision to withstand First
Amendment scrutiny.
Id. at 326, 329.
403. Id. at 323.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 329.
406. Congress enacted the District of Columbia statute "pursuant to its authority under
Article I, § 8, cl. 10, of the Constitution to 'define and punish... Offenses against the Law
of Nations.'" Boos, 485 U.S. at 316 (alteration in original).
407. See supratext accompanying notes 59-60. The framers were also concerned with the
states' refusal to enforce debts owed to the British, also an area otherwise falling within state
control. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
408. The statute made it a crime to "assault, strike, wound, imprison, or in any other
manner infract the law of nations, by offering violence to the person of an ambassador or
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It is illustrative to compare this early statute and the legislation
at issue in Boos to recent congressional efforts to impose federal
penalties under the Commerce Clause. In United States v.
Morrison, the Supreme Court rejected a congressional effort to
create federal civil remedies for violence against women, finding the
Violence Against Women Act to be an unconstitutional assertion of
Commerce Clause powers.40 9 The Brzonkala majority dismissed

extensive congressional fact-finding about the impact of violence
against women on the national economy, because it found that
Congress had utilized a "method of reasoning that is unworkable if
we are to maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers. "'
Congress's error was to employ a "but-for causal chain from the
initial occurrence of violent crime.., to every attenuated effect
upon interstate commerce.41
We .

.

. reject the argument that Congress may regulate

noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local. In recognizing this fact we
preserve one of the few principles that has been consistent since
the Clause was adopted. The regulation and punishment of
intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities,
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always
been the province of the States. Indeed, we can think of no

better example of the police power, which the Founders denied
the National Government and reposed in the States, than the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims. 412

According to the Brzonkala majority, then, the Commerce Clause
does not permit Congress to regulate a noneconomic, intrastate
crime solely because of the aggregate impact of many such crimes
on interstate commerce. By contrast, however, Boos and the history
other public minister." Crime Bill of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat. 112, 118.
409. 120 S. Ct. 1740,1745 (2000). UnitedStates v. Morrisonwas combined with Brzonkala
v. Morrisonon a writ ofcertiorari to the Supreme Court. I will refer to the cases collectively
as Brzonkala.
410. I& at 1752.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 1754 (citations omitted).
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to which it refers demonstrate that the federal foreign affairs power
has long permitted Congress to penalize even a single act of
violence directed against an internationally protected person. The
distinction is that even one act of violence in violation of the law of
nations impacts upon international relations, and thus brings the
activity within the regulatory powers of the federal government.
Would the Court defer to congressional and executive branch
decisions as to the foreign affairs impact of otherwise local
activities? In United States v. Lopez, despite striking down a statute
making it a federal crime to possess a firearm within a school zone,
the majority recognized Congress's broad authority to implement its
enumerated powers.4 1 The Lopez majority noted that judicial
review is limited to deciding "whether a rational basis existed for
concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate
commerce."4 14 Two members of the five-justice majority emphasized
the deference due to the legislative branch's determinations
4 15
regarding the impact of local actions on interstate commerce.
Moreover, given the great deference the courts have traditionally
accorded to the political branches in the area of foreign affairs, it is
likely that a provision enacted by Congress and signed by the
President would receive a less searching review then those enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Indeed, as previously noted, the
Boos court refered to congressional expertise in these areas,
413. 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995). In Lopez, the Court held that Congress exceeded the reach
of the Commerce Clause because there was no direct connection between the possession of
fire arms in school zones and interstate commerce, and because the possible "indirect effect"
on interstate commerce was so tenuous as to threaten to "federalize" all aspects of school and
family life. See id. at 555.

414. Id. at 557.
415. While Justice Kennedy accepted that the judiciary must police the outer limits of the
enumerated powers, he stressed the primary role of Congress in determining the reach of the
Commerce Clause. See id. at 568 ("[The Commerce Clause grants Congress extensive power
and ample discretion to determine its appropriate exercise."); id. at 573 ("The deference given
to Congress has since been confirmed."); id. at 577 ("Whatever the judicial role, it is
axiomatic that Congress does have substantial discretion and control over the federal
balance.") (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy thus reluctantly found the Gun-Free School
Zone statute unconstitutional, see id. at 568, concluding that it sought to regulate actors and
activities that have no commercial character or nexus, see id. at 580.

The Court in Brzonkala cited Kennedy's opinion in Lopez when stating, "Due respect for
the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a
congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its

constitutional bounds." Brzonkala, 120 S. Ct. at 1748.
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"[r]elying on congressional
judgment in [the] delicate area" of
416
foreign affairs.
The foreign affairs power reflected in the Offenses Clause
addresses an area that has traditionally been delegated to the
federal government. If a particular effort to implement
international law falls within the congressional power under the
Offenses Clause, it will be valid whether or not it impacts activities
otherwise reserved to the states-federalism is no bar.
C. The Juvenile Death Penalty
The consequences of a broad view of the Offenses Clause become
clear upon examining domestic issues over which the federal
government exercises authority only because those issues are
governed by international law. If the federal government chooses to
recognize an international norm as binding on the United States,
either through the treaty power or acceptance of a rule of customary
international law, it can enforce compliance even in an area
otherwise regulated by the states. This issue frames the claimed
conflict between federalism and the foreign affairs power: The
authority contained in the Offenses Clause-or in other
constitutional foreign affairs powers-authorizes Congress to act in
areas that would otherwise fall beyond its domestic powers.
Several recent controversies illustrate the reach of the foreign
affairs power into areas otherwise beyond congressional authority.
For example, commentators have argued that Congress could enact
statutes such as the Gun Free School Zone, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, or the Violence Against Women Act pursuant to
the treaty power, if such statutes implemented treaty obligations.4 1 7
416. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988).
417. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension ofRFRA, 14 CoNST. COMMENT.
33, 41-47 (1997) (arguing that treaty obligations authorize Congress to provide protections
for religion that might not be authorized by Congress's enumerated constitutional powers).
An amicus brief filed in Brzonkalaargued that Congress was authorized to enact the statute
to implement both treaty obligations and customary international law, but the Supreme
Court did not address the argument. See BriefAmici Curaieon Behalf of International Law
Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners, United States v. Morrison,
120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), available at http:/supreme.findlaw.com
/supreme_court/briefs/99-5/99-5fol/brief/brief0l.html.But see Bradley, TreatyPowersupra
note 5, at 400-09 (listing examples but arguing that the treaty power should be read narrowly
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A parallel argument applies to the Offenses Clause: if such a
statute were necessary and proper to implement an international
law obligation, the Offenses Clause would authorize congressional
action. To quote Arjona once again: "[If the thing made punishable
is one which the United States are required by their international
obligations to use due diligence to prevent, it is an offense against
the law of nations."'18 If international law thus called for protecting
schools from gun violence, or eliminating certain restrictions on the
exercise ofreligion, Congress could, under the Offenses Clause, take
action to implement those international obligations. In the area of
human rights, Congress can also act to implement international
obligations pursuant to the treaty power, if the obligation is
reflected in a treaty, or pursuant to the Offenses Clause.4 1
The international prohibition of the juvenile death penalty offers
a useful demonstration of the potential reach of the Offenses
Clause. There is a convincing argument that the international
community considers the execution of defendants who committed
their crimes as juveniles a violation of customary international law.
The prohibition is contained in numerous treaties that have been
ratified by most of the nations of the world. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, states that a
"[s]entence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by
persons below eighteen years of age."420 Similar prohibitions are
contained in a wide range of other international agreements."' The
to avoid this result).
418. United States v. Aijona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887).

419. Recent human rights treaties, however, have been ratified with controversial
reservations limiting their domestic import. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratificationof Human

Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995); David P.
Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights: The
Significanceofthe Reservations, Understandings,and Declarations,42 DEPAULL.REV. 1183

(1993).
420. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6, para. 5,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175, 6 I.L.M. 368, 370. The United States expressly refused to be bound
by the Covenant's provision on the juvenile death penalty. See 138 CONG. REC. 8070 (1992)
(reserving"the right... to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant
woman)... including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen
years of age").
421. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8,
1977, art. 77, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 39, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1425; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection ofVictims of International
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overwhelming majority of countries around the world have
prohibited the death penalty for juveniles, leaving the United
States as one of the few nations to continue the practice.42 2 During
the debates surrounding the drafting of the International Covenant,
no nation-including the United States-expressed any objection to
the juvenile death penalty ban.4'
The United States has refused to follow this international rule,
rejecting the customary international law prohibition and refusing
to be bound by provisions in international treaties that incorporate

this norm.4 However, if the President and Congress changed their
view as to this rule, indicating that they accepted, the customary
norm, the international community would view the prohibition as
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, art. 6, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 614, 16 I.L.M. 1442,
1445-46; American ConventiononHuman Rights, Nov. 22,1969, art. 4(5), 1144U.N.T.S. 123,
146, 9 I.L.M. 673, 676; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12,1949, art. 68,6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 286; Conventionon the Rights
of the Child, art. 37(a), G. Res. 44125, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sees., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/44/736 (1989), reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1470 (1989). See analysis of these and other
international documents in Ved P. Nanda, The UnitedStates Reservation to the Ban on the
Death Penaltyfor Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the InternationalCovenant on
Civil and PoliticalRights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311, 1328-33 (1993).
Rights, 66 FORDHAML. REV.
422. See Peter J. Spiro, The States and InternationalHuman
567,574 (1997) (describing the United States"as one ofonly a handful ofmostly rogue states
that continue to allow such executions"). Nanda totals the juvenile executions between 1981
and 1991 as follows:
Of the reported juvenile executions between 1981 and 1991 worldwide, four
were carried out in the United States, one in Barbados (which subsequently
changed its minimum age for capital punishment to eighteen), one in Nigeria,
one in Bangladesh, and three in Pakistan. An unknown number of juvenile
offenders have been executed by Iran and Iraq. In 1992, another juvenile was
put to death in the United States.
Nanda, supranote 421, at 1333 (footnotes omitted).
423. See Joan F. Hartman, 'Unusual" Punishment:The Domestic Effects ofInternational
Norms RestrictingtheApplicationoftheDeathPenalty,52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655,671-72 (1983)
("[T]he view was expressed, without opposition, that the execution ofjuvenile offenders was
contrary to basic principles of respect for human rights and should be prohibited explicitly
in a treaty intended to be a comprehensive codification of human rights norms.") (footnotes
omitted); Nanda, supranote 421, at 1334.
424. See Reservation to the U.S. Ratification of the ICCPR, 138 CONG. REc. 8070 (1992);
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REiATIONS REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIvIL
AND POLrIICALRIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 11 (1992), reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 645,653
(1992); Laura Dalton, Note, Stanfordv. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri:A Violation of an
EmergingRuleof Customary InternationalLaw, 32 WM. &MARYL. REV. 161,172-84(1990).
But see Hartman, supra note 423, at 682-86 (arguing that United States failed to dissent
from formation of international norm prohibiting the death penalty and is therefore bound
by it).
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binding upon the United States.4 2 5 Could Congress then enact
legislation prohibiting state executions of convicted killers who
committed their crimes as juveniles, or would such a statute
intrude upon state powers in violation of the Constitution?
The answer under the Offenses Clause is clear; indeed, this
seems to be exactly the situation contemplated by the Clause.
Congress is authorized to incorporate into U.S. law the norms of
international law. Applying the Supreme Court's analysis of the
Clause in Arjona, the juvenile death penalty would be an offense
against the law of nations that the United States is bound by its
"international obligations to use due diligence to prevent."42 6 If the
United States is bound by international law to prevent the
execution of juveniles, then such executions constitute offenses
against the law of nations that Congress is authorized to punish,
through the wide range of sanctions available under the Clause.
Were Congress to determine that the execution of juveniles
impacted foreign affairs, legislation in this area would not violate
the Constitution.
CONCLUSION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY
Given that the range of topics covered by international law has
changed significantly over the past fifty years, some commentators
have argued that Congress's foreign affairs powers must be
somehow limited to avoid trespassing on domestic terrain properly
regulated by the states. The argument is straightforward: the
expanded reach of the modern foreign affairs powers would enable
the federal government to invade domestic areas, such as criminal
law and family law, that are otherwise assigned to the states by
our traditional federal-state division of powers.4 2 Such broad
425. The international norm would also become binding upon the United States if
contained in a treaty signed and ratified by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to make treaties

with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that treaties are the
supreme law of the land).

426. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887).
427. See Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1622-23 ("The problem is that the traditional

conception of foreign affairs has changed to include matters formerly viewed as purely
domestic issues ....
matters traditionally regulated by states in which the states have a
genuine interest....").
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definitions of foreign affairs and international law, opponents
argue, go beyond the understandings of the framers who drafted,
debated, and ratified our Constitution and threaten to dismantle
the federal system. To prevent the forbidden expansion of federal
powers, they assert that the foreign affairs power should be
restricted to State-to-State concerns of the kind that might provoke
war or economic retaliation, as they were at the time the
Constitution was framed.428
The response is equally straightforward. First, the foreign affairs
power contains no such limitation, but rather reflects the
fundamental principle that relations with the rest of the world
should be regulated by the federal government. The language of the
Offenses Clause, for example, was not restricted to a fixed
definition of the law of nations, any more than the treaty power was
restricted to certain subjects. To the extent that we can uncover the
background assumptions of the framers, the evidence is strong that
they understood the law of nations broadly, even more broadly than
we understand it today. In addition, they recognized both that this
body of law would evolve over time, and that the United States, as
just one member of the world community, would not be able to
control this evolution. Indeed, we have seen that when the Offenses
Clause was adopted at the Constitutional Convention, authorizing
Congress to "define and punish ... Offenses against the Law
of Nations,"129 the only recorded opposition addressed the
incongruence of a claim that the United States could "define" the
law ofnations." The framers understood that the world community
would take international law along paths that they could not
predict; rather than fixing its content, they chose language that

428. Bradley and Goldsmith categorize "what has traditionally been thought of as international law" as including "the law regulating the relations among nations," the "treatment
of diplomats and the use of military force." Bradley & Goldsmith, CurrentIllegitimacy,supra
note 348, at 325. They contrast this with what they label the "new" customary international
law, which "has developed to regulate to some extent the ways in which nations treat their
citizens." Id. at 327.
429. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.

430. "To pretend to define the law ofnations which depended on the authority of all the
Civilized Nations of the World, would have a look of arrogancef] that would make us
ridiculous." 2 Farrand, supranote 68, at 615 (Madison's Notes, Sept. 14,1787); see supratext
accompanying notes 95-98.

554

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:447

would enable the Constitution to evolve along with the law of
nations.431
This is not to say, of course, that any participant in the drafting
and ratification ofthe Constitution foresaw the expansion offoreign
affairs into areas previously considered to be "domestic." They did
not foresee, for example, that police abuse or mistreatment of
detainees in state or federal prisons would be of international
concern, reported to the United Nations Human Rights Committee
as possible violations of international law. 2 An attack on the
expansion of areas of international concern on the basis of
unforeseeability is meaningless: most of the core institutions of our
current society were unforeseeable at the time the Constitution was
adopted. 33 The significance of the phrase "the law of nations" must
evolve, just as "interstate commerce" has evolved to meet the needs
of a national economy, or the expectation of privacy in the Fourth
Amendment has evolved so as to protect against government
wiretapping.' When the nations of the world decided that domestic
human rights violations were a topic of international concern, the
implementation of human rights norms became a federal-not a
state-concern.
431. As the Second Circuit warned in Fildrtiga, courts should not "prejudge the scope of
the issues that the nations of the world may deem important to their interrelationships, and
thus to their common good." Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980).
432. See, e.g., Comments on United StatesofAmerica, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d
Sess., 1413th mtg.
17, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/79/Add.50 (1995) (raising concerns about
allegations of police abuses); id. 20 (raising concerns about prison conditions), availableat
http'//wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/US-ADDl.htm.
433. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992), in praise of a constitutional
framework that 'has been sufficiently flexible over the past two centuries to allow for
enormous changes in the nature of government").
434. See Lawrence Lessig, TranslatingFederalism:United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT.
REV. 125, 132-34 (describing evolution ofconstitutional privacy protections as "translation"
of constitutional language to respond to changing conditions). Flaherty notes that the
Constitution adjusts to changes in the nature of international law just as it has adjusted to
changes in the national economy:
It may be objected that such a change in degree-like the emergence of a
national industrial economy-could not have been foreseen at the time the text
was written and ratified. Barring a theory that would also require the Court to
return the nation to pre-Depression Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
limitations to the treaty-making power cannot be implied on the ground that
the legitimate scope of treaties has evolved along with much else.
Flaherty, supra note 400, at 1306.
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Moreover, to the extent that the goal of the Offenses Clause was
to enable Congress to avoid international disputes, the drafters
were quite astute in recognizing that they could not predict what
future generations would consider to be of international concern. In
their day, the most contentious issues concerned treaty violations,
diplomatic immunity, and protections of aliens while abroad, areas
in which a failure to act could trigger diplomatic -or even military
repercussions. Today, however, issues of trade and human rights
are just as likely to provoke international uproars. The 1999 Kosovo
War, for example, was justified as an international effort to stop
43 5
human rights abuses within the borders of a sovereign nation,
while battles over the intersection between trade and human rights
have dominated international relations over the past year. 6
. Disputes over the granting of asylum and "safe havens" also
provoke international controversy, as when the United States's
willingness to allow the Shah of Iran to seek exile triggered the
occupation of the U.S. embassy in Iran in the late 1970s; or, more
recently, when several European nations asserted the right to
prosecute Chilean General Pinochet. As systems of international
accountability, including both civil litigation and criminal
prosecution, become more widespread, the failure to hold
wrongdoers accountable has developed into a topic of international
concern. Even the death penalty, applied to juveniles, foreigners, or
even U.S. citizens, has triggered international disputes, with
objections both to the fact that the United States continues to
employ capital punishment and to the method by which the death
penalty is imposed.3 ' A broad range of topics now threaten to
435. See Joint Statement on Kosovo, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 711, 711-12 (Apr. 23,
1999) (describing the military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as aimed at
ending ethnic cleansing and other violence and protecting "universal human rights and
freedoms" in Kosovo); Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLYCOMP.PRES. Doc. 516,
516-17 (Mar. 24,1999) (describing air strikes as a"moral imperative," aimed, in part, to halt
Serb attacks "on a largely defenseless people").
436. Demonstrations at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in December
1999 brought international attention to the impact of trade on hVman rights. See, e.g.,
Coalition Promises Continued Fight Against WTO, China, CONGRESSDAILY, Dec. 14,1999,

availablein WL 28417552 ("The coalition of labor, environmental and human rights groups
that took to the streets of Seattle duriug the World Trade Organization ministerial meeting
two weeks ago vowed anew today to 'fix or nix' the WVTO .... ").
437. A sampling of headlines from the first six months of 2000 indicates the protests
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provoke diplomatic and even military confrontations; to the extent
that federal control over issues of international law is justified as
necessary to prevent such disputes, the area subject to such control
must expand along with the areas of potential conflict." 8
As these contentious issues illustrate, the concept of foreign
affairs encompasses whatever relations among nations those
nations view as proper subjects of collective concern. The fact that
international obligations now govern a State's domestic activities
reflects developments in international law over the past fifty years,
developments that the United States has both guided and accepted.
This evolution was triggered by the harsh lessons of World War II,
during which egregious human rights violations within the
boundaries of a single nation had devastating consequences for the
entire world and contributed to international chaos. The decision to
place human rights concerns at the center of the international stage
reflected the self-interest of all nations, including the United
States. The acceptance of these norms into international law
reflects a new international consensus that such issues are of
international concern-that they do affect international, diplomatic
relations.4 39
Ultimately, of course, the clash between these two basic truths of
our constitutional system-the limited nature of our federal
triggered by U.S. death penalty practices. See Amnesty InternationalSlams U.S. Death
Penalty,Prison Conditions, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 14, 2000, availablein 2000 WL
2815053; Eric Berger, Olympics Bid Confronts Death Penalty: Boosters of 2012 Games in
HoustonDismiss CapitalPunishmentasIssue, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 28, 2000, atA37,
availablein 2000 WL4301459;BerlinDenouncesU.S. EnforcementofDeathpenalty,AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, June 24, 2000, availablein 2000 WL 2821804; Suzanne Daley, Europeans
DeploreExecutions in the U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26,2000, at A8, availablein LEXIS, News,
New York Times File; Robert Anthony Phillips, 9000 French Fight to Save Death Row
Inmate (Feb. 28, 2000), available at http'J/www.apbnews.com/cjsystem/justicenews/
2000/02/28/francedeath0228_l.html.
438. "The critical feature of all international law, new and old, for purposes of the
federalism issue is that state-level violations may result in foreign offense and retaliation
against the nation as a whole." Spiro, supra note 4, at 1252 n.130.
439. The history of the last 50 years shows a marked reluctance to employ these
constitutional powers on the part of all three branches of the federal government. Great care
has been taken to avoid clashes with advocates of greater states' rights or with opponents of
the incorporation of international norms into U.S. law. The federal government's
constitutional powers, however, are not subject to claims of "use it or lose it." Despite the
political branches' reluctance to exercise their foreign affairs powers, it remains crucial to
recognize the breadth of those powers and their strong historical roots.
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government versus federal supremacy over foreign affairs-cannot
be resolved solely by reference to the framers and their understandings of this complex interaction. At a time when the domestic
impact of foreign affairs could be confined within narrow bounds,
the framers accepted limited federal intrusion into the states'
control over criminal and other matters. Now that a vast swath of
our daily lives has the potential to impact upon foreign affairs, how
should we resolve the trade-off between local control and the need
for international consistency? As articulated by Lawrence Lessig,
applying the Constitution to this modern-day dilemma requires the
complex skills of a translator, one who not only understands the
meanings of the various words employed by the document, but who
can also40 give them meaning in our language, our culture, our
society.
We face today a world linked as never before by economic,
political, and social interdependence. New international rules of law
are developing at a rapid pace to govern these new international
relationships, administered by an expanding set of international
institutions. Ironically, after centuries of general acceptance of the
dominant role of the federal government in regulating U.S. foreign
affairs, doubts about the extent of those federal powers have been
raised just as the international community has begun to reach
consensus on the need for universal application of international
rules of law. Written by a generation of internationalists who
understood the exigencies of the law of nations and the importance
of cooperation among nations, our Constitution grants the federal
government the powers necessary to incorporate international
norms into our domestic legal system and to lead our nation into
the international world of the new century.

440. See Lessig, supra note 434, at 134.

